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STANDARDS OF DEMOCRACY

HENRY WILKES WRIGHT



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THE MORAL STANDARDS OF DEMOCRACY

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BY

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PREFACE

Man is at once a physical energy-system, a living individual, and a self-conscious person. Because of this many-sidedness of human nature the social relations of men are infinitely complex. It is easy to generalize upon the subject of these relations. But, unfortunately, it is equally easy to refute such generalizations since they are usually based upon a partial view of human nature and one need only call attention to other neglected aspects in order to expose their inadequacy.

Despite these dangers of easy and superficial generalization I have ventured in this book to set forth a definite theory of social relations. I have been encouraged to do so by the conviction that the key to the puzzling problems of human association is to be found in two fundamental facts of our human nature.

One of these is the essential community of human intelligence and will. The fact to which I refer is not simply that men do understand one another and, within limits, do coöperate. This is, of course, an obvious fact. But rather that they are able to understand one another and to coöperate by virtue of a unique property of the reason and rational will which all possess. This property we may call its community or universality; but names are frequently misleading and serve only to conjure up the ghosts of ancient controversy. The fact, however, is fundamental and undeniable: it is inseparable

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from the nature and outlook of intelligence to assume that the conclusions which it reaches as the result of serious thinking are valid for all other intelligent individuals, and this because the same standards of consistency, evidence and proof hold good for all. Or, otherwise expressed, intelligence affirms and, as intelligence, cannot help affirming, the existence of a community of thinkers all concerned with the same inclusive system of meanings. It is this property of human intelligence *and this alone* which enables us to interpret the symbols of spoken and written speech and, despite their bewildering variations, due to the endlessly different ways in which they are employed by countless numbers of individuals, to utilize them in building up one commonly accepted body of knowledge. It is this property, furthermore, which enables us to interpret the actions of others, each a distinct event having its own time and place and its own peculiar characteristics, by referring them to more general ends and purposes intelligible to us because springing from commonly understood conditions of our human experience. The same capacity of intelligence enables us to see our own actions as they must appear to others, and to judge our own desires and ambitions by general standards and in relation to the welfare of society and of mankind.

The second of these fundamental facts is that intelligence always expresses itself in bodily movement, and in this way—through the motor responses of human individuals—becomes actually effective in controlling physical forces and determining social relations. By this I do not merely mean that the conclusions which we reach in our thinking eventually and inevitably modify our

conduct, or that the conceptions and ideals of intelligence seek final realization in action. A much more radical and intimate connection than this between intelligence and action has been established by recent investigations. Doubtless intelligence first found motor expression in modifying preformed responses to external stimuli. But after it has freed itself from direct dependence upon external stimuli and comes to act with apparent independence and spontaneity, as in the case of the "higher" activities of pure thought, constructive imagination, etc., intelligence still expresses itself always and of necessity in bodily movement. The movements in this case are for the most part internal and imperceptible, "implicit" as the psychologists say, consisting of incipient movements of the larger muscles or minute, invisible movements of a special apparatus like the speech mechanism. Unquestionably the most important of these internal movements are those of the organs of speech. In no field to which intelligence applies itself are these verbal responses so significant as in that of social relations, since the speech-forms which the individual has acquired by imitation and instruction are the socially recognized symbols of meanings generally understood and acted upon. Hence although invisible and inaudible these speech-movements have the same effect that overt actions have of giving the conclusions of our intelligence an embodiment and efficacy in the world of our common perception whose uniformities of process make possible continued social collaboration and cumulative social culture.

To insist at the start that these two facts are equally fundamental to social relations may seem like beginning one's journey by trying to board two trains going in op-

posite directions. I shall be accused of combining, or attempting to combine, idealistic and naturalistic views of human association, views which are mutually inconsistent and incompatible. Admittedly, the two facts insisted upon are in some points difficult to reconcile; this is why, I suppose, most writers have felt impelled in the interests of consistency to emphasize one at the expense of neglecting or denying the other. But facts are facts; our first duty is to accord full recognition to both or all of them—in this case, to the "universality" of intelligence and also to its necessary motor expression. Then we should try to envisage their reconciliation from some more comprehensive viewpoint. It is my hope to convince readers of the present volume that these two facts or features of our human nature are not really antagonistic or mutually contradictory but rather supplement one another as opposite and complementary aspects of the one activity through which human society evolves and affords increasing satisfaction to its members.

My debt to modern idealism will be apparent to all readers who are acquainted with the development of this school of philosophic thought since the time of Kant and Hegel. It is quite certain that one may thoroughly understand the views of this school and at the same time wholly reject them. But I believe it to be equally certain that many reject with impatience these views to-day who have not taken the trouble to understand them—they being the losers thereby. Next to the writings of the great modern masters of idealism I owe most to the works of recent British idealists, especially perhaps to Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* and Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State.* Nor would I omit mention of

Royce's *Problem of Christianity* in which he so brilliantly expounds his theory of the "Beloved Community."

I wish to acknowledge a similar indebtedness to writers of the American pragmatist school. First and foremost, to the genius of William James who aroused so many of his generation from "dogmatic slumber." And also to Professors Dewey, Tufts and Bode, whose views upon the relation of thought to conduct I have found particularly suggestive and helpful.

Among books specifically concerned with the psychological basis of social relationships, I have found Professor Graham Wallas's *Great Society* most valuable. In approach to the subject and method of treatment this work by Professor Wallas has seemed to me wholly admirable and in many respects it has been a model for me. The numerous references to Professor McDougall's *Social Psychology* and *Group Mind* are indicative of the amount of help and guidance I have received from these works.

In conclusion I may perhaps confess the hope which has inspired me in writing this book, that it may in some slight way contribute to the realization of the ideal of representative democracy with whose continued development and enlarging influence as a working social system, I believe the future progress of human society is altogether bound up.

H. W. W.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	The Meaning of Democracy	1
II.	Intelligence and Instinct	24
III.	The Realization of the Social Ideal	62
IV.	The Forms of Human Association	77
V.	Discussion	88
VI.	Coöperation	112
VII.	Imaginative Sympathy	138
VIII.	Democracy and the Moral Ideal	155
IX.	The Moral Standards of Democracy	174
X.	Democracy and the Development of Social Institutions	190
XI.	Democracy and Public Opinion	205
XII.	Democracy and Education	228
XIII.	Democracy and Industry	245
XIV.	Democracy and Social Life	280
	Index	305

MORAL STANDARDS OF DEMOCRACY

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

"Democracies have fashions but no standards." We are familiar with so many facts which go to support this judgment that we are inclined to let it pass unchallenged. Indeed, the very idea of democracy, as democracy is generally understood, gives it antecedent plausibility. We know that in aristocracies an hereditary class is endowed with the material means and assured of the leisure time requisite for intellectual and æsthetic culture, for travel and observation, for perfecting the arts of social intercourse and harmonious living. And having discovered, supposedly, what is best in letters and in art, in manners, and in morals, an aristocracy acts (to employ the apt simile which Professor Ross uses in his *Social Psychology*) as "a kind of social stand-pipe from which under high pressure, refined ideas and manners are diffused through society." For it possesses the social prestige which enables it to enforce its example upon the people as a whole. Thus the regard for fair play and the dogged determination to fight the game through to the bitter end in spite of discouragements and reverses, qualities so strikingly shown by the English soldiers and civilian populace during the Great War, have been said to have their source in the aristocratic ideal

of the gentleman and the sportsman which, filtering down through successive strata, have finally pervaded the whole people.

But democracies, we know, contain no such recognized arbiters of what is excellent in life and correct in behavior. In a democracy each individual is, or has the right to be, a law unto himself in matters that concern personal culture and social intercourse. There is only one norm, so it appears, and that is the average man. And only one authority sets limits to the desires and preferences of the average man, and this is the opinion of the majority of average men. Hence democracy seems to enthrone mediocrity, to be in truth the cult of the incompetent.

These misgivings, which frequently assail us in spite of the "democratic first principles" which we profess, appear to be amply justified by the social life of our western democracies as we now observe it. The absence of rationally grounded and socially attested standards is painfully apparent in every department of life and conduct. In politics, lack of vision and steady purpose; in education, lack of unifying aim and intelligent estimation of values; in manners, lack of decorum; in dress and amusements lack of refined taste and a discriminating sense of fitness: these are the outstanding features of the social life that goes on before us in our thriving industrial cities and that is depicted on film and printed page. No doubt the gravity of the problem created by the failure, if such it be, of democracy to provide, or to permit of, any guiding ideals or controlling principles has been concealed in the immediate past by the persistence of authoritative religious standards in societies democratically organized. While it retains authority

religion may be a most influential agency of restraint and refinement among the people at large. It imposes effective restriction upon animal appetite; its field is the world which interests the believer because "white to the harvest"; it creates and maintains an ideal of conscientious and humane living. This service Puritanism performed for the North American democracies. But as a dominant religious influence Puritanism passed with the last century and now we are dismayed by the decline and threatened disappearance of moral and social standards formerly upheld by Puritan tradition, but which now possess no compelling social authority. Confusion and uncertainty reign in many departments of conduct, vulgarity is blatant, excess is unashamed; we are brought face to face with what seems to be a fatal defect of democracy itself.

And so the question of the meaning of democracy takes on a real, even an urgent, importance. If democracy means simply the counting of majorities, we have not the slightest reason for expecting it to furnish us with any standard that can claim rightful authority over the actions and preferences of the average man. For what does the will of the majority represent in the long run but the wishes of the common man? Suppose, however, that, on the contrary, the conception of democracy implies and upholds an ideal of personal character and social intercourse. Then it is not unreasonable, surely, to hope that in the course of time this will define itself in norms and standards that are generally understood and acknowledged as authoritative over the desires and ambitions of individual citizens. That democracy does imply such a social and personal ideal has largely escaped

us because of our tendency to interpret it exclusively in terms of equality. Not that we any longer believe that men are born free and equal; it is, in fact, the present fashion to deride this historic affirmation as too absurd, too utterly opposed to obvious fact, to merit serious consideration. But democracy is commonly supposed to call for, and to enforce, equality, or at least a greater measure of equality in the distribution of the good things of life that have to be divided and possessed in order to be enjoyed. Thus in the political field, democracy is understood as a system of government in which each man's vote has equal weight in the counting of majorities which possess the right to rule. And in the economic realm, democracy, if it is not thought to propose an equal division of wealth among fellow citizens (as some, indeed, appear to believe) is at least supposed to forbid too great a discrepancy in the property owned and the income enjoyed by members of the same society. Fashions in language reflect popular and prevailing modes of thought and, in the usual manner of speaking, the "democratic" person is one predisposed to ignore or to combat inequalities of wealth and political power and social distinction.

The close connection of the principle of democracy with the idea of equality in the popular mind is not without its reasons, we must acknowledge. Liberty and equality have been the watchwords of modern democracy and doubtless it is true, as President Lowell has lately pointed out,[1] that while leaders of social and political reform in the eighteenth century were more interested in liberty than in equality, radical and reforming thought to-day would enforce equality at the expense of liberty.

[1] In his *Public Opinion in War and Peace*, p. 273.

When in the language of theology we say that "all souls are equal in the eyes of God" we have reference to equality of a very fundamental sort, personal or moral equality. Now such equality is certainly implied in the ideal of democracy. By it we mean the right of all normal human beings, as possessed of the power of rational reflection and choice, to direct their own lives and to be exempt from oppression and exploitation at the hands of others. From this fundamental equality springs the moral right of every man to the same opportunity for self-expression and self-satisfaction. Few would deny, therefore, that equality in the sense of an equal opportunity or an equal consideration for all members of society is implied in the democratic ideal. These principles are after all but generalities, however; they must find expression in the working arrangements of human society if the democratic ideal is to be realized. We must be prepared to say what these opportunities are in social matter of fact, and to tell what this consideration involves and how far it extends in the case of the ordinary human individual. And when an attempt is made to answer these questions the tendency asserts itself to interpret equality in quantitative terms as equal amounts of something that can be acquired and possessed, that can be measured and divided. Even the fundamental principle of equal human rights has been construed in abstractly mathematical terms as if all human individuals figured as units equal and interchangeable in constituting the social sum total.

These difficulties arise largely because "equality" tends always to take on a merely quantitative meaning, to signify equal amounts of something, whether it be

political power or wealth or what not. It must inevitably fail, therefore, to do full justice to the meaning of democracy, if democracy means, as most of us believe, the fullest and freest and most fruitful type of human association. For human society is composed of persons, and persons not merely act and interact with one another as they, conscious individuals all, strive to secure the means of subsistence and enjoyment in the same physical world; they are also united or, more accurately, identified, by the intelligence and the intelligent interests which they share in common. *Community* rather than *equality*, therefore, is the first principle of democracy. By community is meant the participation of all members of society in a good which cannot be divided into parts that fall to the exclusive possession of their individual owners, but which, since it is by nature a common good, can only be realized jointly by a group of communicating individuals. Thus the satisfaction which this type of good yields to the individual who realizes it is not of such character as to alienate him from previous competitors for its possession; instead, it links him in conscious unity with all others who share in its realization and whose respective points of view are comprehended in the satisfaction which he enjoys. Evidently such a satisfaction is potentially extended and enriched by every increase in the manner and variety of personal standpoints from which it is understood and appreciated; since each of these differentiations of outlook and achievement may be communicated to all the participants as another and original version of the good which they jointly realize.

There are many such goods and they play an important

part in determining the activities of civilized human beings. Consider, first, the knowledge of men and things which affords increasing satisfaction to the normal individual as his intelligence matures and his judgment ripens: what is it but a translation of experience of life and the world into terms of human personality in its universal aspect? It is couched in terms generally intelligible and involves constant reference to others' testimony and constant appeal to others' points of view; it becomes increasingly satisfactory as it is communicated to others and corroborated and amplified by their expressed opinions. Or, think of the achievement of the inventor in making some new combination of natural agencies or forces to serve human purpose; his inventive faculty is stimulated and directed by what he has learned of the progress of mechanic arts and the needs of industry in his time; the satisfaction which his invention gives him is proportionate to the degree in which it is generally utilized and thus increases the power of man over the forces of his natural environment. Again, a man discovers a prospect of rare beauty on the outskirts of his city; he is not satisfied until he has shown it to his acquaintances and heard their expressions of delight and approval; his satisfaction is not complete until he has persuaded the municipal authorities to purchase the site and reserve it for a public park, thus enabling future generations of citizens to share in the enjoyment of its beauties. Or a constructive genius in industrial and social pioneering sees the commercial possibilities of an unsettled area; he builds a railway, founds cities, and develops industries; his satisfaction is measured by the growth and prosperity of the region thus opened to settlement and civilization,

by its productivity and the number of prosperous and happy residents it supports. Examples such as these of goods that are essentially common or social, and hence not to be divided but shared, might be multiplied almost indefinitely: that of the physician who discovers some new remedy or treatment for disease; of the political worker who devises some new way for making the popular will more effective, of the teacher who works out some improvement in educational method; and in all alike the satisfaction has its source in the social purpose served and increases as the successful promotion of this end makes the number of participants greater and greater. If it be said that the satisfaction of the inventor or railway builder comes primarily from the income derived from the patent on the invention, or from the increased value of holdings of land acquired for little or nothing before the railway was built, and that this wealth gained is not common nor is it shared, we can only reply that the desire for gain may or may not be present and, when it is, it is a motive entirely different from the desire for personal-social power, the desire, that is to say, to increase the power of human intelligence and will over the forces of nature which is unmistakably the primary motive in many cases and which certainly has the social reference ascribed to it.

If there are such common and truly social goods which constitute the most lasting and fertile satisfactions of human life we do, I think, gain a decided advantage in our discussions of democracy if, from the start, we understand it to be an acknowledgment of the right of every human individual to participate in their realization. To approach the subject with any such idea or conviction in

mind is, however, to invite objection and protest from several quarters. A preliminary assumption like this, that there is one common and comprehensive good, is, it will be urged, the besetting sin of social idealism. Society is just a multitude of individuals, the rock-ribbed conservative will stoutly maintain, each of whom has his own special abilities and interests, and democracy, if it means anything at all, means that all individuals are to be alike protected in the pursuit of their several legitimate interests and in the possession and enjoyment of such wealth and distinction as their respective abilities can win for them. This, the radical will indignantly deny: society, he affirms, is a group of human beings with the same natural needs, and democracy signifies that all shall share equally the material means available for meeting human need. These objections have some weight, we must admit, even after a liberal discount has been made for self-interest and partisan bias. Although the existence of such essentially social satisfactions as those just mentioned seems to be well enough established by the examples just cited of the artist and the inventor, the scientific investigator, the political leader, the educational reformer, and the industrial organizer, still their precise character and place in the scheme of social relations has further to be explained. And this explanation must be forthcoming if community is to stand as the fundamental principle of democracy. Moreover, there is no use pretending that we obtain from conceptions like community any ready-made solution of the vexed problems which have brought the the idea of equality to the fore in the field of political and economic relations. Indeed, these very activities of participation in the fields of knowledge and practice, of feel-

ing and imagination, may well require for their unimpeded and fruitful operation equality in these and other senses. But this conception of democracy as participation in an inclusive social good does set these problems of the distribution of material wealth, political power, and social prestige, in their proper perspective and thus save us from such an obsession with their importance as would tempt us to formulate social relations in terms of abstract or arithmetical equality.

And if, furthermore, the proposed conception is *normative*, indicating the ideal and objective of democracy rather than describing it in any form which it has yet assumed, this is by no means a fatal drawback. It has the decided advantage of emphasizing the moral bearing of the democratic principle. For if it is true that the concern of morality is with men's highest good and this is identical with those comprehensive social satisfactions in which democracy insists that every human person has the right to participate, why then it follows that moral idealism and social democracy have important common ground: both are interested in the conditions, social, political and economic, under which this supreme and all-comprehensive good may be realized by the mass of mankind.

My proposal, then, is that as a preliminary to further discussion we understand by democracy the fullest and freest and most comprehensive type of human association, an association made possible by the intelligence and will which is common to all men. This community of human intelligence is witnessed, as we have seen, by the appeal and authority of certain universal ends or ideals in whose realization all men can participate. But in connection

with these very ideals of truth and beauty, of technical mastery and personal fellowship, another and more serious difficulty arises which must be confronted at the start because it threatens the success of any attempt to approach the problem of social relations from the standpoint we propose to adopt. "Absolute" or "universal" ideals such as these, we shall be told, are no longer recognized by psychologists and sociologists as operative influences in human conduct and social affairs: they have been cast aside by contemporary thought as the veriest abstractions, the abstractions of an obsolete metaphysics. Social relations, it will be said, result from the conscious interaction of intelligent human individuals. Intelligence in the case of each one finds expression in aims and interests which in a greater or less degree direct his action, and these purposes involve more or less consideration for the interests and activities of others. But in the case of each actual human individual his dominant aims and interests are determined by his own native dispositions and aptitudes, and the form they take is relative to the conditions and circumstances of his life. If, as an Einstein, he devotes himself to the discovery of truth in a highly technical and abstruse field, this means that he pursues an interest of a highly specialized sort which allies him with others who have a similar interest, but the interest itself and the activity to which it gives rise are simply the response of his own individual nature to the situation and surroundings in which it finds itself. Or if, like an Edison, he applies his powers to mechanical invention, this means that he has adopted a sharply circumscribed aim to whose formation many factors have contributed, some of the most important being social, but the part

which each has played is peculiar to his own individual case and situation. Many individuals do, therefore, have similar interests, and the similarity of interest naturally leads to coöperation, especially where, as in the case of artist, or inventor, or scientific investigator, the interest has a pronounced social bearing. But to talk of universal ideals that appeal to all men as rational is to pay ourselves with high-sounding words; such ideals are too general, too vague and insubstantial, to have any vital connection with the springs of action.

There is a good deal behind the contemporary polemic against moral and social idealism — more than can be taken account of at the present introductory stage. Hence a fuller discussion of some of the issues involved must be postponed to later chapters. But, on first thought at least, the state of mind thus indicated, which is common enough in our day, is surely surprising. The most characteristic and consequential human experiences are those of personal association in which we adjust our actions and our speech to the thought and conduct of others whom we assume to be governed, like ourselves, by ends which we can understand and which have in the minds of those who pursue them a definite and intelligible relation to the ends which we pursue. The ideals in question, those of Truth and Beauty, for example, are noteworthy precisely because in them this personal or social aspect is most pronounced; in this they are distinguished from the interests that concern the individual more narrowly. They depend for their realization upon the exercise of capacities which function in the wider field of social intelligence and which call constantly for corroboration and confirmation in this field. And these most

important and distinctive of human experiences have come to appear most nebulous and unreal.

If personal and moral idealism has suffered discredit in these latter days, it must hold itself largely to blame. For it invested these supreme ideals, for which it claimed a universal appeal and an absolute authority, with an abstract and supernatural character which effectually divorced them from the exigencies and interests of every-day human existence. Truth it represented as an insight into eternal verities behind the veil of sense and beyond the vicissitudes of time, instead of the progressive realization by the social intelligence of men of the structure and the potencies of the world in which it finds itself. Beauty it likewise conceived as in essence not merely supersensible but supernatural, the light of the eternal illuminating with transient gleams the world of sense. Most important in confirming historic idealism in its supernaturalistic and other-worldly character was its determined refusal to find a personal, and therefore a universal, value in outward action, particularly in industrial pursuits. Influenced perhaps by the stigma attached to manual labor, perhaps by the theological prejudice against the material and the utilitarian, it never recognized the possible value of man's everyday struggle to wrest from nature a scanty subsistence as a means of personal discipline and culture, but regarded this latter as exclusively the product of scholarly leisure exempt from the grinding compulsions of daily toil. Yet, as we shall see, industry may be both creative and coöperative, allying men in a unity of purpose and giving to each a realizing sense of the power of concerted endeavor.

If democracy means the opportunity to participate in

a common good and such participation is made possible by the presence in man of certain qualities of reason and will which make him a social being in the true sense, it follows that the ideal of democracy merely brings to clear light the principles on which all human association rests. Social phenomena are so frequently explained as the result of this or that trait or disposition in human nature that we are in danger of forgetting the one condition most necessary: an *intelligence* by virtue of which the individual sees himself as one of a group or class of similar beings, and a *will* which chooses among ends recognized to have value and significance for others as well as for self. The savage who obeys the custom of his people acts with a consciousness of his membership in the tribe and with the knowledge that his act will meet the approval of his fellows and (as he believes) will bring the blessings of his ancestors and ancestral deities; if he decides to risk disobedience, he sees himself in the opposite social situation and takes courage, perhaps, from the thought that others, or certain others, among his clansmen would do the same. Early in the history of human thought the great philosophers of Greece recognized that social and political relationships are expressions of the rational nature of man. This social intelligence was given a limited scope, it is true, by even the greatest Greek thinkers, being confined in its range to the Greek communities and never including the slave or barbarian. But, within these limits, the rational life they understood as the life of the citizen simply because the standpoint of reason was the standpoint of the whole. In modern times this fundamental social fact was recognized afresh in the "social contract" theory that human

society is based upon a voluntary agreement entered into by men early in the history of the race whereby individuals willingly surrendered to one central authority rights which they had hitherto exercised as individuals, in order to save themselves from aggression and violence and to secure for themselves the advantages of law and order. While this is a mistaken view of the origin of society it has the merit of basing human association upon the rational will of mankind.

Although they grasped so clearly the fundamental principle of social relationships, these earlier thinkers were heavily handicapped by the prevailing ignorance of the bodily structures and activities through which intelligence gains expression. Of the development of intelligence as a function of the living organism and of its relation to the variety of physical stimuli which affect the sense organs and call forth some motor adjustment, next to nothing was known. In this new knowledge of the workings of the psycho-physical organism of man which has resulted from the discovery of organic evolution and the advances in biological and psychological science which have followed from the work of Darwin, the outstanding facts are perhaps those that relate to instinct. This term (which had been loosely used in popular speech to signify any action or capacity to act which, without intelligent direction or control, accurately and certainly attained its result) was given a new and definite scientific meaning. It was employed to signify an inherited pathway of nervous transmission leading from a sense organ through the central nervous system to a muscle or system of muscles in virtue of which the living individual on perceiving an object feels an interest in it and responds to

its presence by a definite and predetermined movement. Hence the living organism which is equipped by heredity with a full complement of instincts possesses from birth a set of ready-made instruments for adjusting its behavior to the objects of its physical environment and also to other living individuals. Thus with men as well as the lower animals a strange object moving swiftly into the field of vision arouses an impulse to flight or concealment; a food-object evokes the movements of approach and seizure, of swallowing and ingestion; a forcible restraint of limb or body calls forth struggles and kicks and blows: they possess, as we say, the instincts of fear and food and anger. Certain instincts, commonly distinguished as social, have for their requisite stimulus the presence and distinguishing marks of individuals of the same species to which they respond with appropriate movements. Chief among these are the instincts of sex and parenthood, the gregarious and pugnacious instincts, the instincts of self-assertion and submission, and the instinctive tendencies to sympathize with, and to imitate. It is now recognized that man possesses a full complement of instincts including the social, although in the case of the human individual who is past infancy they are modified almost beyond recognition through the effect of experience in connection with growing intelligence.

The new knowledge of instinct and instinctive behavior of which Darwin laid the foundation has influenced human psychology in a profound way. It has related the human mind more closely and definitely to animal intelligence and it has encouraged a tendency to describe the mental activity of man in terms of behavior rather than consciousness. Particularly in their bearing upon human

conduct have the newly discovered facts about instinct proved illuminating; we seem, indeed, to find in these inherited action patterns an explanation of the principal modes of human conduct and of the springs of human action as well. And since social psychology is concerned primarily with the interaction of human individuals in the same physical environment, it is not surprising that instinct should seem to furnish the natural cause required to explain their modes of behavior. Nor can it be denied that the operation of instinct, principally, of course, the so-called social instincts, does, on first appearance at least, furnish an explanation of the leading forms of human association. There is an "instinct of kind" in men which draws groups of them together and keeps them in contact and communication with one another. The presence of identical instincts which react similarly to the same stimulus accounts for the simpler forms of concerted action: the food instinct strong in all members of the group would cause them to hunt together when signs of game were discovered in their vicinity; the hunting pack is, in the opinion of some authorities, the earliest form of social union. The instincts of sex and parenthood have operated to produce another form of social organization, that of the family or the kinship group, higher because it involves complementary functions, reciprocal activities, and mutual interdependence. The constructive instinct in connection with instinctive tendencies to imitate and to experiment accounts for the beginnings of coöperative industry. The instincts of leadership and submission, strongly stimulated by the emergencies of the hunt and the fight, or manifested in connection with the dominant function of the parent in

the family group, are cause of the first simple forms of political organization and go far to explain the tremendous part played by the principle of authority in the social affairs of men.

One single consideration, however, is sufficient to dispel the thought that we have in instinct, whether social or self-regarding, the key to human association. This is that the instincts in question have precisely the same effect among some of the higher animals, of assembling them in groups, of impelling them to concerted activities, of establishing recognized authority. Yet we do not think of any of these animal groups as societies in the "true" sense: we do not dream of regarding any of these relationships as "really" social. Many ruminant animals are highly gregarious; they feed together, rally for common defense at the warning signal given by the sentinel, or rush *en masse* in headlong flight. Wolves hunt in packs and one is frequently the recognized leader. In many species of carnivorous animals and among the apes, the sex and parental instincts serve to constitute and keep intact for a time the family group. Beavers work together in the construction of their houses and the ant colony is a proverbial model of coördinated activity and coöperative industry. In the seal rookery the eldest male rules effectively if somewhat boisterously over his mates and the younger generations. Evidently then, the distinctive features of the social relationship as we humans know it must be sought elsewhere than in the interactions between living beings brought about by instinct.

What is distinctive and humanly valuable in the social relations of men is not to be found, we must conclude, in coördinations of behavior that can be referred

more or less directly to instincts which produce similar effects in the behavior of the higher animals, but rather in the conscious intelligence that accompanies and controls these relations. But even after the problem of the human association has been admitted to be a problem of the social *mind*, the commanding influence of the biological point of view has been such as to cause students of social psychology to single out as illustrative of the social mind states of consciousness that could be exhibited as effects of instinctive social reactions and with which, consequently, reason and will could have little to do. Thus we all know that the individuals who compose the typical mob tend to lose self control and the power of individual judgment: they respond sympathetically to the feeling shown by others and are finally overcome by the contagion of emotion; they let down the bars erected by reason and will and lay themselves open to suggestion from any source; they yield to any striking show of leadership and take part in performances which, when restored to normal mind, they repudiate and condemn. Thus the man who in his normal frame of mind would shrink from the thought of aiming a blow or firing a shot at a fellow man will, as member of a lynching mob, take active part not merely in the killing, but even in the torturing of some wretched, supplicating human being. This state of mind is certainly social in the sense that it is due to the presence and influence of others. Undoubtedly it owes its intensity to the stirring of fundamental social instincts and instinctive tendencies: the gregarious instinct plays a part; sympathy and imitation and suggestion come into play; instinctive fear and submission in the presence of ostentatious leadership

alternate with hot impulses to self-assertion and summary vengeance.

Because they exhibit the working of the same factors that produce mob-mind the spread of fads and crazes and the cycle of fashion were described and exploited by the social psychologists of a generation ago. Indeed, the influence of Tarde, LeBon and the "imitation school" of social psychologists was so strong and pervasive that the social mind came to be conceived mainly in terms of imitation, sympathy, and suggestion. These studies brought to light important facts and called forth interesting theories to explain them. But they rested, nevertheless, upon a fundamental fallacy: the erroneous assumption that because individual character is the work of reason and will, the social mind is to be found in those regions of consciousness farthest removed from clear intelligence and social control. Thus the social relations of man were made to depend not upon his most highly developed and characteristic capacities of mind, but rather upon a lower grade of mentality more closely connected with the instinctive basis of organic life.

"Crowd psychology" seems to have been but a passing stage in the scientific study of the social mind. To-day there is widespread agreement among competent investigators that man is a social animal because he is a rational animal or, perhaps more clearly, that human association takes the form which it does because of the control which intelligence has gained over the conduct of man. Even Professor Ross, who stresses the importance of suggestion, fad and fashion, as illustrative of the lower forms of imitation, recognizes that they give place as social evolution proceeds to rational imitation, depending

upon intelligent investigation, rational deliberation, and free discussion.[2] While Baldwin follows Tarde in giving a large place to imitation, he neverthless makes it a subordinate factor in the dominant process of intelligent selection. In Professor Cooley's illuminating study of *Human Nature and the Social Order* society is represented as the collective aspect of personal thought, its *locus* being human thought considered in the largest way as having a growth and an organization extending through the ages. Society exists, Professor Maciver affirms,[3] wherever human beings enter into, or maintain, *willed* relations with one another. Professor Graham Wallas, while deploring the social ills which were fostered by the intellectualistic bias of political and economic theory in the early nineteenth century, fears that the loose "anti-intellectualism" which now threatens to take its place will prove infinitely more dangerous to the twentieth century.[4] Intelligence he holds to be as truly a part of our inherited nature and as independent a cause of action as any of the instincts,[5] and he believes that the hope of progress in civilized society depends upon its direction by thought rather than by "instinctive inference."[6]

But the fact remains that all social activities have their apparent origin in the bodily movements of human individuals. No matter how intricate and far-reaching and marvellously efficacious such activities may be, whether the working of a great power plant, or a system of public

2 *Cf.* Ross, *Social Psychology.*
3 *Cf.* Maciver, *Community,* p. 5.
4 Wallas, *The Great Society,* p. 43.
5 *Op. Cit.* p. 45.
6 *Op. Cit.* p. 227.

education or a method of popular government, they all go back to the motor responses of individual human beings, from the sledge-hammer blow to the lightest touch of typewriter key or electric button. But the motor responses of human individuals are originally determined by instinct or reflex, that is to say, by the action patterns which heredity incorporates in the human nervous system. And the instinctive response, as we have seen, is always evoked by an external stimulus which acts at a specific time and place upon the sense organs of a particular individual and takes the form of a bodily movement which is itself a physical event limited like all physical events to its own place and time in the world process. But intelligence, on the contrary, requires no such external stimulus to call it into activity; it is in some very real sense internally or centrally aroused. It is furthermore not limited in its scope to the present situation of the individual in whom it is active but includes within its view the thinker's own past, perhaps the past experience of the race or even the history of the natural universe, and extends its vision as well into the near or the distant future. Nor is its field that of the physical or social environment of the thinker; it may be that of the world or of the social organization of humanity or of the vastnesses of the cosmical system. How to relate these two, instinct and intelligence, to understand their functional interdependence and coöperation, how, as Professor Graham Wallas puts it, to project them on to the same plane, is a problem of utmost difficulty. We know that they do interact, and more than this, they do coöperate in most intimate functional interdependence, but how? The arctic explorer dying in his tent from cold

and hunger responds instinctively to the hostile forces of his physical environment with feeble and futile movements to protect himself from the encroaching cold and to extract some particles of nourishment from crumbs of food and bits of skin and leather But as he tries to write the closing word of his diary, his mind ranges freely over the circumstances of the march, the history of his expedition, the events of his own life, the devotion of his family and the uncertainty of their future, and his own place in the glorious annals of polar exploration in his own country and the world.

CHAPTER II

INTELLIGENCE AND INSTINCT

The contrast between the spontaneity and scope of our thought and the physical limitations under which we act is illustrated by the most familiar facts of daily experience. As I sit at my desk I may think at will of my several friends in a nearby city, recall recent meetings with them, imagine what their opinions will be upon some political question that has just arisen, and frame arguments that I assume they would understand and believe they would be convinced by. But if I wish to talk to one of them this morning, I must take up the telephone at my elbow, make the requisite movements, in prescribed sequence, of arm and hand and head and vocal organs, or I shall not get my connection or hear my friend's voice. This wide difference which approaches diametrical opposition in what is most distinctive and characteristic of mental activity on the one hand and of bodily movement on the other must be clearly grasped if we are to gain any understanding of their functional interdependence. It was this opposition, or apparent opposition, of character that led philosophers and psychologists of previous times to define mind and body in such a way as to render their interaction inconceivable. We are in little danger of going to this extreme nowadays for we live in an empirical age and no logical demonstration, no matter how

rigorous, will make us forget the everyday fact that our intelligence and the motor mechanisms of our bodies do always work together in determining our conduct. Provided that we keep this fundamental fact firmly in mind we shall find it advantageous as a preliminary step to take account of the radical difference between the mental and the physical factors in human conduct, since only thus can we prepare ourselves for an insight into their complementary and reciprocal relations.

The freedom and the range of thought are its outstanding features. The searchlight of intelligence sweeps over the shadowy past and penetrates the darkness of the future; it illuminates objects far-distant from, and quite inaccessible to, the thinker, as well as those near to his hand. The Egypt of Tutankhamen and the men of the early stone age interest the thought of the day as well as German reparations and the growth of revolutionary socialism. Modern science confidently describes the plan and arrangement of the physical universe whose outlines and proportions man, with his limitations of position and perceptual faculty, never has seen and never can see. It also explores the inner constitution of the atom and in this field also discovers facts equally inaccessible to human observation. All this pertains to the field, the subject matter, of thought; but intelligence claims for its procedure and its findings a validity that is likewise universal. Thus the conclusions reached by the solitary thinker and known only to him can, if derived by methods of which intelligence approves, lay claim to the authority of truth. And truth is universal: what is true for one thinker is true for all who possess intelligence. Indeed such a reference to the community of intelligence is nec-

essarily implied in all thinking. When I really *think*, I take for granted, and cannot help taking for granted, the existence of other minds capable of understanding my ideas and compelled to accept my conclusions so far as they are logically derived. But intelligence while it thus moves in a world of universal meanings always occupies a uniquely individual point of view. While I assume that my ideas and beliefs are intelligible to other minds I recognize them as in a peculiar sense my own. While I assume that the objects of my thought are the actual or possible objects of others' thought I am always conscious of viewing them from an angle peculiar to myself. Nor are these two features of intelligence, its universal scope and its exclusively individual point of view, really inconsistent with one another. On the contrary, they are complementary and interdependent; I am conscious of my opinions as my own only against the background of general intelligence; I know myself as an individual only when I acknowledge my membership in the social community.

If we turn now to consider instinctive reaction, we note that its outstanding features are the very reverse of those possessed by intelligence. While we have not the same direct knowledge of the working of instinct that we have of the workings of our own minds, these features in which it differs so radically from the latter are familiar enough to admit of brief statement. An instinctive response is an event in the physical world and, like all other such events, occurs at a particular time and place. The child's cry of terror, like the crash of thunder that evoked it, are both physical events, confined like all physical events to the particular time and place of their occur-

rence. And the instinctive response is linked with other events which condition it in the life history of the organism, just as the sequence of vital processes that occur in this particular organism falls within the comprehensive natural order with its uniformities of cause and effect. So at least the instinctive response appears in its aspect of physical event.

Intelligence and instinct seem upon first examination to belong to different worlds. But advancing psychological science is toning down the sharpness of the contrast between the two; it has brought them into the same world and within speaking distance of one another. Intelligence has been shown to express itself through movements within the body, minute and (for the most part) invisible movements of the organs of oral and written speech, gestures, changes of facial expression and slight movements of the larger muscles, all of which latter have come to symbolize the meanings originally expressed through language. For these discoveries we are indebted to a vigorous and aggressive movement among contemporary psychologists called "behaviorism." Behaviorism, as defined by Professor Watson, the leader of the movement, is the view that the goal of psychology as a natural science is the prediction and control of behavior and that in the pursuit of this aim it can dispense with consciousness in the psychological sense.[1] There can be no doubt that great advantage has accrued to psychology from this study of mind in terms of response to stimulus. For one thing it understands mind as *activity*; its interpretation is dynamic and functional; its unit is the men-

[1] Watson, *Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, 1914, pp. 1, 27.

tal action or reaction and not that abstraction of structural analysis, the elementary "mental process." Then, too, in the field of social intercourse and interaction with which nine-tenths of our mental activity is concerned, we have to remember that mind is effective only through its overt expression in bodily movement, and it contributes immeasurably to our understanding of the social interplay to have exact knowledge of the complicated systems and sequences of motor response, overt and implicit, through which the purposes of intelligence find realization.[2]

Hence the student of social and ethical problems should acknowledge with gratitude his ever-growing debt to behavioristic psychology. But in so doing he incurs no obligation to follow behaviorism to the extreme of dispensing with consciousness or of refusing to profit by the light which its immediate testimony throws upon his subject. Such a procedure may or may not be justified as a method of approach and investigation within the province of psychology proper, but to adopt a negative policy[3] like this in the investigation of social and political, moral and religious, experience, would be suicidal. It is not that "objective," in this case, from-the-outside, explanations are necessarily untrue in these fields; they are inadequate and, beyond a certain point, unilluminating. Any purposive action like choosing and buying a hat may be viewed as a reaction sequence, but it may also be viewed as the attainment of an end chosen

[2] For a further discussion of behaviorism in its relation to social psychology, *cf.* Supplementary Note at the end of this chapter.

[3] As Professor Woodworth says: "There is no sense in such negative principles. Let us accumulate psychological facts by any method that will give us the facts." *Psychology,* 1921, p. 13.

in preference to other recognized possibilities because it offers or promises to possess certain sought-for advantages or desirable qualities such as (in the case of the hat) becoming shape, durability, and suitable, pleasing material. The second view is, to be sure, incomplete without the first, but if our explanations are really to illuminate the world of personal and social intercourse, the reaction-sequence, from the implicit verbal responses of deliberation and calculation to the overt act of paying the money and putting on the hat, must be conceived as the realization of an intelligently conceived and deliberately adopted *purpose*. It is likewise possible to understand our thoughts and ideational activities as "nothing more than a subtle and symbolic repeating of responses previously performed upon some object or situation."[4] But if we are to understand the progress of human knowledge and take a profitable part as individuals in the collective thinking of our time, it is far more helpful to understand thinking as an activity which strives by an analysis and synthesis of the data of experience to attain to a view of the real world at once comprehensive and consistent. Finally it is a fact that the student of human conduct in its social and moral bearings has the support of many competent authorities in the field of psychology in thus availing himself of the results of the introspective study of consciousness as well as the newly discovered and important facts of behavior.[5]

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[4] Quoted from a keenly-reasoned and clearly-formulated statement of the behaviorist viewpoint in psychology, by Professor J. R. Kantor. *Cf. A Tentative Analysis of the Primary Data of Psychology*, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XVIII, No. 10, p. 268.

[5] For example: Pillsbury, *Essentials of Psychology*, p. 5; Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 13; McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 26.

If, then, intelligence has its accompaniment and expression in bodily movement, it is no less true that the instinctive response on its side proves not to be the unvarying, mechanically-conditioned result of the stimulus which occasioned it. It is accompanied by consciousness and, in all except its early stages, is guided by a perception of the stimulating object. Thus the infant of a few months who is prompted by the food instinct to wave his arms, move his lips, and show other signs of eagerness and excitement when the glass containing his daily allowance of orange juice comes within his range of vision, reacts to the stimulus, yes; but to the stimulus *as he perceives it*. His perception is an interpretation of the stimulating object in terms of his past experience of it, in this case pleasant. When the spoon was first put to his lips he was conscious of its touch but did not perceive it as an object with definite qualities to distinguish it. The contents of the spoon evoked the first of the instinctive reflexes involved in swallowing and, since the taste was pleasant and not disagreeable or nauseous, these continued on to completion. As the experience is repeated each day the different sensations induced, the color pattern of glass and spoon, the pressure of the spoon upon the lips and tongue tip, the sweetness and fragrance of the orange juice, connect themselves with the feel of the swallowing reflexes and gradually the stimulating object, glass and spoon, begin to be perceived very dimly as something, or (as we say) containing something good to eat. So perceptions develop, and speedily develop, as the result of instinctive reactions. At four or five months, the babe connects the visual appearance of objects with the motor adjustments of arm and hand required to touch and

grasp them; he is then able to perceive the candy stick as something to be grabbed and put to the lips or the rattle as an object to be picked up and shaken.

We now begin to understand the part played by perception in the operation of instinct. This is nothing less than the reorganization of the stimulus in the light of its future possible consequences.[6] And when future consequences thus become operative in the control of present behavior, intelligence comes upon the scene. Perception serves to locate the object in the field of vision, mapping out the movements required to approach or avoid it, and also to indicate the qualitatively distinct satisfactions it promises or the special dangers it threatens. It is at once a program of movement and a promise of satisfaction (if only the satisfaction of escape). In as much, moreover, as it presents all this in the form of ideal or future possibility it opens the way to a modification of the prospective response in the interests of a fuller satisfaction. It is remarkable how soon the experienced results of action, pleasant or unpleasant, are effective in modifying the instinctive response that led to them. Even before the possibilities of the situation are bodied forth in a definite perception, experienced consequences affect the action of instinct. If castor oil is substituted for, or mixed with, the orange juice on one day, the infant's reaction to his customary spoonful of the latter will on the following day be modified even though he cannot as yet have formed anything like a clear perception of it. Of course

[6] The clearest and most helpful explanation I have found of the function of consciousness, and particularly perception, in human behavior is given by Prof. B. H. Bode in his essay, "Consciousness and Psychology," in the volume, *Creative Intelligence*, p. 228.

this effect of experienced consequences upon the operation of instinct is much more pronounced when they are incorporated in perception. Thus the child comes to perceive the stove as burning hot and the cat as liable to scratch. A step further is taken when he perceives certain objects as things forbidden, that is to say, leading to punishment, if he yields to their attractions. In this last case the intelligence which manifests itself in perception not merely directs instinct so as to secure the maximum of satisfaction, but also controls instinct so that its expression may not deprive the individual of another instinctive satisfaction. The child who on account of greediness or untidiness is sent away in disgrace from the family table to finish his meal in the kitchen suffers in his place of exile as he hears the laughter and talk from the dining room because his gregarious and sympathetic instincts are denied their normal expression; he learns in consequence so to behave himself as to satisfy his appetite for food while at the same time enjoying the sociability of the family circle.

Thus we reach a first conclusion as to the reciprocal functions of instinct and intelligence. Instincts are inborn action patterns common to men and many animal species which bring about those adjustments of organism to environment necessary for the continued existence of the individual or the species, with the pleasant consciousness that may be supposed to accompany continuing organic life. The instinctive response evoked by any particular object or situation consequently preserves or tends to preserve the life or vital interest of the individual in that particular situation at that particular moment. But the life of the individual maintains itself in many

situations and extends through a succession of moments prolonging themselves into days and months and years. And the action which is beneficial and satisfying in the present situation taken by itself may well bring a greater amount of injury and pain in the future. Then, too, conditions change in ways not strikingly obvious but very important in their bearing upon the vital well-being of the organism which must cope with them, and instinct, reacting to them in their more superficial aspect, works harm rather than good to the individual. At this juncture intelligence takes control and directs instinctive responses so that they may subserve and promote the welfare of the individual during the whole of his life including the future as well as the present. This entails an adjustment or organization of activities which, in so far as it is successful, assures each instinctive desire of that degree of expression and satisfaction which is consistent with the due and proportionate satisfaction of all the others. So intelligence, while it controls and regulates single instinctive impulses does so in order to secure a measure of satisfaction for all instincts; while it rules over instincts, it does so in order to serve them. This view of the complementary functions of intelligence and instinct is widely accepted to-day. It is given forcible expression by Professor McDougall in an early chapter of his *Social Psychology* (although, as we shall see, the import of his statements is greatly modified by the later interpretation which he places upon facts). "The instinctive impulses," he says, "determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but

a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means." [7]

No doubt this view has many facts to support it, and marks a decided advance in our understanding of human nature. The insight to which it gives expression will save us from many of the errors and fallacies of former days. We shall not fall victim again to that ancient fallacy of supposing that human nature is motivated by the single desire to gain pleasure and avoid pain, or that equally venerable error of thinking that if the desire of our "lower" nature for pleasure meets any opposition it is from the intuitive deliverance of some higher faculty such as conscience was supposed to be. We know that the human nature with which we are born is attuned in a much more sensitive and intricate fashion to its environment: in virtue of our physical inheritance we are responsive not merely to what offers safety and subsistence but also to what is novel and striking, to what imposes restraint or threatens injury, to what is decaying and noxious, to what asserts superiority or confesses inferiority, to the presence of fellow humans, to difference in sex, to the appeal of weakness and helplessness, and to many other external stimuli. And these natural impulses determine both the objects we perceive and the ends we desire.

Still, this view, if accepted without further modification or addition, leaves out of account the distinctive and salient feature of intelligence. Reference has already been made to the fact that its concern is not with the

[7] McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1916, p. 44.

passing states of the organism which it inhabits but with the objective and universal meaning of things. It selects from the changing world of sense perception, qualities and relations of permanent interest and import, and recognizes objects as they reappear in different guises and settings as possessed of these distinguishing characteristics. Thus on the basis of their common and essential attributes and relations, it classifies and correlates particular objects and events, forming conceptions of them which in their turn are organized into the system of knowledge or truth. The child thinks of a variety of objects as all "good to eat," the scientist classifies them as proteids, carbohydrates, etc., but the intellectual process is the same in both cases. Now these conceptions which intelligence forms may be said to be universal in two senses.[8] In the first place, they are universal in the sense of being comprehensive: they correlate and organize a number of particular qualities and occurrences and relations. And just because they are thus comprehensive and formulate the permanent and essential features of the external world as it relates itself to the needs and faculties of man, these conceptions are universal in the second sense of being valid for intelligence in general. That is to say, they are universally true; they can be understood and verified by all intelligent individuals. Hence the fact is that man is able to conceive of all objects, not even excepting himself, in terms which are universal because they reflect the unity of that intelligence which comprehends the successive experiences of his passing existence and identifies him with his fellows in a still more comprehensive rational community. So it is that

[8] *Cf.* Supplementary Note at the end of this chapter.

each one of us as a human individual knows himself not merely as a bundle of instinctive tendencies pressing for satisfaction, or even as a moving equilibrium or harmony of instinctive desires, but as a citizen or farmer or lawyer, a Christian or a free-thinker, a liberal or a conservative, a humanitarian or a champion of the white race. In this way he objectifies himself as the member of a class, the representative of a profession, the exponent of a religion, possessing, or professing the characteristics common to the members of his class or group. Now this ability of human intelligence to take the universal point of view has important practical corollaries. For there are recognized duties of citizenship, of parenthood, of professional honor, of Christian piety. Hence the universally valid conceptions which intelligence frames may in some cases become universally authoritative ideals.

But at once the question arises: How can these conceptions or ideals of intelligence, no matter how universal they are, call forth the actions required to realize them if the sole source of motive power, the only spring of human action, is to be found in instinct? Professor McDougall has an answer to this question which modifies his initial position by giving to intelligence the power of enlisting instinct in the service of its own purposes. By what force or strategy does intelligence perform this feat of turning its natural master into its servant? How does it utilize the motive force of instinct in the support of its own ends? Through the instrumentality of the *sentiment*, Professor McDougall answers.[9] A sentiment is a mental complex having for its nucleus the idea of an object which in the course of experience has gained

[9] McDougall, *Op. Cit.*, chap. v.

the power of arousing and correlating a number of instincts that impart to it the emotional appeal and motive force required to make it an end of active pursuit. So persons of our acquaintance may become objects of the sentiment of love: whenever thought of, they call forth a number of instincts, not only the "tender emotion" but fear (of any imagined harm befalling them), anger (at the thought of any one's injuring them), curiosity (as to everything they do or may do), etc. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the preponderating influence of intelligence in the organization of sentiments is furnished by the fact that the opposite sentiment of hate arouses precisely the same emotions (love excepted) only in differently understood relations: fear of the injury the hated individual may do us, anger at the thought of past wrongs and insults, curiosity as to possible evil intentions, etc.

Intelligence gains a general control over the conduct of human beings, Professor McDougall holds, by means of a particular sentiment which he calls the self-regarding sentiment.[10] This is the idea of the self in its social relations with a group of powerful instinctive impulses organized about it. This sentiment is the product of social experience and slowly develops from its first beginnings in early childhood in consequence of parental discipline and the exercise of social authority. Being subjected to discipline within the family circle the child soon comes to think of himself as an accountable being subject to punishment and reward. This idea of himself as liable to suffer punishment comes to his mind when he is impelled by natural instinct to do some forbidden thing like help-

[10] *Op. Cit.*, p. 174.

ing himself to food from the cupboard, and is effective in inhibiting the impulse.[11] This, however, is but the first step in self-control. As the result of continuous social criticism and censure from parents, teachers, and others, the self-regarding sentiment develops into the idea of the self as a responsible member of the community and, as such, justly subject to praise and blame.[12] At this stage the idea of the self calls to its support not merely instinctive fear but a number of other powerful instincts as well. There is first the instinct of submission, different from fear and called forth by the thought of the social authority in its unquestioned superiority over the individual. Submission is reinforced by instinctive self-assertion, not simple pride, but pride tinged with submission, the self-satisfaction which comes from having met the exactions of rightful authority. Active sympathy also plays a part, itself a combination of passive sympathy and the gregarious instinct, an instinctive disposition to maintain or restore a harmony of feeling with human associates. Finally instinctive love comes to support the idea of the self so acting as to please those persons in positions of superiority who happen to be objects of tender regard as well.

Thus intelligence rapidly rises to a position of command over instinct. When two instincts like self-assertion and pity, or anger and submission, come into conflict, the victory is not sure to go to the one intrinsically stronger for the weaker impulse may be reinforced (and so given prevailing power) by some impulse arising from within the self-regarding sentiment. Indeed, the essential

[11] *Op. Cit.*, p. 178.
[12] *Op. Cit.*, pp. 187–208.

mark of volition or will power, according to Professor McDougall, is just this reinforcement of the weaker motive by the idea of the self and the system of instinctive impulses which it brings into play.[13] A further development of the self-regarding sentiment is described in which the human individual by the exercise of his own critical and constructive intelligence frees himself from the domination of conventional social standards and forms his own ideal of perfection in conduct and character. But, at this higher stage, intelligence still works under social influences of a more remote and refined character and the resulting ideal is always that of the self playing to a social gallery whether of admired acquaintances, personages of history, heroes of fiction, or the Divine Spectator.[14]

We take then a second step in understanding the relation of intelligence and instinct when, following Professor McDougall, we recognize that intelligence by virtue of its capacity to form general and comprehensive ideas is able to evoke, organize and direct a number of instincts. And it is undeniable that reason is able to form ideas sufficiently general and comprehensive to include the various objects of many different instinctive desires; such, indeed, are the ideas one forms of himself, of a beloved friend, of his family or nation. If we rest content with this insight, however, we leave much unexplained. It is unsatisfactory because it fails to bring intelligence and instinct into any really organic connection. Intelligence is restricted to the work of its own field, that of correlating ideas in more and more complex

[13] *Op. Cit.*, p. 249.
[14] *Op. Cit.*, p. 257.

and comprehensive systems according to the principle of logical consistency. Some of these ideas are comprehensive enough to enlist in their own support several instincts whose natural objects are included within the scope of their meaning. And to the prompting and direction of these instincts are committed the motor activities, often complicated, arduous and long sustained, by which the ends of intelligence are realized. In two respects this view falls short. In the first place, it supposes that if the ideals of intelligence are to be realized, they must somehow call into action the motive force of a requisite number of sufficiently powerful instincts. This introduces an irrational element at a critical juncture in the rational control of human behavior — instinct is, as it were, tricked into rendering a service toward which it has no natural inclination. That this is not a hypercritical fancy is borne out by Professor McDougall's own account of the development of the self-regarding sentiment. It is not out of keeping with the facts to say that the idea of the self as subject to social praise or reward, to social censure or punishment, would call into play the instincts of fear, of self-assertion, of submission and active sympathy, in sufficient strength to impel the individual to social conformity. But there is slight reason to think that the idea of the self as the personification of self-control or as the servant of duty would appeal sufficiently to these or other instincts to bring about its own realization. The claim that it does so appears plausible only because the self-regarding sentiment in this abstract and highly intellectualized form is exhibited as the outcome of a long but continuous development in which the instinctive interest or impulsion is carried over by grad-

ual steps to regions more and more remote from that of its natural stimulus. The second shortcoming of this view when offered as a final solution of the problem of the relation of intelligence to instinct, is, if anything, more serious. It does not relate intelligence or its ideals to the conditions and demands of action, or assign to it any function in organizing or reorganizing the motor responses through which the aims of rational community are realized. "When authors tell us," says Professor McDougall, "that 'reason' is the principle of moral action, it is necessary to point out that the function of reason is merely to deduce new propositions from propositions already accepted." [15] No, intelligence, observing the proprieties of its position and recognizing its own limitations is to keep scrupulously within its own realm of ideas and leave their practical execution to the motive force and motor mechanism of instinct.

At this point in the discussion Professor Dewey's view may with profit be compared with Professor McDougall's. The contrast is startling and instructive. For he holds that the true field, the only field, of intelligence is that of prospective action. "At most, intelligence but throws a spotlight on that little part of the whole which marks out the axis of movement.[16] Even the end itself, the special contribution of intelligence is "the figured pattern at the centre of the field through which runs the axis of conduct." As for the different instincts understood as so many different and distinguishable motives to action, ready-formed and existing like so many natural forces for intelligence to take advantage of, Professor Dewey

[15] *Op. Cit.*, p. 378.
[16] Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 262.

simply disbelieves in their existence.[17] To discover anything like such an original equipment of specific instincts we should have to go back, he maintains, to early infancy.[18] This is because the instincts with which we are born are so soon overlaid and superseded by systems of habits formed under social pressure.[19] Custom, it is, which organizes our social activities and, so thoroughly does it do its work, that social conformity becomes by force of habit a second nature.[20] Thus he attributes to custom backed up by social authority the very work which Professor McDougall assigns to the self-regarding sentiment and its supporting instincts. Instinct and intelligence, Professor Dewey tells us, function as agencies of readjustment and reorganization.[21] But what conditions call them into action? His answer is: When the habits formed by custom come into conflict with, and block, one another. This occurs whenever a new situation arises to which no established habit is adequate. Then a number of different habits assert themselves which obstruct one another and produce a blockade of action.[22] Such new situations arise so constantly in our experience as individuals that they scarcely need illustration. The difficulty created may be a trifling one in the daily routine or a crisis of momentous gravity. They may concern the homely matters of household management; a detail perhaps of private life, or they may involve far-reaching issues that determine one's future career. But in all

[17] *Op. Cit.*, pp. 131*ff*.
[18] *Op. Cit.*, p. 94.
[19] *Op. Cit.*, p. 60.
[20] *Op. Cit.*, p. 90.
[21] *Op. Cit.*, p. 94.
[22] Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 11, 18.

cases the consequence is the same: habit fails and action is suspended, awaiting the intervention of higher powers of guidance.[23] Likewise in social affairs such crises periodically arise. At their maximum they mark turning points in the history of peoples and of nations. The French Revolution constituted one of these; the Great War may prove to have been another.

In such an *impasse,* Professor Dewey asserts, instinctive impulses long held in check by fixed habits break through the cake of custom and urge the individual into new fields of action. But along with such impulse intelligence asserts itself. Thought is born as the twin of impulse in every moment of impeded habit.[24] Its function is to bring about a working harmony among diverse desires. This it achieves through deliberation. Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal in imagination of the various competing lines of possible action, an experiment of making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses to see what the resultant action would be if entered upon.[25] Doubtless the intelligence which is active in deliberation does proceed by projecting ends, or possible objects of pursuit, comprehensive enough to coördinate and give expression to each factor in the situation which gave rise to the conflict and the suspense.[26] But *ends,* Professor Dewey reminds us, are only foreseen consequences, and the object of such foresight of consequences is not to predict the future but to discover the meaning of present activities when their con-

[23] Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct,* p. 183.
[24] *Op. Cit.,* p. 170.
[25] *Op. Cit.,* p. 190.
[26] *Op. Cit.,* p. 194.

flict and entanglement have been overcome and they have been made contributory to a unified release of action.[27] And the value attaching to the ends of intelligence is to be found in this meaning which they impart to present activity by introducing[28] into it proportion, order and freedom. We may draw our own illustration of the interplay of these factors from the social field, if we consider the emergency created by the industrial revolution of more than a century ago. The introduction of power-driven machinery and the rapid development of the factory system of production brought about a situation with which existing laws and conventions protecting individuals in the enjoyment of the rights of free competition and contract were unable to cope. New impulses asserted themselves among "masters" and "men." Particularly among the workers was this the case: the impulse of leadership asserted itself in some individuals, the instinct of collective defense with the mass. Conflict ensued: the first labor unions were formed, attacked by employers and outlawed by the courts. Intelligence took a hand, possible lines of action were considered and tried and, finally, after years of fumbling and uncertainty, of misunderstanding and abortive effort, the method of collective bargaining was worked out and quite generally accepted.

A third fact of fundamental importance concerning the relation of intelligence and instinct is thus brought to our notice. The work of intelligence is not limited to that of imagining ends of action sufficiently comprehensive to evoke and correlate a number of instinctive im-

[27] *Op. Cit.*, p. 205.
[28] *Op. Cit.*, pp. 211, 212.

pulses; intelligence also engages effectively and continuously in the reorganization and control of the activities, habitual and instinctive, by which these ends are realized. Professor Dewey gives forcible, if somewhat exaggerated, expression to this fact when he says that the value of ends lies not in the future satisfaction they promise but in the readjustment and the liberation of present activities which they bring about. "Fixed ends," he says "reflect a projection of our own fixed and non-interacting compartmental habits."[29] Such ends, creations of our imagination, are only fancies or wishes arising out of an emotional reaction against the present state of things and a hope for something different.[30] A fancy becomes an *aim*, capable of directing action, when some past sequence of known cause and effect is projected into the future and when by the assembling of its causal conditions, we strive to generate a like result.[31] To illustrate this function of intelligence and the ends of intelligence in the organization and control of present activity, we may take Professor Dewey's example of a man building a house.[32] Here, if anywhere, he reminds us, we have a case of the subordination of the present to the interests of the future: a man builds a house, we should certainly say, for the sake of the comfort and security it will bring, not just for the fun of building it. But his foresight of future uses is dependent upon an organized survey of past experiences and present conditions, and an acquaintance with available materials and current prices. And

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[29] *Op. Cit.*, p. 232.
[30] *Op. Cit.*, p. 234.
[31] *Op. Cit.*, p. 235.
[32] *Op. Cit.*, p. 268.

his present activity is the only one really under his control. So far as he is able to control his future living, it is only through taking his present activities of planning and buying, of contracting and inspecting, seriously and devotedly. The more importance, indeed, he attaches to the future uses to which his house may be put, the better will he do his present job, which is the activity of building. As this and countless other enterprises of practical life convincingly show, the function of intelligence extends to the supervision and control of the motor responses through whose instrumentality its ends are realized. Through intelligent guidance these activities become experimental: not only are the results of action checked by the preconceived plan and the practical procedure altered to suit its requirements, but the plan itself is modified in the light of the observed consequences of acting upon it.

Let us pause now to summarize the results of the discussion as far as we have gone and to ask what light they throw upon the reciprocal relations of intelligence and instinct. Instinct, we have seen, determines what objects the human individual attends to with interest and what movements he makes in response to their stimulation. Thus instinct may be said to furnish the original impulses or motives of human action. And it is in connection with the working of these instinctive impulses that intelligence first acts. At this initial stage its function is the guidance and coördination of instinctively impelled activities. This guidance is originally supplied by the perception which nascent intelligence furnishes of the objective stimulus. Such perception projects upon the plane of future possibility both the movements required

to approach or avoid the objects and the satisfactions contingent upon appropriation or escape. It is in fact an interpretation of the object which reflects the results of past dealings with it, pleasant or painful. Thus guided by his anticipations of inevitable consequences, the individual is enabled to resist the pressure of present impulse, if the pleasure of immediate satisfaction is to be purchased at the expense of future pain or of the loss of other instinctive satisfactions. The regulation of instinct thus brought about is, of course, made more and more complete as perceptions are more and more definitely supplemented by memory and reënforced by calculation. But intelligence does more than direct and adjust instinctive activities; it organizes and redirects them. The difference here is more than one of degree; it is one of kind: by the advance of intelligence human conduct is lifted to a new and higher level which opens to man wider vistas of achievement and of satisfaction. Intelligence is able thus to transform human conduct because of its power to discover the universal meaning of things, to grasp and to organize what is permanent and essential in transient individual experiences into a self-consistent body of facts which holds true for all rational minds.[33] In the exercise of this power of rational reconstruction intelligence conceives of ends of ideals that are comprehensive in two senses: they include a number of diverse satisfactions so related as to supplement one another in their simultaneous or serial enjoyment; they also presuppose the systematic coöperation of many individuals in an orderly social system. Such ends, of an inferior grade, are wealth and fame; of a higher sort, are pro-

[33] *Cf.* Supplementary Note at the end of this chapter.

fessional honor and patriotic service. These comprehensive objects or ends, in proportion to their scope and complexity, include the particular objects and events which normally stimulate instincts, and therefore they do, when clearly conceived and attentively considered, call into play several or many instincts. The instincts evoked may be thought of as impelling the individual with their combined motive force to the sequence of actions necessary to their own realization. Whether we think of the will of the doer in such a case as the combined motive force of a number of instincts all aroused and organized by some comprehensive ideal which he identifies with his good, or as the self-organizing, self-realizing power of his rational personality first manifesting itself in the vital urgency of separate instincts but developing its full strength as devotion to a comprehensive ideal that takes up and sublimates these its partial and inarticulate expressions, is perhaps immaterial. Finally, however, intelligence not merely evokes and coördinates instinctive impulses which act along lines predetermined by heredity and habit. As he acts under the impulsion of an end or ideal the intelligent individual is frequently confronted with situations to which these predetermined modes of action are quite inadequate. Then intelligence, his own intelligence, must invade the field of action and undertake such a reorganization of conflicting activities as will render them contributory to the chosen end. And, having once taken hold, intelligence must stay on the job, critically scrutinizing every step, always on the alert and ready to alter either working method or guiding plan in the interests of final, substantial, fulfillment.

Still, it may be urged, the fundamental question

remains unanswered: What impels the ideas of intelligence to seek realization in action, and, in what does their realization consist? The first part of this question may be dismissed as meaningless because of springing from a misconception of intelligence. Only if we conceive of the mind as divorced in its own true nature and function from the outer world of physical movement, are we driven to ask why it expresses itself in bodily action. But psychological investigation is proving with scientific certitude what common sense has always been inclined to believe: that mind as a real factor in human life acts in all cases as an influence determining human behavior. Ideas then, in virtue of their nature as ideas, express or register themselves in bodily movement. In case, however, of mental activity of the highly developed and specialized sort to which we give the name intelligence, the bodily movements are internal and for the most part invisible. They take the form of adjustments of sensory apparatus to secure the most favorable reception of stimuli, and of movements of the speech organs with connected and symbolic movements of the larger muscles. Not that such facts prove thinking to be nothing but a complex of motor responses mostly internal: this is a doctrinaire view held only by extremists. But they do show that in the working of intelligence the discovery and selection of possibilities of universal meaning and personal value goes hand in hand with the organization of motor responses which prepare the way for their realization. In fact intelligence might be described as the power possessed by living beings with highly developed nervous systems of so organizing their motor responses as to realize for themselves the possibilities of communicable

meaning and personal satisfaction inherent in their natural and social environment.

The internal movements just alluded to, which register the results of our thinking are, after all, only provisional and preparatory. Ideas which in this way are given objective formulation and prove themselves to be not inconsistent with the results of the individual's own experience and the generally accepted system of knowledge available for his reproduction in oral or written discourse, remain for the individual who has them, merely ideas unless he gives objective expression to them in overt action. Of course they are facts in the consciousness (as we say) of the individual who thinks them and gives expression to them in internal movements. But such ideas are nevertheless contrasted as *mere ideas* with actuality. This is because they are looked upon not as realities but as possibilities of realization. And the realization which they lack and for the lack of which they are often disparaged as merely ideal is realization through outward action. Hence the second of our two questions has genuine meaning and importance. For it asks, not why ideas express themselves in action, to which the answer is simply that it is their nature as ideas to do so. But rather, why do ideas require to be realized through *outward* action? And in what does this, their actual realization consist?

Professor Dewey believes that an idea which is adopted as an end or aim of action is realized in the course or procedure of the action which it instigates. It is a mistake, he holds, to suppose that the end or aim is realized only when such action reaches its completion at some future time, to think of the realization of the end, in other words, as the far-away terminus or remote goal

of action.[34] On the contrary, the realization of any end which intelligence proposes for pursuit consists just in the release and unification of present activities which it brings about.[35] So in the illustration of the man building a house, his aim is realized not by the completion of his house at some future time but by his present activities so far as these are liberated, correlated, and harmonized through the influence of the ideal end. This release and reorganization of activities is accompanied, Professor Dewey tells us, by an emotional appreciation of the far-reaching effects of all human activity and of its countless contacts within the social system.[36] In the release and reorganization of action which it at once effects along with an emotional appreciation of the operative connection which this action makes with the enveloping physical and social system consists, therefore, the realization of an ideal end.

Assuredly this is not the whole or even the most important part of the story. Let us go back for a moment to the original question and ask: Why do our ideas need to be realized through outward action? Why are we not content to contemplate them as ideas? The thought of an object may be interesting enough, all its qualities vividly imagined and their connection clearly understood. Why is a man not content with the *idea* of owning a house or of the house he would like to own? He may have planned it out completely and be able to imagine nearly every detail of its outward appearance and interior arrangement. The answer of course is: Because

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[34] Dewey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 260.
[35] *Op. Cit.*, p. 205.
[36] *Op. Cit.*, p. 263.

the house he imagines and plans for does not exist. And because it does not *exist*, the idea of it may be a source of restless discontent instead of satisfied contemplation. We are not satisfied with the ideas of desirable objects, therefore, because such objects lack reality. How is this lack of reality manifested? By the fact that the responses of perceptual interpretation and the motor responses called forth by the present environment are such as to oppose and exclude them. In the illustration of the man who decides not to pay rent any longer but to build for himself, the idea of the house built and owned by himself is condemned as unreal by the defects and drawbacks of the rented house he now occupies which force themselves upon his senses at every turn, and also, it may be, by the bill for next month's rent which he has just taken from the postman. Its unreality is still further confirmed by the appearance of his savings account which shows a balance of $300 rather than $3000. So insistent are the claims of sensible existence upon the attention in such cases that the object of desire is only held in mind as an idea against the continuous pressure and solicitation of the surrounding environment. If now the idea or plan or dream is to acquire the reality at which it aims, the individual must initiate a series of movements in the outer world which so alter the present features of his environment that the sensory responses at his command no longer thwart and exclude, but sustain, reënforce and intensify those qualities which he has anticipated in idea. This action must avail itself of the pathways established by instinct and habit. Yet not mechanically; for it will be guided by intelligence which, observing the result of each successive step and estimating its efficacy in the light

of the preconceived plan, stands ready so to change the direction, or alter the character, of the action, as to make it instrumental to the desired end. The end is attained and the idea realized when the sensory and motor responses permitted by the external environment not merely point toward the fulfilment of the idea but actually establish and sustain it, confirming its anticipated character, intensifying its imagined qualities, and revealing in it new aspects of interest and sources of satisfaction. So the aim to build a house is not in the full sense realized until the activities of construction are finished and the owner is enabled to move in and take possession of his dwelling. Then, and not till then, is the opposition between idea and existence overcome and the individual permitted to enjoy in actuality all the diverse features which he has anticipated in imagination, and to discover other advantages as well which his thought had not foreseen.

What can we now set down by way of general conclusion as to the reciprocal functions of intelligence and instinctive response? It is difficult to make general statements concerning a relation so fundamental and many-sided, that are not abstract and condemned in advance to technicality; indeed, this pitfall can be escaped in the present case only if we confine ourselves to statements which easily translate themselves into terms of illustrative facts cited in the course of the chapter. Instinct determines which of the sensory stimuli affecting the living individual are first reacted to, and what movements are made in response. In the instinctive response, conscious attention is focussed upon the sensations aroused by the external stimulus, by the movements which

it evokes, and by the effects of the movements upon the organic state of the individual. Intelligence signalizes its advent by reconstituting the external stimulus in terms of its bearing upon the future well-being of the living individual. In the discharge of this function, it endows the stimulating object with certain qualities which give it a distinct character and location in the world of objects. The emergence of these qualities and relations in the evolution of intelligent consciousness means the appearance of a new and higher order than the physical, for they possess characteristics that merely physical events do not. They possess both generality and permanence, that is, they are qualities that permanently characterize particular objects in their changing forms and positions, and also correlate different objects as belonging to the same class and having an identity of nature. These characteristics with which intelligence endows its objects reflect the permanent interests of the individual as a unitary center of activity which seeks to maintain its own existence and to obtain its own satisfaction. From this, the world of meaning and of value discovered by his own intelligence which interprets the operation of instinct in the light of his past experience and that of the race as communicated by language and social tradition, the individual selects objects for pursuit and realization. But he is not limited in his choices to those possibilities whose realization is prepared for by instinct or guaranteed, by socially inculcated habit. By analyzing and recombining in original ways those qualities which his own and other men's intelligence have already discovered in the real world, he is able to construct new ends which promise to enrich his experience

by opening new ranges of activity, by bringing to light unsuspected variety and undiscovered harmonies. So intelligent invention, discovery, creation, have gone on from the beginning of human history in the various fields of man's activity, political, mechanical, artistic, scientific; their success is witnessed by the accumulated totality of human culture. But such ends, as long as they remain unrealized, are significant only for the individual who appreciates them "in idea" and in spite of contrary fact. They can be translated from idea into reality only through action, when the individual makes or initiates the series of movements necessary so to alter his situation that the responses evoked or permitted by his external environment are such as to intensify or reinforce the characteristic features of his ideal rather than to oppose or exclude them. In this task of motor adjustment, he must avail himself of the pathways established by instinct and habit, but must always be ready to reorganize his activity by intelligent experimentation under the guidance of the ideal end. But when the sequence of movements is discovered which realizes the ideal end, then this end, originally an ideal construction, is opened to the experience of all others who fulfill the determinate conditions. Thus the object becomes the property of social intelligence; it is generally accepted as a real source of human satisfaction and furnishes material for new constructions on the part of individuals. Thus the expansion of intelligent human experience proceeds through a regular cycle. From the organized world of intelligible and attested objects communicated to him by teaching and example, the individual imagines new possibilities of satisfaction which promise to augment and enrich the

unity of the whole. These ideal ends he realizes through physical instrumentalities and thus gives them standing in the objective order through which the rational will of man gains expression.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

Behaviorism and Social Psychology

The view taken in this book is that the community as a group of human individuals each of whom is conscious of his own identity and of the identity of others, of his own relation to his fellows and their relation to him, has its source in self-conscious intelligence as well as its expression in determinate forms of behavior. I believe that the social community cannot be understood or accounted for unless we recognize as a necessary condition of its existence and organization a feature essential to the very nature of intelligence which I have referred to as its *universality*. By this I mean an outlook inseparable from intelligence which takes for granted the continuing identity of its own personal point of view and its association with other selves each of whom has the same individuality and permanence of outlook. Prof. D. F. Swenson has conclusively demonstrated this rational basis of community life in its logical aspect in an article entitled: "The Logical Implicates of Community."[37] "The primary test of rationality, as well as the primary test of consistency", he says, "is the principle of identity. . . . What then is the principle of identity? It is a logical principle which at one and the same time defines the individual

[37] D. F. Swenson, "The Logical Implicates of Community." *Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. XVII, No. 10, p. 254.

mind's continuity of thinking, and the social consciousness of a common thought and a common world. It asserts that meanings of all kinds, and hence also the corresponding objects, may be apprehended as identically the same, whether by the same mind at different times or by different minds at the same or different times. . . . The law of identity asserts in addition that the universe of discourse is the same for all minds that really understand each other, and in so far as they do understand one another. The conduct of all meaningful thought, therefore, whether individual or social, requires the validity of this law as its first condition."

In this way to make use of well-established logical principles in explaining the interrelation and interaction of thinking individuals in society is, according to the behavioristic creed, to take refuge in "mysticism." But the explanations which these behaviorists themselves offer of forms of social conduct and modes of social life seem in comparison to be notably thin and superficial and unconvincing. As an instance, consider the case of the savage who after days of hunger makes a kill when hunting alone and then out of deference to tribal custom curbs his own strong appetite, takes the game home and apportions it in the prescribed manner according to degree of family kinship. He acts thus because his intelligence generalizes his situation and applies to it (what we call) a rule. The dead animal is no longer perceived as the object present to his senses, it is thought of as that food supply which he ought as a group member to carry home and distribute in a special manner among his relatives. If the impulse to eat his fill and conceal the remainder continues strong and urgent, the "sanctions" of the

threatened custom come to his thought. Judging by the answers given by primitive group members when asked by investigators why they must obey this or that one of their tribal customs, he will think that the prescribed action is the "way of his people," and that it has always been so because of the example set by an ancestor long ago or because of the command of tribal deities who will punish him and all the tribe for any violation of their commands. Thus the intelligence of the individual in bringing home to him the meaning and binding character of a social regulation ranges far beyond the limits of the particular situation that called it forth, linking the individual with his fellow-members of the group, correlating his present experience with previous episodes in his own life and the remote past of tribal tradition, and connecting his actual condition with the possibilities, favorable or menacing, of an impending future.

The rigorous behaviorist must eliminate conscious intelligence, as an agency of correlation and comprehension, from such a situation; he must explain the working of social custom and the influence of social ideals altogether in terms of stimulus and motor response. Such an explanation Professor Kantor proposes as alone meeting the requirements of psychological science.[38] Any object which operates as a stimulus to produce a common reaction from the group (such as food-ready-to-be-divided-and-eaten) becomes *institutionalized.* Thus the institutional or traditional meaning that attaches to an object in any particular instance is a result of the fact that the

[38] J. R. Kantor, "An Essay Toward an Institutional Conception of Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXVII, No. 6.

agent or others have previously reacted to it in a definite and characteristic fashion. Objects which thus act as stimuli to call forth similar and stable reactions from the group are fraught with institutional meaning for the individual when he first comes into contact with them and this meaning extends itself to the reactions they produce. So the persistence, authority, and generality of custom and tradition are explained. As far as the thoughts and beliefs are concerned that arise in the mind of the individual and give support and sanction to the socially approved ways of acting, these must be understood as implicit verbal responses, the subtle and symbolic repeating of responses previously performed which link up in the sequence issuing in the final overt act.

Which affords the more illuminating explanation of the influence and authority of custom, this exclusively behaviorist account (which certainly reflects a notable advance in our knowledge of the chain of events leading from the stimulus to the final overt response) or the former one which gives central place to the comprehensive unity and organizing power of conscious intelligence? Doubtless we need both. But thus to confine ourselves to physical events and nervous reactions is to rob social phenomena of their inwardness and significance, and leave them possessed only of the externality of mechanical interplay. Professor Allport says, in the opening chapter of his *Social Psychology*, that one negative conclusion seems both justified and necessary as a working principle: that consciousness is in no way a *cause* of the bodily reactions through which the needs are fulfilled.[39] Now this may mean one of two things. Either that conscious-

[39] Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, p. 2.

ness is not a cause of the same kind or order as the physical stimulus or the nervous impulse, and this, few would be inclined to deny. Or it may mean that consciousness is not a determining influence in behavior. But to make such an assertion seems to me equivalent to denying the incontestable facts of daily experience in order to uphold a methodological assumption. Professor Allport does not himself propose to ignore consciousness in his social psychology: he believes that "introspection on conscious states is both interesting in itself and necessary for a complete account."[40] To the fact that he does, in harmony with our established mode of thinking, discuss human actions as if they were consciously considered and directed, the excellence and interest of his treatment of social problems is largely due.

The doctrinaire character of the extreme form of behaviorism is in matter of fact nowhere more fully exposed than in the explanations it offers of social community and progress. Take for example the following statements made by Prof. A. P. Weiss:[41]

If human behavior differs from physical and chemical behavior, it is only in the fact that the parallelogram of forces that are operative in determining the energy and direction of human movements, contain components which derive their magnitude from human movements that are outside the sensory range of the individual whose responses they actually modify. In other words, the *recording* response as exhibited in language makes it possible for past environments, the responses of individuals that are distant with respect to time and place, to function as forces which may be more effective

[40] *Op. cit.*, p. 2.
[41] A. P. Weiss, "Behaviorism and Behavior." *Psychological Review*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, p. 148.

than the unmediated internal and external bodily conditions at any given instant.

Now, of course, such statements as these depend wholly upon the sheer assumption that the only causes which operate in the world of human experience are physico-chemical causes and therefore the only explanation which really explains is in physico-chemical terms. But such an assumption is virtually a contradiction of evolution itself since it denies the existence of different planes or stages of development, each with its own distinctive mode of organization and characteristic method of determination. From such a denial it follows that the activity of conscious intelligence reduces to nervous reaction and nervous reaction reduces to physico-chemical action and all real differences disappear in the dead-level of mechanical uniformity. And with the disappearance of real differences evolution itself as a genuine development also disappears; it becomes, like the "ghost" theory of a conscious mind, a delusion of "unscientific" thought.

CHAPTER III

THE REALIZATION OF THE SOCIAL IDEAL

The community of human intelligence is not a theory but a fact. Every human individual, while he has his own unique outlook upon the world, takes for granted the existence of other thinking persons who share with him a common set of ideas and beliefs and purposes. This is just another way of saying that human association is essentially a relation of persons. I treat my fellow as a person not when I merely observe him from the outside and try to anticipate his action so as to avoid collision or conflict, but when I understand his ideas, agree or disagree with his opinions, and interpret his actions in the light of purposes whose import I appreciate through my ability to take his individual point of view which, although different from, has nevertheless a fundamental likeness to, my own.

This community of intelligence opens possibilities of an enlarged social life, an enriched social intercourse, that are, we should all admit, for the most part unrealized. In this sense the comprehensive community of human intelligence, the rational brotherhood of man, is not a fact but an ideal. Indeed, it is doubtful whether it is even an ideal, whether it is more, in fact, than an *idea*. For while we occasionally think and talk about it and even at times feel vaguely enthusiastic over its limitless

possibilities, few even in civilized societies are sufficiently interested to try to figure out its practical implications, still less to adopt it as an end of action. Nevertheless if it is true that the rational will of man, whether it acts through instinct or as a separate and superior capacity, seeks the most durable and fertile satisfactions it can attain, then we must acknowledge that the realization of universal social community appears to be the supreme human good. Professor McDougall's detailed description of the growth of the self-regarding sentiment has this great interest and value: it proves that the end whose dominating influence disciplines the various instincts and makes them contributory to a more comprehensive social satisfaction is that of the self-in-social-relations. Nor is it doubtful that as civilization advances the social stage on which the individual sees himself playing his little part is gradually enlarging. Hence it seems inevitable that as human intelligence develops and human society progresses, more and more men and women should be governed in their conduct by the assumption, now limited to a few leaders gifted with exceptional moral and social vision, that their interests as individuals imply effective relationship with humanity.

Now, as was shown in the first chapter, the ideal of universal social community is foreshadowed in the conception of democracy. In this, and not in mathematical equality or the counting of majorities, lies the moral meaning of democracy. It brings the common or communal relations of man to the fore. Not that it neglects or denies the importance of other interests which are competitive and call for exclusive possession, such as the desire for wealth and the ambition to exercise authority.

But it does propose that the common interests or personal satisfactions shall be made supreme and that they shall be accepted as normative. Systems of economic production and distribution, of political organization and administration, are to be judged good if they promote the realization of the communal interest, bad if they hinder its advancement. And, indeed, the chance of our reaching any working adjustment of the industrial and political issues that now perplex and harass mankind seems altogether dependent upon the discovery of a common personal interest among men. This question it is which lies behind all the present perplexities, social, economic, political; upon its answer depends the hope of their solution and the promise of a brighter future. Do men by virtue of their intelligence, rational purpose, and responsiveness to the beautiful and the divine, constitute a community which is organized upon a different and higher plane than that of natural existence? If they do, there exists for them a good in which all can participate and their common reason may be expected to agree upon such a division of material commodities, political honors and social preferences as promises to yield to all the fullest understanding, comradeship, and fellow-feeling. But if they do not, and mankind is to be regarded merely as the most intelligent of animal species, each individual being driven by a necessity of his nature to seek in a limited lifetime for the fullest satisfaction of his instinctive desires, there is nothing to be hoped for except continued relentless struggle for the material sources of natural enjoyment.

Such considerations as these may and, I believe, do, represent the deeper truth. Still, we are forced to admit

that our personal ideals, though their scope may be as wide as humanity and their value more enduring than the process of cosmical evolution itself, tend to appear as vague and insubstantial when contrasted with the material objects and tangible influences that hedge in our path and compel our attention. The pleasures that money affords, the power that wealth gives, the advantages that derive from political honor and social recognition, these are open to our daily observation. It is difficult, indeed, to attach the same or greater reality to knowledge, to patriotic devotion and public service, to beauty and fellowship, and to believe them capable of yielding a richer and more varied content of satisfaction. This is not, be it noticed, because the inclusive social goods whose superior value we acknowledge are insubstantial in the sense of being immaterial. For in this sense social distinction and the power to use men and things as pawns in one's own game are also insubstantial; they are not visible, tangible objects. Yet we have no difficulty in attaching reality to them: indeed, they appeal to much of the talent and ambition of our day as the most substantial and reliable of goods. The difficulty is rather that of *realizing* the genuinely comprehensive ideals of personal life and association. We do not see how to realize them; they fail to connect themselves effectively with our powers of action. And since no way opens itself to translate them into action and through action into achievement and satisfaction, they appear insubstantial and unreal. They remain mere ideas, attractive to think about, it maybe, but visionary, impracticable, and altogether divorced from reality.

How is the social ideal for which democracy stands to

be realized by human individuals with limited powers of action and a brief period of existence? This problem brings up those questions of the relation of intelligence to instinct and to motor responses in general, discussed in the last chapter, and the two writers whose views were there compared in some detail have interesting solutions to offer which we shall find it profitable to consider.

While instincts furnish the motive-power for all human action according to Professor McDougall, he assigns to intelligence, it will be remembered, the function of guidance and control. This function it exercises by virtue of its power to conceive of ends comprehensive enough to arouse, and promise satisfaction to, several instincts. The comprehensiveness of the ideals of intelligence, he understands, furthermore, as consisting not merely in their capacity to combine a variety of objects instinctively desired, but also in the fact that they express that new and unique kind of unity which *mind* introduces into the world. This unity which consists, he tells us, in the whole being present at every moment and playing some part in the determination of every thought and action, finds expression in self-consciousness.[1] When this self-consciousness is extended to the group and identified with the organized system of activities by which its corporate life is maintained and promoted, it serves to call forth in the individual those instinctive impulses which are requisite to move him to the performance of his social duty.[2] In his *Group Mind* Professor McDougall specifies many conditions that are operative in raising collective mental life above the level of the unorganized crowd and to the

[1] McDougall, *Group Mind,* p. 157.
[2] *Op. Cit.,* p. 165.

plane of organized thinking and willing, such as permanence of existence, continuity of tradition, differentiation and specialization of function within the group, and rivalry with other groups outside. But the crucial one, he asserts, is the presence of an idea of the group, its membership and activities, in the mind of all its members, supported by a strong system of instinctive impulses.[3] This is brought about in actual experience by an extension of the self-regarding sentiment of the individual citizen or group member to cover the group.[4] The result in such case is that, in the first place, he identifies himself with the group, thinking of himself always as an Englishman, Frenchman, American, or whatever it may be, and of the group as *his* group (of United States, France, Canada, or Britain as his country) and, in the second place, that the idea of the group evokes all those powerful instincts that make self-interest an objective of imperative, lively appeal, with the important addition of the altruistic instincts aroused by the thought of the welfare of fellow-citizens.[5] Therefore, in Professor McDougall's view, a human group may be so organized psychologically as to be capable of collective deliberation and volition which means not simply acting with a common purpose but adopting and pursuing a common purpose because this is understood by all members to be in the interest of the group as a whole which each member identifies in idea with himself and consequently responds to with instinctive interest, desire and devotion.

Here then is a plausible suggestion, we may think, of

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[3] *Op. Cit.*, p. 55.
[4] *Op. Cit.*, p. 62.
[5] *Op. Cit.*, p. 87.

how the ideal of social community to which democracy is committed may be realized in action. The self-regarding sentiment of the individual is capable of extension over a wider and wider field until it includes the largest group with which he is in effective relation, his nation. The effect of this is to arouse a number of powerful instincts which will prompt the individual citizen to act in the service of the national community. And there is no reason why this process should not be continued beyond the limits of nationality until the self-consciousness of the individual is coëxtensive with humanity. Indeed this is the only way in which universal human welfare can become the end of individual action according to Professor McDougall: by the internationalizing of the national or patriotic sentiment. Such an identification of self with humanity will of necessity be slowly achieved and never be as effective in eliciting and directing action as national self-consciousness, but there is no reason to think it impossible.

This theory is valuable in calling our attention afresh to the importance of the work of intelligence in framing ideals which give definite and intelligible expression to that consciousness of a comprehensive social whole which includes the human individual himself and provides a field for all his activities. But it is defective in restricting the function of intelligence to the forming of conceptions of the social system, conceptions of the kind best fitted to call into play a group of instincts strong enough to enforce with their motive-power its authority. Professor McDougall's account throws far more light upon the psychology of social control than of social advance and reconstruction. It is thoroughly conservative in its prac-

tical bearing, stressing the benefits of social conformity in enlarging the scope and multiplying the satisfactions of the individual life. The primary function of intelligence as he presents the matter is to enlist the motive-force of many different instincts in the support of a social system that can be grasped in its organized unity and identified with the self. And the established social system can be conceived as a whole because it is an operative unity, a going concern. Unlike some other contemporary writers on psychology he is not greatly troubled by the problem of how the average citizen of a great modern nation is to obtain sufficient knowledge of his nation and its situation to pass an intelligent judgment upon its policies.[6] The important thing in his belief is that the idea of the nation as a whole should so present itself to the mind of each citizen as to arouse the instincts requisite to make it an object of loyal devotion and willing service. And as far as the participation of the average citizen in the direction of public affairs is concerned, this very national sentiment when strongly developed will prompt him to accept the judgment of wise leaders as his own and then to bask peacefully in the reflected glory of national triumphs which are achieved under their able leadership.

Unfortunately, that conception of his group or nation which most readily arouses the enthusiasm of the individual citizen and makes him proud to identify it with himself is often not the true one. This fact was soon learned by those who were in positions of leadership and authority;

[6] This problem is more fully discussed in a later chapter in connection with the general subject of the forces which mold public opinion in a democracy.

rulers soon acquired the art of clever stage management,[7] of so celebrating past victories and present renown, as to make their subjects willing and eager to spend their wealth and to sacrifice their lives in order to have a share in these glories. Hence while individuals have frequently been moved in this way to act in what they believed to be the service of their nation, their actions did not really contribute to the inclusive social good because the policies, enterprises and institutions which they were induced to support by active service were really detrimental to the welfare of their fellow citizens and themselves. Besides, the liability always exists that fuller knowledge of the existing organization and government of his nation, creating disillusionment and disgust, will diminish or destroy any pride or satisfaction the individual takes in identifying himself with it, and leave him with no motive to serve it further.

On the other hand, Professor Dewey, the second of the two authorities we have quoted at some length, is convinced of the impossibilty of realizing such an ideal as that of a comprehensive social good which we have attributed to democracy. Fixed ideals of far-away perfection or of an absolute social good, he condemns as quite sterile and valueless.[8] This is because their very universality and sublimity renders them inaccessibly remote from the sphere of human action, and hence incapable of realization. For ideas achieve realization, he holds, only through the adjustment and reorganization of motor activities to which they lead. And to be ef-

[7] Ferdinand, late king of Bulgaria, was said to have been consummate master of this art.

[8] Dewey, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 269, 282.

fective as a guide to action an aim must project or body forth the possibilities of action resident in the particular situation that called it forth. To have any real value for human conduct and social life, an ideal or aim must accordingly relate itself to a certain concrete situation: "universal" or "absolute" ideals are, in Professor Dewey's opinion, altogether useless. And not useless and unmeaning, merely; such an ideal is positively demoralizing.

> Instead, however, of serving to organize and direct effort, it operates as a compensatory dream. It becomes another ready-made world. . . . It is a refuge and asylum from effort. Thus the energy that might be spent in transforming present ills goes into oscillating flights into a far-away perfect world and the tedium of enforced return into the necessities of the present evil world.[9]

Still, man may by the intelligent direction of his activities, Professor Dewey believes, contribute to the realization of that inclusive social good at which it is futile to aim. Indeed, belief in the possibility of promoting social progress through the application of intelligence to the everyday activities of social life may be said to be the keynote of his social philosophy. How does intelligence encompass this result? Not, he emphatically maintains, by so idealizing existing institutions that the thought of them can be relied upon to evoke in their support certain fixed instincts. The distinctive function of intelligence as he sees it is rather to reorganize those activities which social authority has made habitual, and to reconstitute those institutions which tradition has consecrated, so as to provide for a freer and more har-

[9] *Op. Cit.*, p. 261.

monious interplay of human activities. Those ends and ideals are effective in realizing the inclusive social good which liberate and harmonize the activities of men in the everyday situations of actual social life.

> The world in which we could get enlightenment and instruction about the direction in which we are moving only from a vague conception of an unattainable perfection would be totally unlike our present world. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof! Sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial action, to endeavor, in order to convert strife into harmony, monotony into a variegated scene, and limitation into expansion. The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable or attainable by man.[10]

If the bias of Professor McDougall's theory is in favor of social conservatism and conformity, that of Professor Dewey tends equally toward radicalism and reconstruction in social affairs. Indeed the practical influence of a social idealism like Professor McDougall's is from Professor Dewey's standpoint not to inspire men to ever-renewed efforts at social reform but to make them content with things as they are and subservient to existing social arrangements with all their injustices and futilities. For, picturing a social order divorced from the world of everyday human experience by virtue of its ideal completeness and perfection, it encourages the individual to accept the existing political and economic organization as the practical embodiment of the ideal. Suppose that we do, however, as members of society, make an effort, if possible a concerted effort, to apply our intelligence, as Professor Dewey recommends, to important situations of our social life, disentangling and

[10] *Op. Cit.*, p. 282.

adjusting the confused and conflicting activities so that they can function freely and harmoniously. Shall we realize thereby those satisfactions of real social community which we are constrained to accept as the most durable and fertile goods of human life? Yes, says Professor Dewey, by way of emotional appreciation.[11]

> The ideal is not a goal to be attained. It is a significance to be felt, appreciated. Though consciousness of it cannot become intellectualized (identified in objects of a distinct character) yet emotional appreciation of it is won only by those willing to think.[12] . . . Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is fit symbol of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are only its rites and ceremonies.[13]

Eloquent words that plumb the depths of our social experience! With rare adequacy they describe or suggest the appreciation of universal social community, a satisfaction of which we all at occasional moments have some foretaste or intimation and which we then recognize as the greatest good that human life can offer. But surely what can be characterized so unerringly, and identified by us all on description, can be sought after as an objective or end of action: its promise of infinitely varied, ever-expanding, and reciprocally illuminating experiences of social contact can serve as an incentive and

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11 *Op. Cit.*, p. 282.
12 *Op. Cit.*, p. 263.
13 *Op. Cit.*, p. 332.

inspiration to human endeavor. And the facts of social life prove beyond doubt that it does do so. We find it taking many forms, but easily recognizable as the dynamic force in them all: as the hope of human salvation that has inspired and directed the arduous and self-sacrificing labors of many a missionary to relieve the suffering and dispel the ignorance and ill-will of his fellow beings; as the ideal of public service that has aroused the enthusiasm and guided the action of numberless patriots; as the purpose of combating injustice and putting a stop to oppression that has supplied motive force and aim for many a social reformer's career; as the standard of professional honor and service which has been the mainspring of a multitude of loyal, devoted lives in the military, medical, and other professions. Nor is there any reason to doubt that if, in a reorganized social system, the individual worker could have a clear understanding of the necessary part played by the industry that employs him in the system of industries by which the needs of society are met, and also of the functional importance of his own task in this industry, that the ideal of serving society through the faithful doing of his daily work, would be effective in imparting added efficiency to his labor and added dignity and satisfaction to his life.

The efficacy and fertility of those comprehensive social ideals which Professor McDougall, in agreement on this point with philosophical idealism, regards as expressive of the potential universality of intelligence, seems to be fully confirmed by the facts of social life. But the question raised by Professor Dewey's analysis, as to their realization, or the possibility of their realization, remains

unanswered. Are they efficacious merely in their power to kindle imagination, arouse enthusiasm and thus, by virtue of their perfection and completeness, to call forth effort productive of limited social good, while remaining themselves unrealized and unrealizable, seeming to retreat like the rainbow's end or the mirage, and certain finally to dissolve as the realities of advancing age dispel the romantic vision of youth? For this is a psychological fact and, as such, furnishes good ground for the current criticism of idealism: ends or ideals can be realized only through the motor activities of human individuals, and the motor responses within the power of a human being are limited by the situation in which he finds himself. So the problem of realizing that ideal of social community which democracy professes reduces to this: Are there any motor activities prepared for by instinct and developed by social habit which when reorganized and redirected by intelligence are capable of realizing the universal social good? Actions are effective in realizing ends, we have come to see, when they work such a change in the actual situation and environing conditions of the agent that his perceptions and the images that supplement them, his motor responses and the interpretations that give them meaning, are such as to establish, strengthen, and amplify the various characteristics combined and correlated in the ideal, instead of opposing and excluding them. Are there any motor activities that are capable of bringing home to the human individual the infinitely varied content of universal human experience? With this question we reach the heart of our enquiry.

In the attempt we have now to make to discover these

activities by which the community of intelligence and interest among men is realized, we may with advantage remind ourselves of one criticism which Professor Dewey is constantly levelling against moral and social idealism. Its characteristic and prevailing tendency, he asserts, is to subordinate present interest to a remote future good, thus emptying the present of all value and significance, and this for the sake of a future "good" too subjective, vague and general to admit of realization. Now this contention has some basis and justification as far as the ideal of human brotherhood or the great community is concerned. It is within the power of no human individual to realize this ideal if realization can only come as the result of effort which succeeds in bringing the comprehensive social community into existence. Realization must be accomplished if at all by activities which in the course of their performance enable those who initiate and control them to realize through sense, feeling, and imagination the experiences implied in the social ideal.

The specifications for the activities we seek can now be definitely stated. They must avail themselves of the channels provided by instinct and social habit, yet be susceptible of redirection by intelligence; they must take place in the outer world of social interplay, while at the same time they make real those personal experiences in which all men as rational can participate. In the next chapter we shall try to find out what these activities are.

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMS OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION

In the attempt we have now to make to locate in the field of human conduct the activities specified at the close of the last chapter, we shall find an illustration helpful. Let us suppose that two men go without knowledge of one another to the same district of the north woods for a season's hunting and fishing. Soon after the two enter the region they meet and become acquainted. Talk about their respective plans brings out the fact that each has thought of building a shack for the purposes of shelter and the safe storage of supplies. As the two men prove congenial and continued association promises to be pleasant for both, they decide to build a hunting lodge together, and to set about it at once.

First they exchange ideas as to where and how the lodge should be built; each communicates his thoughts upon the subject to the other. The conditions of such communication are that each one puts his ideas and preferences into forms of speech; he gives them objectivity by setting them in the wider relationships of human experience generally; this of itself places them in a new light and imparts some added meaning to them. The suggestions which each one receives from his fellow convey to him not merely the meaning originally intended, but that meaning interpreted in the light of his own experi-

ence and, from such interpretation, obtaining perhaps an increased interest and significance which they did not possess in the mind in which they originated. This added suggestion or modified meaning he makes explicit by the aid of speech and tells it to his fellow. In the meantime, his own ideas previously expressed come back to him reinterpreted in the light of the other's experience and outlook. So the discussion proceeds, with the result that new ideas take form which assimilate elements of value and relevancy to the present situation from the experience of each and which, because they have won the assent of both, yield a plan upon which the two can agree.

Then they set about it, each in his own way, to carry out the common plan. Each uses his own initiative in choosing the method of action that promises most expeditiously to advance the undertaking. But each acts in the presence of the other, often seeing his companion adopt a different method for accomplishing the same result. Possibly he doubts the practical wisdom of his fellow's method as compared with his own, and expresses his doubt by a question. His coworker explains and defends his own way of working; he in his turn perhaps criticises it, with the result that his fellow modifies his method of operation. The result is that both change their ways of working so that while each still follows a different and original line the activity of the two is correlated with reference to an identical end.

Together they complete the work; their plan is carried out; the hunting lodge is built, and ready to be used as intended. Each feels the satisfaction of successful accomplishment, of realizing through his own activity an

end which he previously projected in thought and whose existence he at that time willed. This satisfaction he expresses upon his face, or by laugh or exclamation. He perceives the same signs of emotion in his comrade. Since these have to his knowledge the same source as his own, they acquire a personal meaning for him and enhance his own satisfaction. The two companions are united in feeling, not because they happen to be pleased or joyful at the same time but because the satisfaction of both has source in a common personal achievement. This, the rational meaning of their common satisfaction, they seek to express in song or shout or some form of triumphal decoration with which they emblazon the walls of their lodge.

Now what is the basis of the association of these two men in their common enterprise? To make the question more definite: Through what activities are they associated in the truly human sense?

In the first place we note that, in the unfolding of the situation, many instincts, more or less modified and overlaid by the habits which social experience has produced, come into play. The desire for change and recreation that prompted each man to make the excursion has undoubtedly an instinctive root; a "hunting instinct" is recognized by many psychologists. The gregarious instinct operative in both drew the men together, as we say, and they were instinctively curious as to one another's antecedents, purposes and equipment. The determination of each to build a hut instead of living in a tent was partly due to an instinctive craving for safety and shelter. In building the hut the constructive instincts of both, their imitative tendencies, and perhaps

their rivalrous impulses came into play. At the jollification which marked the completion of the task active sympathy finds expression as before; other instincts, such as that of display, may be in evidence. Without doubt, then, many instincts are effective and some of them powerfully so in the social interplay; to the social significance of these and other instinctive desires we shall later return. But the fact of present interest is that while instincts are operative in such variety and complexity, instinct itself does not account for the association in its distinctive aspect of human fellowship.

We observe, secondly, that such a situation as has just been described is primarily and characteristically a creation of the intelligence and will of the two human participants. Both bend all their efforts to realize by action an ideal plan which they have jointly projected and to which they have individually committed themselves. In this, as in all cases of voluntary action, three phases or aspects may be distinguished which appear as successive steps or stages in the progress from choice to realization. The first is idealization. While this term may smack of metaphysics, the experience for which it stands is familiar enough to every one who is conscious of the way in which his own will works. Volition really begins when the idea of an object, nonexistent but possible of realization, is projected in opposition to the conditions which actually exist. With this ideal object in preference to anything that exists in the actual present, the individual identifies his own will; he chooses it as his end and aim. The second phase or step is that of purposive action. The doer strives by effortful action to bring the existing conditions into harmony with the ideal end which he has made his

purpose. The third and final stage is that of the satisfaction felt when, by effort of action, existing conditions are brought into conformity with the demands of the ideal and the agent enjoys in reality what he has anticipated in idea.

We are now prepared to see, in the third place, what is of decisive importance to our argument, that in connection with the prosecution of this joint enterprise of will, three activities of personal intercommunication are carried on. These three activities have their source in intelligent volition; they arise in connection with the three phases which have just been distinguished as succeeding one another in the regular course of voluntary action. They appear first as subsidiary and instrumental to the one practical purpose for which the whole work was undertaken, but they are capable of acquiring an independent interest which gives them value in and for themselves. The first is the intercommunication of ideas and opinions, thoughts and judgments. The two sportsmen in our illustration *discuss* the kind of building that will best serve their purpose, the materials which will be required for its construction, its location, etc. The second is the intercommunication through actual performance which becomes an objective demonstration of the methods and expedients, the adjustments and contrivances, whereby existing materials may be utilized and existing obstacles overcome in pushing forward the work. The two men *coöperate* in building. The third is the intercommunication of feeling through the intermediation of sense imagery, patterns of color and sound and movement, which induce similar emotional reactions in different percipients or serve to heighten a feeling of

satisfaction in which they already participate. The mutual congratulations, the songs and decorations, by which the friends celebrate the completion of their temporary dwelling, stir their imagination and thus increase their *intelligent sympathy,* as together they experience the satisfaction of work well done.

With the help of our illustration we have gained at least a preliminary understanding of the nature and forms of human association. We have seen that the effective exercise of rational will which proceeds from idea to action, and from action to fulfillment and satisfaction, is accompanied by personal intercommunication. Personal intercommunication is the exchange of conscious experiences and, as such, is the basis of human association. If experiences are to be exchanged they must be communicable; and in order to be communicable, they must be mutually intelligible. An essential community of intelligence and will among men is therefore implied in personal intercommunication itself. All true association consists, we then say, in the intercommunication of intelligible experiences; but the nature of the experiences to which intelligibility attaches is not always the same. There are, in matter of fact, three such types of experience and consequently three forms of personal intercommunication: (1) that in which ideas and thoughts are exchanged, or *discussion;* (2) that in which practical inventions and adjustments are communicated, or *coöperation;* and (3) that in which feelings and the fancies that evoke them are communicated, or *imaginative sympathy.*

But these three forms of personal association differ, not merely in the nature of the experiences they com-

municate; they differ also in the means and agencies of transmission. Each makes use of distinct bodily organs and structures. And it is a remarkable fact, furnishing a somewhat striking confirmation of the view we have adopted of human association, that the bodily organs and structures in question are just the three which (the brain itself excepted) are most important in distinguishing man from the lower animals. The first is the vocal apparatus which makes speech possible. The second is the perfected hand and arm, made possible by the erect posture, which gives man power to fashion tools with which he constructs utilities out of natural materials and thus transforms his physical surroundings. The third is the increased facility given to the senses of sight and hearing by the assumption of the erect posture, with correlated adjustments of head and neck muscles, which enables the human individual to meet his fellow face to face and to survey, steadily, or with sweeping gaze, the objects of his environment. These structures, like all other bodily characters, were originally instruments of adaptation; they helped to adjust the human species to its environment, to increase its chances of survival, and to raise it to its present position of mastery among living-races. To sound the cry of alarm, to give the food call, still more to express through speech ideas as to common defense and to discuss measures for curbing refractory individuals, contributed immensely to the security of the early human group. So also the working out of methods of coöperative industry was the price of survival to many a primitive society. No less important was the heightening of emotional concord and the intensification of the feeling of group loyalty through such art forms

as pictorial representation, ceremonial chant, or ritual dance. But as in the course of human evolution intelligent selection and rational control tended to supplant struggle and survival, the structures in question were made subservient to another and a higher purpose; they became instruments of communication between human beings. And when discussion, coöperation, and imaginative sympathy, thus become ends in themselves, cultivated for their own interest and value, they must like all objects of will be realized in action. This has been made possible by the development of language and literature, of the technique of industrial production and social control, and of the powers of æsthetic appreciation and artistic creation.

Notwithstanding the force of all these considerations and the importance of the facts that have been cited in their support, misgivings very naturally arise. Do we gain any real advantage in the way of explanation by thus referring the forms of human association and communal life to the three forms of personal intercommunication just described rather than to, say, the original instincts of man guided by his growing intelligence? The existence and strength of the "social" instincts are facts easily verifiable by our everyday experience of human nature and human relations. Their power and efficacy in determining the conduct of human individuals toward one another is witnessed by the course of social life as it proceeds from day to day before our eyes. Constantly we are impressed anew by the ruthless drive of the instincts of sex and parenthood. Here we see a glaring instance of instinctive self-assertion, there an equally notable case of instinctive pity and altruism, and we seem

to find in the conflict between these two instincts or instinctive complexes a key to the character of social life and social movements. Some emergency, a local catastrophe perhaps, or a national peril, calls our attention to the strength of the "herd instinct" which is always at work in us and has been acclaimed by some writers as the underlying psychic force cementing all gregarious species like our own. War, we are told, is inevitable because the pugnacious instinct is an ineradicable part of our biological inheritance and certainly the instinct of combat does often enough determine the behavior of men toward their fellows. Every mass movement calling for concerted action shows us the complementary instincts of leadership and submission in effective operation. Certainly there can be no conceivable doubt as to the influence of instinct, with or without the direction of intelligence, as a cause determining the social relations of human individuals.

These misgivings disappear, however, if we give due weight to what is after all the outstanding feature of the social life in which we at present have a share. The organized life of civilized societies is maintained by an intricate network of activities which brings hundreds of thousands of individuals into indirect contact and communication. These activities and the far-reaching though indirect associations that they establish have been made possible by the progress of modern science and invention. Modern mechanical means for disseminating knowledge and giving publicity to ideas, beginning with the invention of printing and involving the circulation of newspapers and periodicals and books through the post, as well as telegraph and telephone and radio, have asso-

ciated millions, personally unknown to one another, as members of one "public." The modern organization of industry, depending upon the invention of mechanical instruments and methods of production and utilizing steam and electrical power as well as modern means of transportation by railway and steamship have likewise combined the labor of hundreds of thousands in an operative whole. Popular government in a modern nation depends upon the impersonal coöperation of millions of people separated by thousands of miles of territory who are placed in indirect although effective intercommunication by telegraph and telephone, by public press and postal service. So also modern devices for amusement and recreation, utilizing mechanical means for reproducing art creations, such as photogravure and color printing, as well as the gramophone and motion picture, induce through their influence, unanimities of feeling among numbers of individuals who have no direct personal contact.

It is therefore a fact that in modern society association by direct personal contact has been supplemented and, so far as social organization is concerned, has been largely replaced by impersonal association and indirect contact. Now these activities of indirect contact and communication proceed through the intermediation and instrumentality of mechanical agencies. And these agencies themselves are extensions in the physical world of those bodily organs of intercommunication and personal association lately referred to as possessed by every human being; namely, those of oral and written speech, of practical contrivance and construction, and of æsthetic perception and artistic creation. Hence these three activities of intercommunication, singled out and

designated as the principal forms of human association, are fundamental in the double sense of determining both the direct personal association of human individuals with one another, and also the indirect association of millions of individuals as fellow citizens and fellow workers. This is true of no instinct or group of instincts. Moreover such chance as there is of giving personal value to indirect and impersonal contacts brought about by modern large scale social organization, and thereby making it a means for realizing that comprehensive social community for which democracy stands, depends altogether upon our understanding this social machinery as an extension into the physical world of the three activities of personal intercommunication: discussion and coöperation and imaginative sympathy. Hence the full right of these three forms of communication, intellectual, practical, and emotional, to be regarded as fundamental to human association.

In as much as the activities of personal intercommunication are thus the basis of human association and the source of its governing ideals, we shall have to consider more fully what they involve and how they work. The purpose of the three chapters which immediately follow will be to emphasize the value and importance of everyday social activities in so far as they are made means of such personal intercommunication, in its three forms of discussion, coöperation, and imaginative sympathy.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

No one will question the importance of verbal intercommunication, or discussion, in the social life of men. To associate, as we usually understand it, is primarily to talk and converse, to describe and discuss. So true is this that it is difficult to place a just emphasis upon the importance of discussion without seeming to dwell tediously upon the commonplace. "Yes, to be sure, we could not live or work together without talking and writing, but — what of that?" This ready recognition of the social importance of talk, with the suggestion of disparagement that frequently accompanies it, has its source in a misunderstanding of the nature of discussion, presently to be explained. Talking is usually conceived as a method which human individuals take to reveal their own mental states and subjective experiences to their fellows. Words are therefore looked upon as the vehicles through which individuals express their opinions and manifest their feelings. Such verbal expression costs little effort, and unlike "real work" makes no difference in the actual condition of the world. Hence words are accounted but poor substitutes for deeds. "Successful" men have a low opinion of talkers. Yes, he can *talk*, they say, with the invidious intimation that talking is a recourse of the practically incompetent. The proverb, "Money talks," indicates the same tendency in the popu-

lar mind. The idea, of course, is that hard cash has the substance and efficacy that mere words lack, and hence is capable of really discharging the office to which they pretend, but fail, of expressing in a definite and dependable manner, the will of the individual. He who can neither pay in money or in service that can be turned to pecuniary profit cuts a sorry figure in the world's market: he can *talk*.

If talking and writing were merely ways for individuals to communicate their emotions and passing impressions, they would have no more real importance than popular prejudice is inclined to allow them. Indeed, they could not be accepted as forms of personal intercommunication at all. But discussion is the very bulwark of social union because it is in truth a great deal more than this. Discussion, as we are now to see, introduces the individual into a world at once more comprehensive and more real than the world of his own sense experience. This is the world of rational discourse whose reality is not a matter of anybody's opinion but of concerted, systematic, human thinking. The knowledge which is communicated in discussion is the fruit of human experience universally; the world which it reflects is the world that has proved itself real to the reason of mankind, and its objects are the objects which have stood the test of calculated action and deliberate experiment. He who by serious thinking, purposeful discussion, and intelligent reading, gains an insight into the world of rational discourse, wins an outlook that transcends the limitations of his own sense perceptions and natural existence; he sees with the collective reason of mankind. To realize that there is such a world comprehended by the social reason of mankind is the first

step toward a sound philosophy of social relations. And to demonstrate its existence is to make the first breach in that wall which traditional prejudice and popular "common sense" have reared to shut us in to the world of sense and to conceal from us the possible scope of our own rational consciousness.

Against these high claims, made on behalf of rational discourse and the world to which it introduces its participants, we have to set the persistent human distrust of ideas and disparagement of theory. To call a man a theorist is still enough to condemn him in popular estimation; he is classed with the talkers and the dreamers rather than the doers. The idealist is only tolerated by an impatient public; he may through his exceptional gifts gain political prestige and hold the unwilling attention of men for a time, but they are ready whenever the excuse offers to turn and rend him. To account for this attitude, maintained in spite of the fact that we owe what makes life most worth living to the reformers and prophets, the discoverers and inventors, of history, there must be some persistent and deep-lying cause. We detect it, at least in part, in the widespread misunderstanding which exists as to the nature of ideas and their relation to real things. Ideas are commonly understood as the images or symbols in our minds of the real things that exist in the outside world. So our sense perceptions, of the buildings we see and of the faces and voices we recognize as we walk along the street, are thought of as pictures or copies which the objects themselves produce in our minds by acting upon our sense-organs. As for opinions, beliefs and theories —are they not formed by the individual who holds them, or received as ready-made products of other people's

thinking, even though they too purport or pretend, as is generally supposed, to represent externally existing things in some aspect or connection? And, as far as our fancies and imaginings are concerned, the obvious thing about them is that they are wholly "subjective," are fictions not facts, although it is recognized by those who give the matter a second thought that even they somehow represent or stand for objects that might exist. Internal images, at best mere copies, mental substitutes for real facts — such, in short, all our ideas are believed to be.

Now it is not even true of our sense perceptions that they are pictures or images which externally existing objects set up in our minds by acting upon our sense organs. Many facts appear to support this view, it is true, and it is no wonder that it has gained general credence. Consider the eye, for example: it seems like a photograph camera with a sensitized film on which, by photo-chemical reaction, images of external objects are produced and supplied to the mind. Yet the image on the retina is not the perception nor is it a true copy of the object we perceive. The retinal image of the table top, as I enter the room, is neither of a rectangular nor a level surface, but a rhomboid or a trapezoid, tipped in accordance with my perspective. Yet the table top, as I perceive it, has right angles and a level surface: I correct obtuse and acute angles, in fact make constant allowance in all visual perception for perspective, distance away from the sense organ, superposition, etc. My perceptions of external objects are therefore not image copies of them that crowd into my mind through the channels of sense; they are interpretations which reflect

the results of my past dealings with the objects that stimulate my sense organs. So I perceive the table top as a level rectangular surface upon which I can write a letter or eat my dinner. Since, moreover, it is through bodily movement that we have contact and connection with external objects, our perceptions always locate their objects in space, thus indicating the movements that must be made to approach, avoid, or, in some manner, to control them. That is, we perceive objects "where they are": yonder mail box, for example, I perceive as "on the corner across the street." And since, secondly, it is the use or value of objects that makes them interesting to us and calls forth the motor response just mentioned, the perception projects into the object those qualities and attributes which cause it to be distinguished and reckoned with as practically or personally important. So I perceive the mail box as a receptacle for receiving letters for the post. Let us also, while we are considering the nature of perception, note this significant fact. Although the object we perceive is always the one that exists at this particular moment in this particular place, still the qualities we attribute to it in perception are all of them *general.* This is quite evident in the case of all qualities that signify the practical use or value of the object perceived. Try as we may to make our perception of any object fuller and more adequate, to make it fully adequate and entirely complete, we can only add quality to quality and relation to relation, all of them general and hence applying to other objects and events as well. All the different kinds of meaning that can be read into an object on perception resolve themselves into such qualities as red or yellow or green, sweet or sour or bitter,

hard or soft, sharp or dull, hot or cold, and so on indefinitely. While this fact will be readily admitted in case of qualities and characteristics which signify use and value, it may not be equally obvious as far as the attributes of size, shape, and location are concerned. Surely only one object, we may say, can occupy a certain point in space at one time; the location in which we perceive it is unique and peculiar to itself. While this is true, nevertheless, if we ask ourselves how this location is actually perceived, the answer is: through qualities and relations themselves general, such as far and near, high-up and low-down, right and left, north and south, over the hill or down the valley or along the river.

These latter points may seem to be mere dry technicalities of logic and psychology. But they have been cited and stressed because they bring to our attention an interesting fact which is highly important to our argument. The qualities which are attributed to objects in perception are general because the perception itself reflects the bearing of an object, existing at a particular time and place, upon the life-interests and self-satisfaction of a human individual. These interests remain the same and continue through successive moments of time because the human individual is a permanent centre of activity, conscious of an identity that persists through the successive moments of his life. The qualities which we perceive in objects are general, therefore, because they body forth the permanent unity of individual intelligence which attributes to all objects that fulfil the same purpose an identical character.

Our perceptions are, in short, interpretations of external objects at once *mental* and *objective*. They are

mental not in the sense that they are inside our minds but in the sense that they read into an object the "sum and substance" of our past experiences of it. They are objective not because they copy or represent the "real things" of the outside world but because they are the attested outcome of our everyday dealings with this external object. But, granted all this, are not perceptions subjective to this extent, at least, that the objects which any one of us perceives body forth the results of his own experience and nobody else's? Now, of course, it is true that in the world of our common perception each individual has his own perspective and sees things from the point of view it determines. To hold, however, that perceptions are subjective in the more essential way just referred to is to overlook (as we have done, thus far) the part played by language in perception. We are born into a world of words and sentences as literally as into a world of land and sea and sky. Indeed the material world as we perceive and deal with it could scarcely exist without the intermediation of language. The child is told the names of things as soon as he comes into contact with them; words are thrust upon his consciousness in every waking hour. This has two profoundly significant effects upon his nascent perceptions and the world he begins to perceive. In the first place his attention is forcibly called to the classes of objects and kinds of activity that it is advantageous for him with the vital and social interests of a human individual, to perceive. Secondly, he is effectively constrained to notice the qualities and relations which are common to different objects, events and situations. He is warned against different sorts of objects as hot, is told that they will all burn;

he is constantly introduced to new articles of food, is urged to eat them, "baby taste," "good to eat"; he is urged to look at the dog run, to watch the boy run, and his own efforts are applauded "see the baby run." As the result of such experience and training, the world which we human beings perceive when we reach maturity is determined as much by our vocabulary and linguistic resources as by the external stimuli that play upon our sense-organs.[1] When we visit a strange city or "take in" an international exhibition, what we actually see is largely determined, as we all know, by our verbal anticipations and our power of classifying and describing the objects presented. Indeed in adult life, we seldom perceive anything for which a place or pigeon-hole is not already provided in our mind by words and definitions which prescribe in advance what we shall perceive it as.

As long as we confine ourselves to perceptions it may be thought that we are still outside the strictly "intellectual" realm which is liable to popular suspicion and depreciation — such as found expression, for instance, in the enthusiastic adoption and widespread use of the term "high-brow." What then shall we say of our ideas proper, that is, of our conceptions and beliefs, opinions and ideals, principles and theories? Are these not the mere constructions of the human mind which get whatever reality they possess or claim to possess by copying or otherwise representing the external world of existing

1 Indeed Professor J. B. Watson has recently said: "Being 'conscious' is merely a popular or literary phrase descriptive of the act of naming our universe of objects both inside and outside." (*Psychological Review*, July 1924, p. 280.) But this is an unwarranted and extravagant statement, surely.

things? Under this head fall the beliefs of common sense: beliefs about the properties and powers of common things, about the forces of nature and the traits of human nature, the causes of physical events and the motives that govern human behavior. Under this head fall also the moral principles, the political maxims and the religious beliefs that have currency among us. To the same category of intellectual constructions belongs that body of organized and attested knowledge that we call science.

To the question just asked about these products of human thinking the answer is: No, they are not images or representations of an externally existing world which presents its varied features for us to inspect and compare our ideas with, in order to correct their subjective aberrations and human inadequacy. On the contrary, they like perceptions are interpretations of our natural and social environment which are at once intelligent and objective. They are in a fuller degree intelligent because they not merely, like perception, reproduce the results of past experience for the interpretation of present situations but they involve the analysis of the results of past experience into their constituent elements and the reorganization of these elements into new mental forms for the guidance of present and future conduct. These intellectual reconstructions of the facts of experience are objective because they determine the world that we human beings must take account of in our deliberate and collective endeavors to control our own future as social beings and thus to obtain the satisfactions of organized communal life.

In virtue of two characteristics explained in a previous chapter, such "intellectual" interpretations of the ob-

jective world as are represented by our conceptions, our beliefs, and our science, differ from the perceptions we have just considered. In the first place, they are concerned with the more general and comprehensive aspects and relations of things. When I perceive an automobile, although I attribute to it certain qualities and capacities that are in themselves general and belong to other vehicles and machines, nevertheless I attribute them in the present case to this particular car and no other. But when I think or conceive of "motor traffic," I am singling out and correlating features common to all automobiles and, not to all automobiles merely, but to all motor vehicles of every description. I am also envisaging in my thought certain relations: of motor transport to the construction and upkeep of roads, to the distribution of commodities and the organization of social life. And because the ideas and conceptions of intelligence are at once more discriminating and more comprehensive than perceptions, they single out and give expression to facts and features of the objective world that interest and affect all men, that are, or may be, of import and value to mankind as a whole. In the particular automobile I perceive, unless indeed it is my own, I have no special interest, except to keep out of its way. But in the bearing of motor transport and traffic upon civilized social life I cannot help being interested if I am an alert and responsible citizen. There is a second difference between these constructions of intelligence and the perceptions of sense which, while it is already implied in this first point of difference, is deserving of separate mention. The conceptions of reason possess the comprehensiveness just alluded to because they select and combine what is essen-

tial in the properties of things and invariable or uniform in their relations. And just because they fix upon what is essential and orderly in the facts of experience they possess a wider validity than the perceptions of sense. They claim in fact to hold true universally, that is in all cases and for all intelligent beings. Of course this claim may in any particular instance be mistaken; but the conclusions of intelligence can be refuted only by a more extensive use of the same methods of critical analysis of data, reconstruction in idea, and empirical verification by actual experiment, that originally produced them. This second difference between "ideas" and perceptions finds constant illustration in everyday life. What a man sees in a particular automobile he does not expect that every one else will see, nor will he, if he is sensible, attempt to make them see it. Factors peculiar to the individual case are sure to enter: taste, experience and prejudice, the pride of proprietorship or the emotion of jealousy. But his reasoned conclusions about the future of the motor industry, supposing that he has gathered information and spent time thinking about it, he believes to be true, and this means that he expects you will agree with him and he is confident that if you do not, he can convince you by reasoned argument that he is right. This claim which our intellectual conclusions make to be universally valid of course reaches its climax as well as receives its justification in science. But in all cases of serious thinking whether systematic and coöperative as science is, or not, the claim to be true means the same thing. It means that the belief or conclusion is capable of verification by all intelligent individuals who can fulfil the requisite conditions. And verification, as we have seen, occurs when, as

the result of acting upon the idea, the motor responses at the command of the individual are such as to confirm its anticipations and reinforce and amplify its imagined qualities.

In the interpretation of the objective world by social intelligence language performs a double function. Words serve first as abiding symbols of distinct and practically important qualities which continually recur in the ever-changing variety of sensations and feelings, and of the permanent relations which hold among these distinguishable qualities and characters. Without such a set of symbols, elaborate but flexible and coherent, it would be impossible for the intelligence of the individual to progress with its work of selection and correlation: elements previously discriminated and connections traced out would slip away and be lost in the bewildering confusion of new impressions. Words, in the second place, serve as a means of communicating what the individual has found significant in his experience and of corroborating it by the experience of others. The fact that our earliest experience is accompanied by descriptive words, that we learn the names of things along with their original perception has this far-reaching consequence: our experience is cast in the form of sociality from the start. We learn the habit of talking to ourselves: thus we objectify our experience, we translate it into terms of common human life and are enabled to look upon it impartially and from the universal point of view. To the use of language, therefore, the remarkable development of intelligence in man is largely due. Yet we should by no means forget that men would have been entirely incapable of making this use of language had not an identical reason and

rational will been operative in them all. The fact is that human intelligence finds itself confronted by an external environment which acts upon an organism whose movements it, that is to say intelligence, can in a large measure control. By control of the mechanism of bodily movement and sensory adjustment, it selects certain qualities and complexes of qualities from time to time presented by the external environment. To these qualities and relations it gives objective expression through speech. So vocal sounds, being both within the control of individual intelligence and at the same time projected as events into the external world common to all individuals, become media for the interchange of intelligent interpretations of the real facts and conditions of human life. Thus it is that through the aid of speech the human individual, without it confined to the more or less haphazard world of his own perceptions and imaginings, comes into conscious possession of an orderly system of significant objects realizable under uniform conditions and offering socially authenticated ranges of possible satisfaction. But it is also true that he can enter upon, and engage in, the world of rational discourse only if the principles by which it is constituted answer to demands of his own consciousness, only if his own will demands of its world uniformity of action, consistency of character, and continuity of growth. The fact that man, developing as man, comes more and more to think and act in this social world of reasoned discourse rather than in that of his private fancies and inventions proves that the principles on which it is based are essential to the human mind itself. The requirements of uniformity and consistency are all of them based upon the community of social

intelligence; in fact they merely state the conditions of individual participation in the life of social community.

The world of rational discourse is an ideal world in the meaning that its objects are not objects as they were originally perceived but instead are the objects of perceptual experience reorganized and thus made to reflect the unity of rational will working in the social consciousness of man. To assert that the world of social intelligence is an ideal world is by no means to say that it is an abstractly intellectual realm, however, a world of pure ideas divorced from actuality and remote from the concerns of practical life. It is on the contrary the truly real world. For ideas, even when their bearing is primarily "theoretical" continue to be in a certain sense *ends*, that is, they point, directly or indirectly, to voluntary action. Ideas which have gained social acceptance and pass for true or valid are ideas that have been, or can be, *realized*, which means verified through action. But not all of these ideas, to be sure, are plans of action in the ordinary sense. Many of them have no reference to the outer world or to man's movements in it; their purpose is to interpret other ideas, to correlate them into a system. This is just another way of saying what we all know to be true; namely, that ideation or thinking, originally a function of behavior, acquires an interest in and for itself. Its aim becomes *truth*, the expansion of the system of ideal meanings to include all objects possible of realization. What is noteworthy about it in the present connection, however, is that it is essentially a social ideal, and that speech as the instrumentality of communication affords the means of its realization. Ideas which are not open to direct verification by observation

or experiment, or whose purpose is merely to correlate other ideas, are verified by ascertaining their consistency with the socially accepted body of knowledge. We put our supposition into words and communicate it to another, if it is by word of mouth, adjusting our auditory apparatus to the expected reply. In many, perhaps most, cases we hold conversation with ourselves, so stating our selected idea that its agreement or disagreement with the system of propositions whose meaning has been verified by our experience or the experience of the race, shall be made apparent.

The construction of a socially accepted system of knowledge by aid of the speech mechanism is an impressive instance of how within the continuous course of organic evolution, powers appear whose activity is not completely explainable in terms of the biological categories of stimulus, response and adjustment; for while the relation between selected idea and motor expression conforms in outward order to the biological pattern, it is a virtual reversal of this, because thought is not really (as the order of events might seem to indicate) instrumental to motor response or ensuing adjustment. Instead, the movements of the speech apparatus turn out to be themselves instrumental in building up a system of ideal objects which express to the individual what is significant in the experience of his fellow men. Within the consciousness of individuals there is created or recreated the world of universal human life and achievement, in which all objects that have proved generally realizable, directly or indirectly, all events that are capable under prescribed conditions of being reëxperienced, are woven by organizing principles into something approaching unity. The hu-

manly significant result achieved by habits of speech spoken and written is not organic adjustment but intellectual insight, spiritual vision. The noble function that language may discharge has been eloquently set forth by Professor Gilbert Murray. *Grammata* or letters, he tells us, the poetry and the philosophy that have come down to us from our fathers, enshrine their living thought and feeling. The scholar's special duty is to interpret the *grammata* and thus to relive, and to enable others to relive, the chosen moments of human life wherever they are recorded.[2]

The *traditio,* the handing down of the intellectual acquisitions of the human race from one generation to another, the constant selection of thoughts and discoveries and feelings and events so precious that they must be made into books, and then of books so precious that they must be copied and recopied and not allowed to die—the *traditio* is itself a wonderful and august process, full no doubt of abysmal gaps and faults, like all things human, yet full also of strange half-baffled and yet not wholly baffled, splendor, which marks all the characteristic works by man.

In truly social intercourse, as we now understand, not goods or commodities but conscious experiences are exchanged. But experiences, as we have also noted, in order to be communicated must be mutually intelligible, and some experiences are not so. The feeling of organic stir, the tension of movement, the leap of vitality, the throb of pain, are not subject matter of communication — they can only be signalized by inarticulate cry. To be communicable an experience must be the experience of an object possessed of qualities that may be dis-

2 Presidential Address, *Century,* June 1918, p. 171.

tinguished, recognized and reëxperienced whenever the conditions of their realization are fulfilled. Words are the symbols of these definite qualities, abiding characters, and constant relations, in the changing experiences of sense, which interest the rational will of man and whose realization may at any time become the chosen end of conscious pursuit. With renewed emphasis, therefore, the fact is brought home to us that it is not the subjective feelings and impressions but the real facts of human experience, open potentially to the experience of all, that constitute the primary subject matter of discussion. A way is thus opened for the individual to participate in the significant experiences of humanity; the claim made on behalf of verbal intercommunication is now seen to be justified. Men's lives are primarily successions of events, series of deeds. Viewing the strivings and the sufferings of men in their order and sequence we have human history. Every individual has his history, so also has every group, and mankind as a whole. Through verbal communication we are able in a measure to repeat in our experience the history of humanity, to relive its significant happenings and crucial experiences. At first verbal communication was limited, we must suppose, to the interchange by individuals of their own experiences. But soon oral tradition took its rise, through which men learned of the deeds and achievements of ancestors and heroes of the remote past. Thus the world of social interchange enlarged and man's intellectual vision extended to take in other generations than his own, times long dead and places far distant. But always the requirements of rationality were operative: these reported deeds and reputed happenings must cohere with the order of

events open directly or indirectly to the experiencing of all. Definite criteria of truth and probability became effective and, when the invention of writing made verbal transmission more accurate, tradition gave place to history and science. Through the power of verbal and written communication culminating in history and science, each one of us to-day is made a sharer in the experiences of humanity, of his fellow-man in all ages, from the dark and shadowy past when he hunted the mammoth with clumsy weapons and decorated the walls of his cave with rude drawings, down the ages when he fought with unquestioning loyalty for half-understood causes on nameless battlefields or doggedly worked with crude implements and roundabout methods to wrest a poor crop from an unwilling soil, to the very present, when he sits in judgment upon his own history.

Through the verbal communication of an ever-growing social tradition to successive generations of individuals, that "consciousness of kind" which Professor Giddings holds to be the psychological basis of human as well as animal association, is lifted from the plane of instinctive feeling to that of rational realization. In this way the consciousness of human kind becomes not simply a perception of racial identity among human individuals but a knowledge on the part of each that all are sharers in a common group tradition, going back for its beginnings to the far past and perpetuating the memory of heroic exploits and illustrious achievements which exemplify and accentuate the supreme worth of the socially recognized values. In the words of Professor Giddings:

> Public opinion, tradition, and the combinations of opinion with tradition, are intellectual products of the social mind.

In constant interaction with them are the ever-changing moods of desire. In combinations of the intellectual products with desire, therefore, there is a final integration of the elements and products of the social mind. The resulting final products are the social estimates of what is socially important. They are social values, and are analogous to the subjective values of the individual mind. The consciousness of kind being the psychological basis of social phenomena, it follows that the supreme object of social value is the kind itself, or the type of social life that is characteristic of the society.[3]

Not only are the significant experiences of mankind preserved in their historic sequences to enrich the conscious lives of later generations; through the same medium of rational discourse human experiences are critically examined and reorganized so as to constitute what we call scientific knowledge of reality. Such reconstruction proceeds in accordance with two distinct principles of correlation. The difference between them goes back to the relation of all objects of thought to the power of rational will which is behind all conscious human life. To the will these ideal objects are ends possible of realization and, as such, they promise to reveal a definite character, a specific complex of qualities, when the conditions of their pursuit and realization are fulfilled. Obviously, such an object may be investigated with regard either to the conditions and manner of its existence, or to the various qualities it manifests when experienced, and the further satisfactions to which it opens the way. The first enquiry has its starting point in the movements of the agent and extends to the world in which those movements are carried out, the world of bodies that impinge upon one another in space and of the forces that de-

[3] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, 1903, p. 171.

termine their interaction. The second investigates the various qualities which objects possess by virtue of which they awaken interest and promise satisfaction; it seeks to discover which are compatible and which are antagonistic as objects of human choice. The first, the investigation of the causes and conditions of the existence of objects, developed as *natural* or *descriptive* science; the second, of the kinds and interrelations of values, as *normative* science. Since the interest which underlies the first is in the prediction and control of physical processes and events, its sole concern is with the relations of reciprocal determination between them. Hence science reveals to us a physical universe from which qualitative differences have been eliminated and whose changes proceed mechanically, as the motion of material atoms whose speed and direction are mathematically determinable.

Over against this mechanical system we have to set the world of normative science, the "realm of ends," which is every whit as real even if its organization is less akin to the world of external sense and hence is less easily imaginable. It was discovered by thinkers of the ancient world that values are organized in a system just as valid and objective in its way as the physical system of nature. Some objects are more comprehensive than others in the purpose they serve, the range of satisfactions to which they open the way. As objects of choice, food and applause promise experiences distinct in quality and characteristic interest. But wealth as an end is more comprehensive than food, just as reputation is more than applause. Both of these latter offer a wide range of experiences; they open up a variety of possibilities to be exploited in a series of choices; they include the two

former within their scope. Such general objects as wealth and reputation, moreover, are pursued by far-reaching activities extending over a period of time and involving continued association with other individuals. This holds true to even a greater extent of such ends as personal culture and family well-being, public order and national prosperity. Not only does their pursuit entail extended coöperative human endeavor, but their realization involves intercommunication and the exercise of social intelligence and imaginative sympathy among men. Pursuing its enquiry, normative science finds that human purposes are related according to their degree of comprehensiveness in a system which assigns to each subordinate end its place and degree of importance in the whole. This is the true "spiritual" world, the system of objects, domestic, educational, industrial, political, religious, which man in his social life is realizing and for which he must claim some enduring place in the total scheme of reality.

Thus the result of the rational reconstruction of the world of sense is to reveal to us the existence of two worlds, both claiming reality but distinct and, in some respects, opposed to one another. This opposition can be overcome only by tracing each back to its source in voluntary action which is the fundamental form of human experience. Here, in the light of their original function, their relation becomes clearer. Matter and mechanism exist to provide the common background of permanence and uniformity that is required if the creations of intelligent individuals, each of whom works freely and from an original point of view, are to be woven into a single social pattern. Such, in briefest suggestion, is the real-

ity to which the system of rational discourse introduces the human individual. Consider how different and how infinitely more meaningful is the world of rational discourse than that of common perception. Instead of having to adjust himself to a miscellany of natural objects by a variety of actions, some requiring a degree of skill, the individual is brought face to face with an articulated system of purposive pursuits with their accompanying satisfactions, a good to be realized by the joint enterprise of human invention and endeavor in the control of the system of mechanical and vital energies and offering when realized the wealth of meaning which reality takes on when interpreted by associated human personality.

Does not a consideration of the scope and significance of rational discourse justify the claims made for it at the beginning of this chapter? What it adds to a man's life has not to be subtracted from the sum total available for others' use and enjoyment, but constitutes an addition to the social resources of mankind as well. This is because its effect is not merely to increase the sum of a man's material possessions but to expand and to enlarge his own personal life to include what is valuable in the experiences of his fellows and the structure of the real world. And in the degree to which his own personal outlook is transformed and developed, the human individual is enabled to contribute to the associated life of humanity. This power which reason gives to man, of looking beyond the concerns of his own present situation, beyond the limits of his own lifetime even, and of taking the universal and social point of view from which he surveys himself and his earlier life as a passing episode in the course of human evolution and social progress is, in a way, fa-

miliar to us all, but its very familiarity prevents us from appreciating the wonder of it. We lament the limitations of the human lot, the shortness of man's natural life, the defects of his native endowment. But do we appreciate the marvellous power our intelligence gives us of recreating the universe and recapitulating the history of this planet and its successive forms of life, within the limits of our consciousness? Through the instrumentality of oral tradition and of scientific and historical writings we share the experiences of other men in many different places, both near and remote, and of all times from our own to the dim and bygone past. These experiences have been correlated in accordance with the laws that express the conditions of general intelligibility; they have been purged of all exclusive subjectivity and converted into objective facts. Through a realizing study which reinterprets them in the light of his own experience, the human individual enters into communion with the spirit of humanity and shares in the vicissitudes of its lengthy and checkered career. The full possibilities of intellectual intercommunication are realized when the individual, by thought and investigation, renders certain of his own experiences that are unique and significant into terms that are generally intelligible and thus makes them accessible to his fellows of his own and future generations.

In conclusion, then: verbal intercommunication or discussion increases the meaning and value of human life to an incalculable extent because it opens to the individual the experiences of other men of all times and places, experiences of human interrelation and physical adventure, and each new point of view or range of per-

sonal experience imparts added interest and significance to the whole. Does this seem an exaggerated importance to attribute to mere words even when they are instruments of communication? Words are but symbols, to be sure; they have no rational meaning or personal value unless translated into terms of concrete, first-hand human experience. But given such experience of the fundamental facts and features of human life and the social situation, then words become the cues which prompt active intelligence and constructive imagination to recreate by selective analysis and recombination of the data of ordinary human experience the principal events of human history and the salient features of the real universe. Thereupon the outlook of the individual is progressively transformed: the objects directly presented are set in new relations; material objects and natural forces previously perceived as particular items of the physical environment are now understood as the outcome of mechanical forces which in their interplay constitute the physical universe; human traits and tendencies, dispositions and behavior, previously perceived as opaque facts to be accepted and coped with as might be, are now seen in historic perspective, understood and appreciated in the light of the age-long struggle between man's animal inheritance and his social intelligence.

CHAPTER VI

COÖPERATION

A lecturer upon scientific subjects once said in my hearing that he experienced the greatest pleasure of his life when in the course of one of his lectures he was conscious of explaining a difficult point so successfully that he could see that his audience was really grasping and appreciating the meaning he was trying to convey. This reminded me of the remark of another acquaintance who was also a student and teacher of natural science: "I think that the most satisfying experience connected with my work comes when my students and I are working together in the laboratory and I realize that I am directing their activity to good results and their success stimulates me to greater effort." Now both of these men were teachers; both were engaged in imparting or communicating something of meaning and value. Yet there was an essential difference in the two cases both as to the material imparted and the method of communication. The second man was trying to impart, not ideas through the medium of speech, but methods of laboratory operation through force of practical example and demonstration. This second form of intercommunication we have now to consider. It falls within the field of action and takes place through actual performance, through objective demonstration and example. What is communicated

consists of ways of working, of practical contrivances, inventions and achievements, and these comprise mechanical tools and processes, technical methods and devices, as well as social expedients, customs and institutions — in fact, all the products of action in the physical and social spheres. To accord this recognition to action in distinction from thought and feeling, holding that it opens a field of genuine personal intercommunication, will seem strange to those schooled in the idealistic tradition. The matter is certainly one of crucial importance to a true understanding of the social relations of men.

The social and moral value of outward action, in distinction from the exercise of thought or the appreciation of beauty and sublimity, has been largely ignored or even denied by the moral and social philosophy of the past. This surprising prejudice against the "merely practical" has many causes: some of them have been previously referred to. The fact is that thinkers have approached this subject of the value of action and practical performance with a bias derived from their general convictions as to the relation of man and the human faculties to the natural world. If they were idealists they felt constrained to exalt the "spiritual" ideals of truth and beauty and divine goodness as alone possessing universal validity and value, and to disparage outward action as concerned merely with material comfort, pleasure and utility. If, on the other hand, they prided themselves upon a naturalistic bias, produced perhaps by exclusive preoccupation with physical science, they were eager to stress the biological function and physiological utility of action, and to prove that the so-called higher activities of intellectual insight and æsthetic and religious appreciation also owe their origin and development to

their utility as means of natural adjustment and of individual and group survival. Now here, as in so many cases, views which are extreme opposites prove to be infected with a common error. The error in this case consists in taking for granted that action at any rate is inevitably and altogether utilitarian. But advancing knowledge of human nature and the trend of social evolution are rapidly dissipating any basis of fact there may seem to have been for making a distinction in this regard between man's powers of action and his intellectual, æsthetic, or religious faculties. We are now assured that our activities of intellectual insight, æsthetic appreciation, and religious aspiration, have their bodily modes of expression, and we also recognize (what has been plain enough at all times) that knowledge may be sought and art produced and religion cultivated from selfish or mercenary motives. And, on the other hand, the slowly growing power of the humanitarian ideal proves that action may have a purpose as comprehensive and humane as that of intellectual research and religious devotion. And when it does, it involves intercommunication of the real sort. More than this, we shall further see that all action in so far as it is initiated and directed by rational purpose has an end that is, at least implicitly, universal, and therefore relates it to the inclusive social community.

The different kinds of movement that man is capable of making depend directly upon his bodily structure and serve to emphasize the close relation of his physical organism to its natural environment. While his powers of movement do thus indicate his close relationship, founded on descent, to the lower forms of life, man's most characteristic actions are distinctive, since they depend

upon structures peculiar to his own species. These structures are, first and foremost, the hands along with accompanying developments of wrist, arm, and shoulder. "Man could not have attained his present dominant position in the world," says Darwin, "without the use of his hands which are admirably adapted to act in obedience to his will."[1] There can be no question of the superiority of the human hand with its opposed thumb, as an instrument of manipulation and construction, over any organ or structure possessed by any other form of life, even the higher apes. "To throw a stone with as true an aim as a Fuegian in defending himself or in killing birds requires the most consummate perfection in the correlated action of the muscles of the hand, arm, and shoulder and, further, a fine sense of touch."[2] And not merely do the fine efficacy and delicate precision of the human hand as an instrument of investigation and fabrication depend upon the correlated adjustments of the wrist and arm; it presupposes, and is consequent upon, other far-reaching changes which accompanied the assumption of the erect posture.

In addition to possessing thus in his own hands a special equipment for effective action, man has an instinct which prompts him to make use of these structures in manipulating and altering the objects of his environment. This is usually called the constructive instinct; sometimes, as in recent discussions of the industrial problem, it is named the instinct of workmanship. The scope of this instinct is somewhat uncertain, but its existence is in no way doubtful; practically all psychologists affirm

[1] Darwin, *Descent of Man*, chap. ii.
[2] *Ibid.*

its existence. Man's continued survival has always depended upon the use he has made of the objects and materials of his physical environment; his principal instinctive satisfactions arise from the successful pursuit and unhindered appropriation of these objects. But the constructive instinct reveals its presence in the interest which man takes in the activity itself, the activity of manipulating and controlling natural objects, without particular regard to their possession or use. Of course any activity that is constructive serves a purpose; its constructiveness consists in the adjustment it brings about of existing objects and agencies to foreseen and intended results. But the point is that man possesses an innate tendency to interest himself in the assembling of materials and the creation of technical instrumentalities that serve rational ends, quite apart from any attraction or interest that the ends themselves may have for him. The savage first chipped the flint into shape of spear-point or other tool or weapon because he needed the spear or hammer or scraper; but in case he developed skill he came to enjoy making spear-heads for its own sake and without reference to his own need of weapons. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the existence of the constructive instinct in man is furnished by the play of children. Almost as soon as the child is able to grasp and handle his blocks he begins to "build houses" with them; to "make something," generally in imitation of the constructions of the grown-up world, is a primary motive of children's play; the exercise of the constructive instinct in games is one of the first stepping-stones in primary education.

Without hands capable of manipulating objects and

of fashioning tools and the instinct to make use of the instrumentalities thus created in transforming his natural surroundings, man could never, Darwin says, have risen to his present dominant position in the world. Indeed, without these powers of constructive action, human evolution, as we know it, would have been quite impossible. For the effective employment of the hand and arm in constructive work, more is necessary, however, than the prompting of instinct; intelligence must furnish guidance. In the case of man, fortunately, sufficient intellectual capacity was developed for the direction of action and industry. While human action had thus the advantage of rational control from its early beginnings it is, on the other hand, certain that action and the outcome of action, beneficial or otherwise to the individual, were an important factor in the development of human intelligence. No doubt the development of the two faculties of intellect and of practical construction were closely correlated and went hand in hand. As his readers are well aware, the French philosopher Bergson holds that human intelligence developed as the faculty for making and using "unorganized instruments" or mechanical tools. He believes, in fact, that this power of dealing constructively with physical objects differentiated the human species on its first appearance, the date of man's advent on earth being set by the manufacture of the first weapons and tools.[3] Mechanical invention, he holds, has been from the first the dominating factor of human life. While not necessarily agreeing that the development of human intelligence has been dictated throughout by the

[3] Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Translated by Mitchell), 1911, p. 137.

requirements of action and the properties of matter, we must admit that it would be equally one-sided to say that pure intelligence is responsible for man's achievements in practical construction. Certainly true is it that man's experience of constructive labor has given pronounced stimulus and definite direction to his intellectual development.

If actions are to have social significance, however, they must be capable of communication and therefore of incorporation in the common experience of mankind and, as we have seen, only experiences which possess intelligible meaning can be, in the full sense of the word, communicated. How do actions acquire this meaning? Suppose that we examine our consciousness of effortful movement. This is made up mainly of sensory elements from two sources: the muscular systems which are brought into play and the organs of vision. A series or sequences of pressure and strain sensations is coördinated with a series of visual sensations. As one swings an axe, he is conscious of a succession of "kinœsthetic" sensations arising first from straightened back, uplifted arms, and tightened grasp, continuing with changes in intensity and distribution which follow one another in serial order as the back is bent and the arms are swung, and culminating in a blow whose stinging impact is felt in the hands and as reverberating through the body. Closely correlated with these sensations resident in the muscular system is a series of visual sensations centering in the point at which the blow is aimed, including a perception of the body bending and the arms swinging in the stroke, and culminating in a glimpse of the effects of the blow. Now this, the consciousness of one's own movement, derives

meaning from the end toward which the movement is directed. In addition to the sensory complex just described, there is present in the consciousness of one who moves voluntarily, and not automatically from habit or inherited reflex, an idea of the result at which he is aiming. This idea of sought-for result plays a directing part: in the case of extended action it guides the sequence of movements, checking some and encouraging others, according as, in performance, they appear to promote or to hinder the realization of the chosen end.

Now, unquestionably, the result aimed at and achieved through the succession of bodily movements gives meaning to the action. This idea of result, understood by the agent as the end at which he aims and for whose realization he strives, can be understood and appreciated by others. And in as much as the action itself takes place in the external world and is open to the observation of others, it is susceptible of interpretation by them in terms of the result at which their own intelligence and experience tells them the agent is aiming. Therefore the action means to observers as well as to the performer an effort to realize through rationally directed movement an object whose character is anticipated in idea and whose qualities as thus imagined are actively sought as sources of satisfaction.

Still, what is distinctive of action, what serves to differentiate it from, say, discussion, as a means of intelligent intercommunication, has yet to be explained. In order to make this clear, let us ask: In what way does action *mean* or *express* its preconceived end? In the same way that words, spoken or written or printed, mean an idea — that is, as the physical sign or external symbol

of the idea of the desired object? No, there is an essential and noteworthy difference. A printed manual of directions may mean a certain course of action in the sense of verbally describing it in every detail. So if I decide to go into gardening, about which I know little or nothing, I may buy and read a book in which the whole procedure of laying out, planting, and caring for, a garden is described in every step and last detail. Undoubtedly the pages of description and instruction which I read with care mean making a garden. But in quite a different way do my actions mean making a garden when, by dint of much toil and after some tribulation, I succeed in raising the flowers or the vegetables upon which I had set my mind. Actions, then, do not simply symbolize to the outward eye the imagined objects at which they aim; they signify *the power of the human will to control existing nature and to make use of its forces, physical and vital, in producing a desired result.* Intellectual meaning, realized through words, extends and deepens the insight of thought into the nature of the real world: this is its rational and personal value. Practical meaning, realized through action, signifies increased power of man's rational will over the conditions of his external environment. This realization of increased power is what gives intelligible meaning and personal value to constructive action. And, like all forms of personal meaning and value, it is universal, is capable of being understood and appreciated by all intelligent individuals. It is felt by the agent who, by the exercise of contriving skill and executive ability, triumphs over all obstacles and adapts existing forces and agencies to the realization of his purpose. It is also communicated to

others. The spectacle of constructive human endeavor is always interesting, sometimes fascinating: our wills respond sympathetically to any exhibition of rationally directed power; we appreciate eagerly any originality of contrivance or inventiveness of procedure displayed. How intently the gathering crowd on a city street watches the movements of two workmen who, engaged in demolishing a building, stand now on a brick wall and with cautious and tentative movements of their crow-bars endeavor to dislodge and topple over the edge of the wall a steel beam, without such damage to the wall as would threaten their own safety! The attentive observers respond sympathetically to every movement, making instantaneous estimate of its adequacy.

We now return to the result which is anticipated in idea and whose achievement has this kind of meaning and value. Is it not going too far to say that all action which utilizes the forces and materials of the physical world to realize a preconceived and intelligible end, is *constructive*, no matter what the nature of the end may be? Must we not admit that some actions which aim at, and by exercise of inventive ability and practical contrivance achieve, results that are intelligible enough to everybody, are destructive rather than constructive? May not the forces of nature be used to destroy human life, to imperil society, or even to wreck civilization? What of the man who displays mechanical ingenuity and practical resourcefulness in contriving and putting to successful use some new and highly efficient method of blowing open safes? Is his action constructive? Or that of the man who invents some new type of "infernal machine" by which he or others can deal wholesale death

to their fellows with the safety of complete concealment? Or of him who makes a poison gas capable of exterminating in one breath a whole city population? These are extreme instances but they give point to the question before us? Do not such sinister possibilities as these examples suggest compel us to acknowledge that the result aimed at must in some sense be *good* in order that the action be genuinely constructive and possess the communicable value referred to.

Here we must go carefully, however. Constructive activity, we say, has communicable meaning and value because it signifies an increase in the power of rational will over the conditions, physical and physiological, that limit its activity. It means, then, the liberation of intelligently directed activity in the external world of human behavior. Every human being when he enters upon intelligent life finds himself possessed of the power to direct and control his own bodily movements. But when he attempts to deal with external objects, as he must if he is to fulfil his desires, he finds that his power over them is strictly limited. Physical objects have their own properties and physical forces obey their own laws regardless of human hopes or wishes; the vital and psycho-physical reactions of living beings and also of fellow humans are determined by their own conditions; indeed, the human being finds, as we all know, that even his power over his own bodily movements has decided limits. Constructive activity extends the power which man has to work changes in his natural and social environment by means of bodily movements of his own; it so manipulates and contrives with external objects and agencies that they, while acting in accordance with their own nature and laws, produce

results at which it has consciously aimed. The adaptation may be very simple, the use of stones to throw as missiles or of boughs and brush to make a shelter, or it may involve the intricate combination and delicate adjustment of many different materials and forces which have been previously analyzed into their constituent elements and subjected to exhaustive experimental investigation, as was the case with the construction of the modern automobile or airplane. But in all cases the principle is the same: action is really constructive which increases the scope and efficacy of human activity in the external world, and the power of human intelligence to control its physical and social environment.

Accordingly, an action which is itself ingenious and effective but which diminishes man's practical resources and lessens his power and control over the external conditions of his existence is not truly constructive, but the reverse. It is possible that man's powers of practical construction should be used to defeat themselves. This would be true of a man who, because of pique, applied all his powers of skill and contrivance to blot out every trace of a practical invention he had made, in order to deprive mankind of its use. Or of the man who devised with great sublety a form of will and testament which would legally enforce the destruction of his life's productive labor so that rivals might be prevented from benefiting by it. It might also apply to the invention of a tool, method or machine, involving a new use of natural forces, but to serve a criminal design. The governing purpose, we may hold, is clearly destruction — of life or of property. Nevertheless this case is not quite so clear. The invention itself, if it signifies a real in-

crease in man's power over the forces of nature, can be utilized by others to enlarge the scope of human activity and satisfaction. The fact seems to be that such an invention possesses a practical value on its own account which is universal, regardless of the particular motive, purpose or circumstance that called it forth. This value, while it may not be appreciated by the inventor, is nevertheless available for communication to, and realization by, other men. Tradition contains many stories of the trivial causes and selfish motives that have led to important, even to epoch-making, inventions. Evidently, then, these cases which on first thought may perplex us do not contradict or overthrow the principle enunciated that all action which adjusts or adapts physical forces or agencies to the realization of a preconceived and clearly understood purpose, has a meaning and value that can be generally appreciated and effectually communicated. Either the action is really self-defeating, and consequently not constructive at all, or else, in spite of the conditions and circumstances that called it forth, it has constructive features and to that extent possesses the meaning and value in question.

The way is now open for a further step. We have next to see that all constructive action is in essence *co-operative*, implying the comradeship of all men in the execution of the world task of subjecting the forces of nature to the purposes of social intelligence. Not, to be sure, that the power of practical invention and construction is always exercised for the common or social good; as we have already seen, this is not necessarily the case. Doubtless the first practical contrivances were made, the first tools manufactured, the first technical methods de-

vised, by individuals who sought to satisfy their own instinctive needs and desires. The first bows and arrows were probably made by some savage who wished to be more successful in hunting. And the invention was effective in enabling the inventor to obtain more food by enlarging his range of activity on the hunting grounds and increasing the amount of game he could kill with safety to himself. But such a practical invention which proved itself efficient and successful could be copied by other individuals, provided they had the interest and the desire to do it.

Furthermore, it is a fundamental fact of human nature that all men do possess the same primary instincts and are actuated by the same natural desires. Hence all, savage as well as civilized, have similar practical interests: interest in the means and methods of subsistence, in agreeable companionship, in family ties, in safe and speedy means of transportation and communication, in a secure and orderly walk of life. This being so, any improved method or new implement that was successful in meeting one of these common human needs would be eagerly adopted and utilized by all members of the group. The invention of the bow and arrow, to revert to our former illustration, would change the hunting methods of the tribe and eventually reorganize all its militant activities on a new basis. In this way all members of society would experience the practical benefits accruing from an organization of their activities under the direction of constructive intelligence. After they had mastered the new and improved technique that coördinated the activity of all they would receive from their own efforts an exhilarating sense of increased power and

would be stimulated to make further improvements in the accepted practice. And as men thus learned to work together, all the possibilities of action as a means of personal communication would be fully revealed. Then and then only does action become coöperative in the full meaning of the term. All participants follow the same general methods of operation which are generally understood and taken for granted. Within these limits of common procedure, however, each exercises his own freedom and originality in devising better methods for doing his part. But each works in the presence and under the scrutiny of others and receives from the ingenuity they exercise many practical suggestions for improving his own methods. Thus out of the give and take of practical invention and appreciative recognition there arises a new efficiency which is accompanied by a thrill of concerted achievement. It is that sense of "team work" of which team mates in athletic sports tell us, when the individuals engaged, without sacrificing their own initiative, but rather by means of it, are knit together by the common purpose they serve into a supremely effective working unit. Such is coöperation, the form which communication takes when fully developed within the field of action.

Thus we see that constructive action, because it has a rational meaning and value which can be communicated, tends to become consciously and deliberately coöperative. Men who apply themselves to the work of industrial production and social organization find an unexpected and growing joy in subjecting the forces of nature to the control of their own consciously formed purposes, quite apart from the particular object or advantage they are working to secure. This realization of increased power

and mastery which the inventor or organizer experiences from his own practical achievements is enhanced by others' intelligent appreciation and admiration; it is further augmented when he sees others reproducing his inventions, adopting his contrivances and following his methods. Hence those who devote themselves wholeheartedly to practical construction tend to become interested in tasks that have social importance and value; they are led to apply their powers to the betterment of the conditions of common life. And this brings its own reward. For technical invention makes possible organized industry and social administration, and as men work together in willing devotion to a common task, their powers of practical construction and technical efficiency achieve a culminating satisfaction, each one's sense of practical mastery being increased not only by the success of his own efforts but by the results successfully accomplished by the combined efforts of all. Thus constructive action, so far as it fulfills its own nature as rational and communicable, allies men as fellow-workers in the performance of common social tasks.

These facts, drawn from the social experience of mankind, suffice to drive home and clinch the central contention of this chapter that productive labor is a mode of personal intercommunication and a means whereby the human individual realizes a universal social good. The communication is accomplished through action which links the practical efforts of the individual with those of his fellows in coöperative endeavor to transform the natural conditions of human existence to meet the requirements of personal-social community. As to the last step in our argument some remaining doubt may be felt.

Before proceeding to more extended illustration and application of our conclusions it may be expedient to attempt a final reply to certain objections and misgivings that may have arisen in the mind of the reader. Even those who would readily admit that constructive effort to adapt physical forces and agencies to the rational uses of social life has universality of meaning and import, may find difficulty in agreeing that such action is coöperative in principle and implies a universal comradeship of human endeavor. Let it be granted, they might say, that human actions are governed by ends which are generally intelligible and that men have common purposes in life, it does not by any means follow that they must, or do, coöperate in practical pursuits. Just the contrary: we know very well that identical desires frequently provoke competition and strife rather than coöperation and helpfulness among men. And so far as practical invention is pressed into the service of individual desire and exclusive group interest, its effect will be to make competition more ruthless and destructive. Each individual or group will seek to appropriate for selfish use the means of satisfying the need which every one feels; so men have struggled for food and houses and lands, for honor and influence and authority, from the earliest times. And if men have some identical interests that can be sought only by coöperative effort it does not follow that the same interest will appeal simultaneously to all. Men have constantly failed one another in this respect, subject as they are to changing moods and shifting desires. Among our savage ancestors, when one would recruit a hunting party to replenish the food supply, he finds his fellows interested in a marauding expedition

or a home celebration; with us, those public-spirited souls who from time to time try to arouse their fellow citizens to make a united effort in behalf of some worthy civic enterprise in which they have a vital interest, find them one and all preoccupied with private business and family concerns.

To these objections an answer is furnished both by the nature of man as an intelligent person, and by the course of his social evolution. All men are sharers in the "common reason of mankind" and the action of all is governed, to a greater or less degree, by rational purpose. It is of the nature of rational will whenever and wherever it finds opportunity to express itself, to seek the most comprehensive satisfaction; among possible objectives that it wishes to attain to, it chooses the one that promises the widest range and greatest variety of agreeable activities. Now in the field of practical control and construction, the action that yields the most comprehensive satisfaction is the one that organizes the interests and correlates the activities of the largest number of individuals. For the individual whose practical endeavors are thus linked in operative unity with those of his fellows realizes as if it were his own the growing power and control over the external conditions of human life that is gained by the joint efforts of all. And the course of social evolution proves that mankind is slowly awakening to a knowledge and appreciation of this: gradually and in spite of many setbacks the conviction is gaining ground among men that the fullest and richest satisfaction comes only to the individual who completely associates his activities with those of his fellows, who accepts as his own the world task of improving

the physical and social conditions of human life universally considered.

The inventor, the organizer, the reformer, in the industrial and economic, the political and social fields, although their constructive work may to the external eye be carried on in complete seclusion, are nevertheless specialists in this practical form of communication. Their creative powers are stimulated by the social need: the object sought by their fellows in some branch of human endeavor interests them, becomes their absorbing preoccupation, and evokes their constructive skill. What they communicate is, of course, no material thing, or particular sequence of movements or sounds, not this tool or device or machine, not that graven tablet of laws or this social ceremonial or salutary regimen; their achievement is ideal, an ideal that is realized. It is a new human use, tried and established, for forces present and operative in the physical environment and the human organism, but combined in a new way that can be generally applied and regulated at will; it is a new adjustment and adaptation of existing materials to purposes that all men can understand and appreciate. Because of their rational character and appeal these inventions can be socially appropriated; all men can participate in their use. From the social environment the inventor, reformer or organizer receives his problem and draws his inspiration, and from him society acquires a new method for employing natural forces in the service of rational life.

Mechanical inventions, industrial methods, political procedures and ethical institutions, produced in the spirit of coöperation, are themselves sources of coöpera-

tion among those who use them. Oppressed in mind as we all are in these days by the prevalence of conflict and strife among men, and appalled by the devastating effects of warfare in the international and industrial fields, we are perhaps inclined to underestimate the amount of coöperation that has actually taken place among human individuals. The statement that human action has from the first been coöperative, in fact is in principle coöperative, may seem surprising, and the further statement that human action has at all times been coöperative in industry and in government provoke a derisive smile. Yet it is true. Within the family and the group, social order has always been maintained and social safety secured by organized effort. The limits of such coöperation were at first very narrow, to be sure; they have, however, been gradually, if slowly, extended. In the field of industry, men worked together from the start; industrial technique was a group, not an individual, possession. This was inevitable in view of the nature of the tool and of technical methods and instruments for subjecting the agencies and forces of the environment to the intelligent uses of man. These first tools were, of course, ready-made objects of nature, but chosen because of a dim perception of the requirements of this or that human purpose. Their shaping and perfecting were due to an increasingly clear consciousness of the ideal requirements of such instrumentalities and a comparison of different objects with these standards in mind. When shape and material were once clearly distinguished and the various possibilities fully investigated in both cases, men were enabled to standardize the processes of manufacture in accordance with the dictates of the ideal

pattern. The finished tool or appliance is consequently a result of the analysis of different natural forces and agencies that promise to contribute to the realization of human purposes and their recombination in such manner as to serve most efficiently this end. These instrumentalities embody methods of procedure universally effective because depending upon a selection from among the conditions of human action of those factors essential to the realization of a human purpose; they represent the reorganization of existing environmental forces by the power of creative intelligence at work in human society. Hence the individual in all stages of development who learns to use the tools, weapons, and appliances of his people receives from their employment a greatly augmented sense of power coming not merely from the increased control gained over natural forces, but also from the coöperative alliance with his fellows in the prosecution of identical purposes.

Thus we return to the point on which it is worth while to lay repeated emphasis because it gives us the clue to the social significance of all work of practical construction. The whole machinery of industrial production and social intercourse which is handed down from one human generation to the next, just because it represents the conquest of nature by an intelligence in which we all share, may be productive of experiences of comradeship in effort, of associated enterprise, which have highest ethical significance. The perfecting of tools and appliances in any department of industry means the establishment of a uniform procedure, a regular technique. This in turn favors concerted action on the part of individuals: many forms of labor become communal. Wundt tells us in his

Elements of Folk Psychology[4] how the use of the hoe has been in many tribes the source of a cult of community labor. Hoe culture, carried out by many individuals in adjacent fields at the same season of the year and with a common purpose of securing the harvest is quickened by a thrill of comradeship; a certain rhythm and tempo are observed along with accompanying expressive movements which symbolize and accentuate the coöperative unity of all. Plough culture, the same writer points out, individualizes labor: each man must guide his own plough in comparative isolation. But it must not be forgotten that plough culture makes feasible the division of arable land into separate holdings or farms whose cultivation becomes the common interest and coöperative employment of the family, often enlarged to include two or even three generations. And although such agricultural proprietorship has been handicapped by isolation from the larger social community, it remains within limits the most effective basis of coöperation that society has produced. The world contains no more impressive symbol of coöperative endeavor than the farm homestead. The division of labor that restricted farming to the farmer also limited the activity of other men to specialized trades and occupations. But here, too, while the new association was less wide and varied, it was in many cases more thoroughgoing and continuous. The master workmen, journeymen and apprentices were, or might be, associated in an intimate and inspiring way by the labor of the workshop. Indeed such a workshop illustrates in a striking fashion the possibilities of comradeship in industry; within it a

[4] *Cf.* Wundt's *Elements of Folk Psychology* (English translation by E. L. Schaub).

number of workers associated by a common aim and technique have each one as much opportunity for individual expression through creative work as his skill and experience may warrant.

Civilized man of to-day is often represented as the slave of the machinery he has himself invented and set up. But if modern man is in danger of having his soul crushed out by machinery the fault is his own and not that of the mechanical devices his intelligence has created. That extension of political and social organization which by the end of the last century had made the world one community was brought about by mechanical facilities of communication, transportation and production. If this enormous enlargement of man's powers of action has worked social injury, this is because its true meaning has been obscured and its normal influence has been stultified by the attempts of individuals to utilize it for private profit instead of finding in it means for more extended and effective intercourse with fellow men. Much of the machinery of social life now inherited by each successive generation is adapted to the use of all and, in civilized countries, all receive more or less training in its use. It is not merely such "modern marvels" as the telegraph and telephone, steam and electric transportation, automobile and airplane and radio, but such familiar instruments of commerce as coinage and bills of exchange, or devices to expedite the processes of government like the secret ballot and proportional representation, or any of those appliances and instrumentalities which have been introduced into our homes to add to the comfort and convenience of life. All these technical devices are social products, conquests of matter by that faculty in man whose scope is

universal, and the most of them directly encourage human intercourse and facilitate human coöperation. They should be used with a sense of their social significance. This requires some exercise of imagination, some power of intelligent correlation and, it must be admitted, these capacities are often-times defective and under-trained. Many individuals acquire a manual dexterity in working the machinery of social interplay, and employ now this, now that, instrumentality for their private convenience or gain, with no appreciation of the network of social activities into which they are drawn. It should, consequently, be made a prime concern of popular education so to enlarge the intellectual horizons of future citizens that they can follow in imagination the ramifications of their everyday activities. Our schools should give information concerning the growth, organization, and interdependence of the great industries that feed and clothe and house us, that put us into intercommunication or transport us bodily, without regard to barriers of earth or sea or sky. We are told that a regiment comes to realize its own unity by marching together. If men could be made conscious of working together, they would awake to a fresh realization of the social solidarity of mankind.

The power of action, frequently degraded to the position of a drudge whose sole concern is with the lower utilities of life, proves when investigated to be one of the principal means of personal intercommunication among men. So far from merely providing us with material necessities and thus giving us a little leisure for the exercise of our higher faculties of reason and æsthetic appreciation, action is itself an indispensable source of culture, both social and personal. For man's power as a rational

agent is not limited to projecting in the form of idea a system of objects whose distinctive qualities and permanent interrelations express the unity of his own will. He has also the power of initiating through his bodily organism the movements which are required to transform his actual environment so as to bring into existence the ideal object of his choice. He has, moreover, the power of creating instrumentalities (tools and machines) through which physical forces and agencies are made subservient to rational uses. What he communicates through action is not, therefore, his experience of objects which can be understood by others because open, directly or indirectly, to general verification, but rather the ways he invents, the methods he devises, for the expeditious and certain realization of such objects as appeal to the purpose and choice of men. Such inventions and expedients, once made or devised, can be reproduced, become standardized, and thus increase by so much the power of man's will over the external conditions which limit it. When the inventive powers of many individuals are enlisted in a common undertaking to which each willingly devotes himself, intercommunication of the practical type proceeds most eagerly and effectively; each worker is inspired by the inventive efficiency of his fellows to use his own originality in improving upon their methods and is encouraged by their ready appreciation of any contribution he may make to their joint procedure. Thus each receives from uniting his efforts with others an enlarged sense of personal power, that feeling of working fellowship, that zest of team play, which is one of the most fruitful and satisfying of human experiences. The complete fulfillment of the possibilities of human association requires that the in-

ventive faculties of all men should be engaged and allied in the discharge of the necessary and useful work of human civilization, and this not merely in order that the work shall be done most efficiently and thoroughly (for what was first the end becomes the means) but that each may realize from participating constructively in the comprehensive world-task, the identity of his own will with the one rational will directing the social evolution of man.

CHAPTER VII

IMAGINATIVE SYMPATHY

A third form of intercommunication depending upon the exchange of emotional experiences is open to man. We not merely think and act, we also feel, together with our fellows in society. Sympathy is now recognized as an original instinct or instinctive tendency of man. There is a disposition born in members of the human race as well as some animal species to reproduce the feelings observed in others. Thus the spectacle of others suffering pain or grief distresses us; their joy and enthusiasm please and cheer us; their fear and anxiety disquiet and depress us; their hope and confidence encourage and inspire us. Since the human individual feels others' pains and pleasures as his own, he is moved to promote their happiness or to relieve their distress as inevitably, if not as strongly, as he is to secure his own comfort and avoid, if he can, his own hurt. Thus instinctive sympathy means that human beings are attuned in feeling, and by this emotional rapport many of the fundamental reactions necessary to associated life are brought about and sustained.

Instinctive human sympathy is the transmission of feeling from one person to another by means of its external and observable signs. The groans, the cries, the tears, of one produce sorrow in the other who observes

them; so the smile, the dancing eyes, the shout, the laughter, awaken in observers something of the joy which the one who is rejoicing himself feels. But experiences to be "communicated" must, as we know, possess intelligible meaning. Mere feelings, pleasant or unpleasant, cannot be said to have such meaning; they are simply subjective states. As such they are facts, actual occurrences in somebody's consciousness. So much, of course, their bodily expression which we observe and respond to tells us, but this does not of itself constitute any meaning which we can by virtue of our common reason understand and appreciate. What we have now to consider, accordingly, is how feeling through the help of perception, imagination, and associated ideas, acquires rational meaning and thus becomes matter for personal intercommunication.

Let us begin with the simplest case. The sight of others who are terror-stricken normally produces the pangs of fear in ourselves. Laughter is in the same way infectious: if on entering a room we find the occupants laughing hilariously, we can scarcely help laughing too, although we are not "in on the joke" and feel foolish for doing so. Also the visible and active expressions of anger seem to provoke a similar feeling in the onlooker. At least this appears to be the case with mobs in early stages when the spectacle of an infuriated few starting to wreak their anger upon persons or property appears to induce a like feeling in others, and more and more of those who have joined the crowd as curious and excited spectators are swept into the work of destruction. Such transmission of feeling is probably best explained, not by referring it to a single instinct of sympathy, but by supposing that with

gregarious animals each principal instinct has been so modified as to respond not merely to its own proper stimulus but also to its visible and audible expression in the mien and behavior of others.[1] Can we say that the emotions which are thus transmitted, of fear or joy, of anger or wonder or love, have any rational meaning beyond the information they give us as to another person's state of feeling? They do ordinarily mean something, I think, concerning the objective situation or cause that called them forth. If I see a number of obviously panic-stricken people running down the street with contorted faces, screaming and waving their arms, I do not merely feel a pang of fear, but have communicated to me suggestions as to the danger that threatens: an explosion that is imminent, a flood that is coming, a mad dog which is running loose and biting people right and left. Or if I should see people hastening in a common direction with blazing anger written on their faces and such weapons as they could pick up in their hands, I would not merely be stirred by the anger of "collective defense" but would have thoughts of an outrage that had been committed or an attack that was menacing, of murder or pillage or rapine. In this case it is important to remember how remarkably effective an instrument the human face with its infinitely varying shades of expression is, not merely for the transmission of emotion, but also for communicating suggestions of meaning. It furnishes perhaps the primary instance of

[1] This is the theory of Professor McDougall, first advanced in his *Social Psychology,* further developed and applied in his *Group Mind.* In criticizing this theory, Professor Allport, in his *Social Psychology,* cites a number of interesting and important facts. But these facts seem to call for the revision rather than the abandonment of the theory. *Cf.* Allport, *Social Psychology,* p. 234.

the power of a sense object, possessing visible outlines, proportions and color-scheme, to convey both feeling and intelligible meaning. No one can doubt its efficacy as a medium of personal intercommunication, or that it enriches immeasurably the possibilities of human association. Although the prototype of all art models, its sensitiveness and mobility increase with culture and civilization, and artists continue ever to discover in it new resources of expression and significance.

The transmission of feeling in the manner just described, by the sympathetic arousal of identical instincts, is illustrated on a large scale by the psychology of the mob. The contagion of emotion that sweeps over such an assemblage and its cumulative intensification is in a great measure due to this fact, that primary human instincts react readily and strongly to their observable expression in the faces, words and actions of others, and the close physical contact of large numbers in the crowd heightens this susceptibility to a maximum. We now pass to a second case of the transmission of feeling which, while it depends to a degree upon instinctive sympathy like the first, introduces a new and highly significant factor. Think of the joyful enthusiasm that is aroused in a throng or great audience by the singing of some patriotic song or the display of a flag, standard, or banner, that has rich historic associations and a deep national or religious meaning. Such a wave of identical emotion might be attributed to instinct and hypnotic suggestion; it might be thought of as a mere case of "mob feeling." But, in many instances, it is assuredly more than this. The external symbol, flag, song, picture, or whatever it may be, arouses strong emotion in every individual pres-

ent because of the meaning it has for him; because it means his country which he loves, the religion in which he has placed his trust, or the hopes and ideals to which he has devoted his life. And the feelings which he sees others express have personal significance for him because they indicate that the same hopes, sentiments, and loyalties, possess them. His feeling is strengthened by the consciousness that others share the ideas and beliefs that have evoked it, and the emotional accord which is thus self-intensifying, is an index of personal understanding and agreement. Words are not needed to facilitate such personal communication; they would hinder rather than help it. The common response of feeling and of fancy to a sense object, whose beauties all perceive and appreciate, thus opens the way for the communication of experiences which on account of their very depth of meaning defy articulate expression. While bright and catchy tunes win hearty and hilarious applause from a popular audience, really great music is listened to by the majority with abstracted look and in constrained silence. This is because it has for them a meaning, it awakens thoughts, kindles associations, and stirs sentiments, before whose deep and solemn import they feel at once abashed and uplifted. Recognizing that others are having the same experience, they refrain from disturbing them by any act or sound. Yet, in spite of this, intercommunication of a real and satisfying sort is going on, far more profound and meaningful than could in these circumstances be accomplished by speech or action.

What significant point of difference is there between the second and the first case of the sympathetic transmission of feeling? The second differs from the first in

this respect: through the appeal which sense-objects, such as patriotic or religious music, banners and flags, uniforms and vestments, ceremonial parade and display, make to imagination and thought, feeling acquires a meaning, intelligible if not articulate, in consequence of which its transmission becomes a form of personal communication. This form of intercommunication through feeling involves the intermediation of external symbols which so stimulate the perceptive and imaginative faculties as to induce a feeling which, in connection with the images and associations that have been awakened, possesses a rational meaning. The meaning is of course attributed to the external object whatever it may be, picture or ceremony, tune, poem, or human face, that makes such appeal to feeling and fancy. This type of perception in its most highly developed form is called *æsthetic;* we frequently speak of it as *æsthetic appreciation.* In such instance which we might distinguish as the third of our cases, the feeling which is induced when some object visible or audible, like a landscape or musical composition, stimulates perception and kindles imagination to free and harmonious response, is accompanied by the judgment: this is *beautiful,* or this is *sublime.* In more trivial instances other adjectives are used, such as "pretty," "lovely," or "attractive," but when applied to an object they signify that it has this same influence upon our minds. How are we to explain the power which certain objects have when perceived to convey meaning through their influence upon feeling and imagination?

An answer to this question is at least suggested by the part played by feeling in that voluntary activity through which our personal wills grapple with external condi-

tions in an effort to secure their own fulfillment and self-satisfaction. The essence of personal character and development which (in spite of all we say about the vast, impersonal forces of nature) constitute the foundation and substantial core of our human experience, consists in this power we possess to project in the form of ideal ends those possibilities of expression and fulfillment that appeal to our individual natures, and then to strive with effort of practical contrivance and control, to realize them. Now in this process of planning and working and achieving with which we are all familiar, feeling, we may note, seems to indicate primarily the bearing or relation of things to *ourselves;* it is intimate and subjective in its import and emphasis. Certain objects of desire—cherished plans, life purposes, ardent ambitions—because of the possibilities they hold forth of self-expression and self-satisfaction, arouse in contemplation feelings of eager interest, of enthusiasm, even of rapture. Yet this joy we take in dwelling in imagination upon the plans we intend to carry out, the ideals we propose to realize, is broken in upon by contrary feelings. We cannot help thinking of the fact that the ambition is not yet achieved, that the desired object is not yet ours. And in this connection the thought of it produces a feeling of painful want that is almost intolerable, driving us forth from the pleasant, peaceful realms of fancy into the hard world of practical effort and struggle. In much the same way the work of practical pursuit, the endeavor at actual achievement, is accompanied by mixed feelings: on the one hand the pleasure of successful progress, of triumphing over obstacles, of approaching the goal; but, on the other, the

anger of temporary frustration, the anxiety of delay, the fear of final failure. But when by practical effort and contrivance the opposition between the object desired in idea and the conditions which actually exist is finally overcome, and the end which has been projected by thought and imagination is realized in present fact, this result is reflected in an undisturbed harmony of pleasant feeling.

This, the pleasure or the happiness of satisfaction, is the subjective reflection of the harmony achieved between ideal purpose and actual world; in union with the object the will feels itself at rest. As long as the desired object remained unrealized, it could, as we say, be only imagined: the perceptions which crowded in from the senses were such as to hinder if not to prevent even the ideal anticipation of its characteristic qualities; only by strained effort of attention was it kept before the mind in idea. But let the existing situation be transformed as the result of action and thus brought into harmony with the ideal purpose—then the sensory adjustments and bodily movements called for by present surroundings no longer obstruct or prevent the desired experience but rather facilitate and reënforce it. Sense perception and intelligent imagination work together in exploring its characteristic qualities: imagination discovers new possibilities of meaning in sense fact; sense perception supplies fresh data for intelligent interpretation and appreciation. Now this union of the ideal with the actual in which imagination is freed and perception illuminated is *felt* as satisfaction. Suppose that a man has for years desired to visit some distant region of great natural beauty or rich historic associations. He has

read all he could find in description of the region in question; he has talked with those who have been there; his imagination has dwelt fondly on its every feature. It costs an effort to build a structure of thought and fancy like this in spite of intrusive perceptions that force themselves in from the world of present fact, and when it is accomplished, these same perceptions testify to its *un*reality and reduce it to the status of *mere* idea. But now let some stroke of fortune permit our dreamer to visit the land on which his fancy has dwelt. Then the world before his eyes, the things he sees and hears and handles, no longer acts to turn his imagination from its cherished field, or to shut out the land of his favorite fancy. Instead the whole prospect present to his perceptive faculties serves to liberate his imagination and gives wings to his thought. The knowledge he has acquired adds meaning to what he observes, while the facts themselves serve to correct and to amplify his knowledge. This is what happens when any ideal is realized: this is what the feeling of satisfaction *means*.

Now there are certain objects which when only perceived or contemplated and not appropriated or possessed arouse in us, remarkable to say, a feeling akin to the satisfaction just described. These are primarily objects of sight and hearing, and the feeling is that of æsthetic appreciation or the enjoyment of beauty. The object we call beautiful, the sunset sky, the picture, the song, pleases us because when present to the senses it facilitates perception, liberates imagination, and thus conveys suggestions of far-reaching meaning. To have this power, sense objects must fulfil two requirements. They must first be such as to arouse the sense organ to which

they appeal to unimpeded and harmonious activity. In the visual field, for example, figures must have proportion, symmetry, balance, etc.; in the field of sound certain general requirements of tone-quality, harmony, and rhythm must be met. But, in addition to these general qualities, the object that is beautiful in the fullest sense must have the power of expressing in some particular way a meaning that is universal. But because this meaning is merely suggested, being symbolized in imagery of color or of sound, we identify it with the feeling that these sense qualities arouse in us—we say that we feel it rather than understand it. Thus with the painting that arrests my attention as I walk through the gallery: a winter scene picturing a country road in the sunset light, stretching away through snow-covered fields and lined on either side by trees whose gaunt, leafless branches bend to the cold wind. The picture casts a spell upon me. I forget my surroundings, I am for the moment completely absorbed in its beauty. It has, moreover, a meaning for me, although I should find it difficult to express this meaning with clearness or precision. It seems for the moment to illuminate the deeper mysteries of human life in its universal aspects: its remorseless progress, its bleak and chilling prospects, and the light of promise that shines over it.

The close kinship between æsthetic emotion and the feeling of satisfaction which accompanies the realization of rational purpose perhaps explains the power of beauty to convey the personal meaning and value realized in all human experience so far as it is guided by intelligence. This personal meaning which is embodied and glorified in objects of natural and created beauty is open to the

experience of all. The most that is asked of the beholder is an effort of intelligent attention and synthesis in imagination. And the reward is indeed great: a heightened joy in the patterns and textures of sense appearances, in the lights and shadows, the forms and colors, the proportions and movements, the tones, melodies and harmonies of the outer world; a more intimate insight into the typical facts and features of human life and a deepened sympathy for fellow men as they are subject to those crucial experiences of personal fulfillment and frustration which are the common lot of humanity. For, be it noted, it is not the meaning of personal fulfillment, of successful achievement, merely, that is expressed and communicated through æsthetic feeling. If this were the case then æsthetic enjoyment could do little more than reënforce the satisfactions we feel in finally gaining the objects upon which we have set our hearts. No, in the different forms of beauty all the typical and crucial experiences of our associated human life find embodiment and expression: hot desire and vaulting ambition, vague yearning and lofty aspiration, effective endeavor and blind struggle, frustration, disappointment and failure, as well as the triumph of success and the peace of fulfillment.

We may wonder how this can be in view of the close relationship pointed out between æsthetic enjoyment as a harmony of perceptual and imaginative response, and the satisfaction that is felt when an object desired in idea is finally realized in fact and its characteristic qualities explored and enjoyed at will. But we see the reason when we remember that the pleasure of æsthetic contemplation differs from the satisfaction which crowns successful pursuit and appropriation precisely in this

fact that in æsthetic enjoyment the opposition between subjective aspiration and objective fact, between desire and possession, between yearning and fulfillment, is in the nature of the case eliminated; it cannot obtrude itself, or prevent imagination from playing freely and with delight over the qualities of the object. Æsthetic appreciation lifts the object out from its context in the course of our purposively directed and intelligently organized lives and treats it as an end in itself, to be contemplated and enjoyed for its own sake. So we can feel the beauty and enjoy the meaning of tragedy as well as comedy; we can appreciate the beauty and majesty of nature in her menacing and destructive as well as her beneficent moods. We can feel the wild beauty and sublime sweep of the hurricane at sea which is driving human shipping to destruction upon many rocky coasts—perhaps not from the deck of one of these vessels which is being hurled onward toward the angry reefs, but this is because the consciousness of our peril prevents us from viewing the scene with the detachment of æsthetic contemplation.

Since the objects that we call beautiful seem to us to embody and reflect the deeper meaning of our life and the world, the person who can create them has an expressive medium for the communication of his own feelings and thoughts. While in discussing the æsthetic experience we have for the sake of simplicity confined our attention to painting and music, the field of art is of course much wider than this. It includes engraving and sculpture and architecture, the different branches of literary art, and extends to many other fields as well. What the artist finds expression for in his material medium is neither simple feeling nor pure thought; it is rather a

blending of the two, feelings which carry intimations or suggestions of meaning, in a word, emotions or sentiments. The power of artistic creation of the first order is a special gift, present to be sure among all peoples and in every age—but limited to a comparatively few individuals. We may all of us be fellow artists, however, if we care to cultivate the sense of æsthetic appreciation in ourselves. We may develop the faculty of discovering beauty in nature and in human relationships, which is the equivalent of creating beauty, as far as we ourselves are concerned. For, having found beauty in the natural world and in human life, we shall be instantly anxious to share its enjoyment: æsthetic delight seeks ever to reproduce itself in others' minds.

Perhaps the simplest as well as the most primitive type of æsthetic communication is through the changing shades of facial expression and the intonations and modulations of the human voice. Both are marvellous instruments for the interchange of emotion. How much is human intercourse enriched by the fact that the feelings which we betray in feature and in voice when confronted by a special situation, are answered to by the quick change which a like feeling produces in the countenance and voice of a friend or associate who understands! The parallel between the control which one has over his own features and their expression, and the control which the artist has over his medium is, of course, not exact—no one except the actor, perhaps, makes his own face and its varying possibilities of expression an object of conscious study. Still it is true that the shape and balance of feature, little tricks of eye and of mouth, complexion, carriage, tone and inflection of voice, make the same

direct appeal to feeling and convey in the same obscure way the meaning and flavor of personality—just as form and color-scheme give beauty and meaning to the picture. The essence of personality is spiritual not physical, we frequently affirm; it lies in the characteristic purposes and preferences, aptitudes and susceptibilities. Certainly personality is not to be identified with body; it belongs to a different order and must be interpreted by different categories. Yet we should not, if we wish to be candid with ourselves, forget how large a part these physical signs, these combinations of sense qualities play in determining the impressions we receive from others' personalities. In æsthetic appreciation, the sense facts which thought subsumes under logical concepts and action treats as mere signs of our power to achieve certain preconceived results reveal their own inward significance and radiate a wealth of personal meaning.

To the creative artist the products of his art serve not only to express his emotions with their intimations of personal meaning, they are also means of communicating them to his fellows. The two, communication and expression, are inseparable; they are aspects of the same process and go hand in hand. To express in a material medium open to the perception of all, feelings which suggest the profounder meanings of human life itself is to appeal to the experience of mankind and to seek confirmation in a universal concord of feeling. As a recent writer upon the subject of art and its social significance has stated it:

> The artist as artist speaks to mankind, not to any particular set of men; and he speaks not of himself but of that universal relation he has experienced. His effort is to establish that

universal relation he has seen, a universal relation of feeling. And to him, in his effort, there is neither time nor space. Mankind are not here or there; or of this moment or that; they are everywhere and forever. The voice of Mozart's music is a universal voice speaking to the universe of universal things. And all art is an acting of the beauty that has been experienced, a perpetuation of it so that all men may share it forever. The artist's effort is to be the sunset he has seen, to eternalize it in his art, but always so that he and all men may be part of this universe by their common experience of it.[2]

Thus a conclusion is reached highly important in its bearing upon our social life and relations. This is that beautiful objects, natural and created, constitute the most effective means for inducing a harmony of personal feeling among mankind in the large. Beauty, in nature and in art, arouses the same or similar emotions in all men because it symbolizes or suggests in some manner dictated by the medium of expression, what is universal in the human lot. The "universal" feeling to which beauty is said to appeal is therefore the capacity for a similar emotional response to the fundamental facts of human experience. Love of nature and the beauties of nature is always a bond of sympathy among those who feel it. Groups are kept together and drawn into coöperation by their common love for their natural habitat, the mountain plateau, the sheltered valley, the open plain, or the seacoast and the sea. How much of the spiritual tradition that unites the Arab peoples is due to a common emotion which the desert inspires, as seen in the hot sun of midday, in the cool of

[2] A. Clutton-Brock, *Essay on Art in Recent Developments in European Thought,* Edited by F. S. Marvin, p. 256.

evening, and under the mid-night stars. All classes and factions of a community forget the differences that divide them and unite to protect and preserve its spots of natural beauty. In the field of art, it is to the gifted few we look for those beautiful creations which win the applause of mankind at large and through succeeding generations. To the great artist is it permitted to give permanent and definitive expression to the great universally meaningful features of human experience in the material or the sensuous medium of which he is master. His work has therefore a universal human appeal; through the emotions it arouses, its meaning comes home to us all. Its enjoyment is a source of fellow feeling among men, a form of genuine intercommunication. That art has this effect of creating a harmony of feeling, an imaginative sympathy, among those who enjoy it, scarcely needs to be proved. We know that a common appreciation of the beauties of ritual and of ecclesiastical music and architecture is as strong a bond of union among fellow communicants as is agreement in belief. And in the political field, notably architecture, but also sculpture and painting, music and poetry, are most potent influences which work to maintain and intensify the feeling of national unity. Monuments which commemorate historic events and achievements, public buildings which symbolize national power and authority, songs and poems which celebrate the struggles and triumphs of the past and express the hopes and aspirations for future greatness—all these, in proportion to their true beauty, increase the sympathy among fellow citizens and strengthen their patriotic devotion. Indeed the real unity of a people or group is largely determined by the degree to which they, as individuals, have learned

to find satisfaction in these objects open to the enjoyment and appreciation of all, and are not wholly devoted to the pursuit of individual ambition and gain.

Man's efforts to objectify and communicate his emotions through artistic creation constitute one of the most characteristic and important features of his social life. From earliest prehistoric times he has found satisfaction in pictures and engravings, in chants and ceremonial dances, which cannot be explained in terms of organic adjustment and which must be attributed to the intrinsic significance that these art products have had as an expression of his dawning intelligence. The cave man of Europe at the close of the glacial period was decorating the walls of his grotto with carefully wrought designs, and patiently shaping figures from bone and ivory. The products of primitive artistry, pictures and ornaments, rhythmic movement and melody, were probably employed as magical means of protection; but magical potency was ascribed to them, doubtless, because of the mysterious power they exercised over those who produced or perceived them. They were appreciated by primitive man as beautiful objects are appreciated by us to-day, because through the emotions they arouse they signify more or less definitely those fundamental experiences of personal aspiration and achievement, or personal disappointment and haunting regret, which are common to the lot of mankind as possessed of rational will which strives for self-expression in the face of a partly alien and sometimes hostile environment. The accumulated art products which each human generation receives from those preceding are witness to that which they themselves have fostered, the personal sympathy, the rational concord, of humanity.

CHAPTER VIII

DEMOCRACY AND THE MORAL IDEAL

Throughout the chapters that have preceded, a close connection has been assumed between the aim of democracy and the ideal of morality. This conception was affirmed in the definition proposed at the start, of democracy as a political and social system in which men, by joint efforts freely put forth, realize a common social good. So the equality which democracy is understood to insist upon was said to be primarily a *moral* equality, the right of all members of society and ultimately of all human beings to an equal opportunity of participating in the comprehensive social good. Without question, many sincere friends of democracy will think it a mistaken policy thus to link its cause with the hopes and the vision of moral idealism. As far as past history and development are concerned, they will say, not even the most enthusiastic admirers of modern democracies can hold that they have been conspicuous for their lofty and humane idealism. And, in facing the future, the chief reason for pinning our faith to democracy is that it constitutes on the whole the most practicable and promising method for dealing with the realities of the social and political situation of civilized mankind. On this, they will assert, rather than on the moral principles or social ideals which it proclaims, rests the claim of democracy to our support.

If, on the contrary, it merely voices our aspirations toward moral perfection and the social millennium, it is condemned in their view to the inefficiency and futility which they are ready to charge against all varieties of idealism.

There is much in the trend of modern civilization to suggest that democracy has little enough to do with idealism. This we may readily admit, whether or not we agree, "So much the better for democracy." And, for that matter, there are many facts of civilized social life to excuse this curt dismissal of idealism as visionary and futile. But in the historic beginnings and development of modern democracy special influences have been at work which have counteracted its inherent idealistic tendencies and have finally brought social and moral idealism itself into something like discredit and disrepute.

Modern democracy arose in the eighteenth century as the result of a revolutionary movement by which the individual citizen won (in name, at least, and to a considerable extent in actuality) his liberty. This meant that he gained the right to freedom of thought and action in the political, economic, and other departments of social life and relations. Previous to this, western society had been organized on the basis of established and acknowledged authority. Such social organization with its fixed differences of hereditary caste and privilege did provide a way whereby the individual could participate in the larger social good and thus give scope and dignity to his life. Through faithful discharge of the duties of his station, by loyal devotion and faithful service rendered to sovereign and to country he might share in the achievements and the glories of his nation. He might, in Pro-

fessor McDougall's phrase, extend his "self-regarding sentiment" to the group, with resulting expansion and enrichment of his individual life. But, with all its merits, this type of social organization resting upon authority and fixed social status had one fatal defect: it stifled the individual by the crushing weight of an iron-bound social system. It was unjust to individuals for it deprived them of the elementary right to self-expression and self-fulfillment. It was unjust to society, depriving it of the fruit of individual talent which for its growth and ripening requires an atmosphere of freedom and opportunity.

Hence to the mind of its founders and of the generations that directly followed, democracy stood, first of all, for liberty. Its establishment signified that the individual had obtained the right to freedom of speech and a voice in the government, the right to liberty of conscience and of religious faith and worship, the right to choose his own occupation and to seek therein the means of support and happiness, the right to sell his labor and the products of his labor in free competition with others, the right to accumulate and invest, to spend and bequeath, the wealth he had earned. Consequently democracy defined itself in the modern mind as an association of individuals freely governing themselves, equal before the law and with equal rights to seek, in unrestricted competition with others, the material means of happiness and to enjoy the benefits of their own productive activity and economic interchange within the system. A fine conception (despite its dubious emphasis upon the competitive pursuit and individual enjoyment of material wealth) whose influence has been productive of social

benefits we cannot afford to lose! Resting upon the cardinal principles of "liberty, equality, and fraternity," it seemed in the opinion of the political and social idealists of a century ago to promise the speedy realization of the Christian ideal of human brotherhood and the spiritual unity of mankind. Why has democracy disappointed the hopes of these idealists and brought no nearer the realization of the moral ideal of free personal participation in an inclusive social good?

It would be easy to answer: Because democracy in its modern form has encouraged and sanctioned a competitive struggle between individuals for the goods of life which is necessarily antagonistic to the spirit of social community and must finally prove fatal to it. But this answer does not take us very far. It merely calls our attention to a symptom; it does not diagnose the underlying trouble. What we wish to know is why modern industrial democracy, democracy as we know it, has developed in the direction it has. The question is important because of its bearing upon another problem: that of the limitations of social and moral idealism. But an answer can be found only through an analysis that penetrates beneath the superficial aspect of modern democratic social organization.

Democracy in the modern world has meant the liberation of individual activity. It has turned the attention of individuals away from the social satisfactions which they might expect to enjoy in virtue of the circumstances of their birth and early training, to the possibilities of improving their situation by dint of their own enterprise and effort. It has spurred the individual to restless activity on his own behalf; its gospel has been that of

getting on in the world by hard work and shrewd calculation. Now self-directed activity is the primary condition of all self-development and personal satisfaction: without it no individual can make a contribution to social life which will identify him with the community and thus enlarge the content of his own satisfactions. But whether individual activity *is* thus productive of social good and personal satisfaction depends entirely upon the ends toward which it is directed and the methods by which it succeeds in attaining these ends. Now there was much in the social situation of the enfranchised modern individual to appeal to that group of instincts commonly called "self-seeking" or "self-preservative." Not merely the elementary instincts of food and fear but also the instincts of acquisitiveness, self-assertion, and rivalry. The objects of these instincts can be depended upon to make a strong appeal to the normal individual at all times. These are the things we all of us naturally desire: physical security and comfort, the ease and the pleasure, the social deference and distinction, which the possession of wealth affords. Furthermore the outward activities by which these objects of natural desire are gained are themselves roughly mapped out in the human nervous system; instinct makes provision for them. Instinct makes it natural and social habit confirms it as second nature for men to build and contrive, to calculate and accumulate, in active competition with one another.

But these are the factors that would operate at any time; the liberation of individuals would simply mean the release of these natural desires. Quite in addition to their influence, modern science and invention were opening before the vision of mentally alert individuals in the

youthful democracies of a century ago dazzling possibilities of adding enormously to their wealth and life's enjoyment through the use and control of the forces of nature. It is not surprising, therefore, it was probably inevitable, that of all his newly found rights the one the individual most eagerly seized and energetically exploited was that of working along lines of his own choosing in free competition with others for the material means of subsistence and enjoyment. And when we remember that modern technical progress culminated a century ago in an industrial revolution in which the employment of machinery, the organization of factories and the use of mechanical power enormously increased the amount and variety of goods produced, we do not wonder that industrial activity became the absorbing preoccupation of modern democracy. The character of social life has been transformed by the multiplication of comforts, conveniences and utilities produced in ever-increasing amounts and more and more widely distributed. The use and enjoyment of these material aids and accessories to comfortable and pleasant living give added importance to industrial activities and processes in the popular estimation, and heighten their interest and appeal to the individual. Moreover, large-scale mechanical production gives opportunity for enormous profits which are always alluring to individual ambition; hence, industrial production tends to become an end in itself motivated not by the desire to meet human needs but to increase individual profits.[1] Of course, in our industrialized democracies,

[1] A study, at once illuminating and profound, of the tendencies in modern civilization is to be found in G. P. Adam's *Idealism and the Modern Age*. Professor Adams seems hardly to do justice, how-

the higher fields of personal activity and achievement have not been altogether neglected. Men have made socially fruitful use of their new political liberties and also of the freedom of thought and expression which, in spite of intermittent relapses, has continued to exist on a scale unapproached in any previous century. It is a significant fact, however, that human science has made its most notable advance in the field of the physical and the biological sciences where its conclusions promise to be most useful in guiding man's efforts to control natural forces in the interest of human industry and commerce.

So we find industrial democracy in our day elaborately and successfully organized—for the production and consumption of material wealth. And this network of industrial processes which dictates the activities of individuals under threat of economic privation and ultimate extinction depends for its *go* upon the appeal which it makes to the instincts of acquisition, self-assertion and competition. Before the eyes of democracy as thus organized, idealism, moral and religious, has not failed to hold up its ideal of a comprehensive social good in which all human individuals by virtue of their intelligence and personal wills are free to participate. Such idealism has proved largely ineffective. And because ineffective it has lost prestige and authority. But the reason for this is not simply that idealism has stood for altruism and brotherly love in a society which has abandoned itself to a competitive struggle for wealth, a mad scramble for selfish advantage and enjoyment. Whatever we may

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ever, to the creditable and encouraging features in the modern social situation.

say of the motives to which modern industry and business appeal in the individual, their results have been to increase enormously the sum total of human security and comfort and well-being. Furthermore, there is no just ground for supposing that the impulses in question, of ambition and emulation and acquisition, may not have a legitimate and necessary function in evoking the individual effort required to provide the necessary basis for the life of social brotherhood and personal community. No, the trouble with idealism has been that the high principles and lofty aims which it professed and recommended made no connection whatever with the impulses and motor activities of individuals through which alone it could be realized. Hence its ideal remained a mere ideal, a utopian vision of a social order so different from the one we know as to be realizable, if at all, only in another and a better world. And devotion to such an ideal was bound to fade into a mere glow of moral sentiment, a mere gesture of pious admiration.

We now know, however, that there are motor activities at the command of the human individual by which he can realize in his own way the inclusive social good. These are the activities of speech, of practical contrivance and construction, and of æsthetic perception and appreciation. We have also seen how, through the exercise of these capacities in discussion, coöperative endeavor, and imaginative sympathy, men participate in the satisfactions of personal fellowship and rational community. We have now to consider a little more specifically why the life of universal social community thus open to human realization possesses a worth, objective and absolute, which makes it superior to all other values and entitles

it to recognition as the highest human good, authorized to prescribe the moral standards of democracy.

The distinguishing mark of human conduct is that it is *self-determined.* Hence no study of man's conduct can be illuminating or profitable which does not accord to his rational will its rightful position of central importance and determining power. It is equally necessary to be clear from the very beginning as to the nature and demands of the human will. By nature it is intelligent and, as such, craves the completest satisfaction it can attain. More specifically, it seeks to enlarge the scope of its own free activity to a maximum by bringing within the range of possible realization the greatest variety of intrinsically interesting and mutually enhancing objects. Now this is not to say, to be sure, that every human being, so far as he possesses the power of deliberate choice and voluntary endeavor is conscious of seeking in all his choices and actions "the most comprehensive satisfaction." Perhaps, what he wishes is no more than his savage ancestors most frequently desired—a square meal. And this desire itself is susceptible, biologically speaking, of explanation as the effect of the action of some stimulus, external or internal, upon the food instinct which owes its existence and strength in human beings to its survival value. But, in so far as he is actuated by rational will (and this is the real point of the matter) he does not desire and seek a full meal in order to gratify his food instinct or to repair his tissues or to promote his ultimate survival, but in order to experience the taste and relish of it, to enjoy in actual fact those stimulating and filling qualities which his whetted appetite anticipates in imagination. Just in proportion,

however, as man's will becomes more intelligently awake to its own demands, the satisfactions which it seeks through objects become more comprehensive. The square meal is sought not simply with the thought and intention of eating it but also as an occasion for family intercourse and rejoicing, or as a preliminary to rest, sleep, and the variety of interesting activities that wait upon renewed strength and restored vigor. At first, objects are found satisfactory when realized because of the intrinsic character or quality peculiar to them, which is pleasant to experience. The pleasure may be understood as the conscious reflection of the fact that the will finds expression, not curtailment and frustration, in them. So the tastes and smells of food, the coolness of the breeze, human contacts of hand and body, the unchecked play of invigorated muscles, may be desired and sought simply because they are in their own intrinsic quality pleasant. But as in the course of its development the human will manifests more fully its own rational nature, it values objects also and, in many cases principally, for the other and different objects to which they lead or which they suggest or signify. Objects which are different yet interrelated, whose qualities reënforce, and are reënforced by, the distinctive object of primary desire. Fire is warm and bright; it may be valued for its own present qualities. Its value is increased and given rational meaning, however, when its brightness and warmth connect themselves with its uses in the cooking of food, the heating of human habitations, and the preparation of materials for manufacture.

The values of human life and experience are not created by ourselves; they are inherent in the real world

that presents itself to our human intelligence and will. But these values can be realized only by the activity of rational will in intelligent choice, purposive endeavor, and practical experimentation. If we may venture a general statement in terms somewhat technical: value consists in the capacity of certain existing objects identified by the perceptual responses of the living individual, to unfold a series or system of different yet interrelated qualities which supplement and amplify the object-characters in which they originate, and also one another. Now the values which man's will discovers in the existing world and realizes by dint of his own efforts, group or classify themselves in an order of increasing comprehensiveness. First and most limited are the values of life, of vital energy, survival, and well-being. We are all familiar with the objects that possess this type of value; they make the same appeal to us all: food and shelter, bodily health and comfort, companionship, play and family intercourse. Their possession and use mean all the diverse and pleasurable activities that prolonged existence makes possible. The satisfactions which the individual gains through fulfilling his own bodily needs and maintaining his own vital strength and well-being do not concern himself alone however; they involve constant interaction with others in the family and social group of which he is a member.

Next in order of comprehensiveness come the economic and (in the narrower sense) social values. Intelligence employed in the service of will correlates the objects of instinctive desire, including them within the scope of more comprehensive purposes which upon realization open to the agent many different avenues of self-expression

and provide comparatively permanent sources of satisfaction. Among such purposes are the acquisition of wealth, the attainment of power and influence, the development of strength and skill in industrial art and military enterprise. The nature and scope of these more general purposes are made clearer by the discussion which constantly goes on among men in regard to life and its successes and failures. Since, moreover, these purposes direct the activities of men over extended intervals and involve the employment of many means and instrumentalities, their pursuit can scarcely fail to correlate the activities of individuals and to encourage the growth of orderly community life. Neither wealth nor fame can have meaning or value apart from a community life sufficiently organized to admit of the protection of property rights, the recognition of authority, and the existence of an influential body of public opinion.

These values, vital, economic and political, are all of them relative to the conditions of individual existence and group life; they are justly called subjective because grounded upon the desires and needs felt by particular individuals and groups. But in the course of his voluntary efforts to obtain and enlarge the satisfactions of conscious life and human association, man finds himself realizing values that are objective and absolute. At first appearing as incidental to the exercise of will in rational choice, practical performance, and appreciative enjoyment, these values because of their greater comprehensiveness come to be sought and realized for their own sake, as ends in themselves. In conceiving of the object of his choice and planning for its realization, man puts his thought in the speech forms he has acquired by

social inheritance and thus incorporates it in the system of rational discourse in which all his fellows have part. Thus, through verbal expression, the experiences, the preferences, the discoveries, of the individual are made communicable; his plans and purposes along with the conceptions of the real world on which they are founded acquire an interest for all other intelligent persons, a place in universal human experience. Men find satisfaction in the mere exchanging and comparing of ideas without regard to the immediate demands of action or prospects of enjoyment. The ideal of an organized body of knowledge or *truth*, of facts open under determinate conditions to the experience of all, takes its rise. In seeking to realize his purposes through effort of practical contrivance and invention, man fashions and utilizes tools and appliances, devises and employs methods and procedures which relate his action to an intelligent technique of physical control and social organization. Thus the actions of individuals become objective and intelligible demonstrations of the power of practical intelligence to control the conditions, physical and social, which hold uniformly for all human existence, in the interest of purposes we all understand and appreciate. The intelligent use and employment of natural forces and agencies thus acquires an interest and a value of its own; the control of nature as a joint enterprise of human invention and industry becomes consequently an end which appeals in its own right; the idea of *practical power* achieved by the coöperative effort of men dawns upon human consciousness. Lastly, for the emotions which they feel in the face of life and the world as a theater of human effort and aspiration, men find embodiment and expression in

the harmonies of sound and form and color either discovered in nature or created by their own artistry. Through such æsthetic imagery, individuals can communicate feelings of the deeper and inward significance of things which resist articulate expression but which, because fraught with universal human meaning, need to be concordantly experienced in order to be fully appreciated. The creation and appreciation of *beauty* also becomes an end in itself, offering to its devotees inexhaustible resources of satisfaction.

The values realized through these instrumentalities of intelligent intercommunication are objective and universal because they signify not merely an increase in the varied satisfactions of individual life or of social interplay within the group, but an expansion and enrichment of the life of personal community in which all human individuals as rational beings can participate. The end which they all of them realize is nothing less than intelligent personality in its universal aspect. The written record, literary and scientific, the technique of industry, the system of political and social customs and institutions, and products of artistic creation, stand as an external embodiment of rational will; they embody its achievements in exploiting the resources of the real world to establish and promote an all-comprehensive personal life. These rational achievements and the qualities of mind and will required to produce them, the mental alertness and intellectual grasp, the practical courage and resourcefulness and tenacity, the range and fertility of imagination, the refinement and delicacy of perception, these and these alone give personal meaning and value to our brief period of individual existence. To these achieve-

ments and the experiences of personal community to which they give rise, moral and spiritual value belongs: to insight into the nature of the world as it has revealed its character to the intelligence of man, and understanding of the different points of view from which individual thinkers have regarded it; to fellowship and coöperation with others in productive labor; and to imaginative sympathy and intelligent appreciation. They enable the individual who has part in them to interpret his life in terms of the rational experience of humanity and thus to give permanent personal meaning to his thoughts, his efforts and his feelings. Thus the individual is prepared to engage as a person in the life of rational community and to contribute to its personal value. And what can an individual contribute of personal value except the discoveries and insights which others can understand, verify and extend, the inventions and practical contrivances which others can control and employ to rational advantage and the expressive embodiments of fancy whose significance can be felt by all who perceive them? These values appear at first as incidental to the more obvious and limited interests of individual happiness and social security and well-being. As such, they may only give a precious glint of personal meaning to the routine activities enforced by instinct and social custom. But, more and more, they have come to be recognized as the supreme good for which natural existence and social organization afford but the means and occasion. And this position they claim because they alone are universal and fulfill the demand of rational will for an all-comprehensive and inexhaustible satisfaction.

These three comprehensive personal ideals of *Truth*,

Power, and *Beauty* have a double import and reference. It is desirable to emphasize this fact since idealism is constantly accused of being purely formal and abstract, a misunderstanding for which idealists themselves have given cause by expounding it in terms of abstract principles and formal organization. The three absolute values in question signify in the first place the exploration of the objective world as it confronts us, with all its intricate and fascinating detail of fact and process, the realization of its dynamic potencies, and the appreciation of its wealth of interest and suggestion. Conceptual and scientific thought through the instrumentality of language and mathematical symbols discovers the underlying structure of the existing world, its constant features, its permanent relations, its fixed sequences of cause and effect and of means and end. Practical contrivance, experimentation and invention, utilize human powers of skilled movement to adjust and adapt physical and vital forces to the realization of rational purposes. While human intelligence cannot be said to have gained control of cosmical energies like gravity, still within the limits of his earthly sphere man does make use of gravity to serve his purpose. And now in the field of atomic mechanics he is unlocking, harnessing the energies of the electron. Thus are the forces of nature subjected to intelligent direction and control, or perhaps it would be truer to say, through the intervention of intelligence, are the potencies of rational service in the physical universe coming to their own fulfillment. Æsthetic perception and appreciation likewise exploit the resources of the objective world in a third principal aspect, that of sensuous appearance, realizing through harmonies of form and color,

tone, rhythm and movement, its limitless possibilities of suggestion and delight.

In the second place, the realization of these three values signifies the establishment of relations of personal community and fellowship among those conscious individuals who seek and attain them. Sharing in, and contributing to, a common knowledge of the real world and the vicissitudes of human experience, men come to understand one another. Through engaging in the organized activities of industry and the institutional life of society they are drawn into a working comradeship and experience the satisfactions of loyal coöperation in the discharge of a common task. Through appreciative enjoyment of beauty, created and natural, which stirs their feelings and kindles their fancy, men are made sensitive to those finer harmonies of perception and of feeling which intimate or express the essential community of all intelligent human life. Now the joint realization of the three ideals under consideration, thought of particularly in their social bearing and effect, constitutes *goodness*. The moral ideal consequently calls for the existence or creation of a society—a universal community of intelligent persons among whom there is complete mutual understanding, working fellowship, and imaginative sympathy. This ideal of the "perfect society" is the ideal of democracy; no less perfect union will afford to all its members that full and free participation in a common good which democracy intends.

To proclaim this as the ideal of democracy is to appear extravagantly utopian at a time when utopias have fallen into general disfavor. It is not difficult, truly, to understand the present impatience with ideal schemes for social

reorganization and reform. The social state which they portray is so far removed in its perfections from the social situation as it actually exists that it is impossible to work out any practical connection between the two. Such idealism "cannot be translated into terms of present social fact"; it "prescribes no concrete measures of social reform." It therefore seems to many earnest workers for social betterment to be worse than useless, to be positively mischievous. For does it not offer to many who are painfully aware of the imperfections and injustices of existing human society an idealized social order in the contemplation of whose imaginary perfections they find solace for the evils of present social life? Captivated by the ideal, they lose their hold upon the actual, they shrink from any attempt to cope with its harsh and brutal exactions; they are thus made incapable of effective effort for social amelioration.

Yet moral idealism is not entirely bankrupt, as such an indictment as the foregoing might lead us to think. It has paid for twenty centuries, and is still paying, rich dividends in revived inspiration and renewed direction of the work of social reform. In a great undertaking like that of social betterment, we need to see the goal. The fact that it is far away does not much matter if its salient features can be clearly envisaged and are such as to stimulate the imagination and to arouse the powers of action. The ideal of the perfect society, of the community of free persons, has been the distant goal which has inspired and directed men in the effort of social service during the whole of the Christian era. The Stoics anticipated it in their conception of the "City of God" in which every man should receive the justice and consideration

due to his rational nature, and as social ideal it inspired their notably successful efforts to ameliorate the conditions of subject peoples and classes in the Roman Empire. More clearly and positively formulated in the Christian ideal of the Kingdom of God and the Brotherhood of Man, it has not merely inspired those charities and philanthropies which constitute the most creditable social achievement of Christendom; it has also, by virtue of the unchallenged authority it has gained over the occidental mind and conscience, prepared the way for the growth of democratic institutions in the last two centuries of the modern era. If democracy adopts as its own the ideal of the perfect society, there is no reason for deriding it as visionary and regarding its cause as hopeless: this ideal has already proved the most powerful force that has ever worked for social betterment.

CHAPTER IX

THE MORAL STANDARDS OF DEMOCRACY

We come to closer touch with the actual problems of social morality when we ask: What qualities of character and of conduct does the ideal of democracy require in the individual citizen? To be in the full sense a good citizen, assuredly; for, as we have seen, democracy seeks to develop and confirm what is best and most worthwhile in social relations; its ideal is the society of free persons in which the supreme moral values of *truth* and *power* and *beauty* are realized through processes of personal intercommunication. Translating these values into terms of concrete social fact, the ideal of democracy insists upon mutual understanding, coöperative endeavor, and intelligent sympathy, among men. These furnish the standards by which democracy judges the conduct of its citizens. We have now to apply them to the conduct of ordinary life, and to enquire: What qualities of thought and action and feeling ought the individual citizen of democracy to develop? What habits and capacities should he form?

Quite naturally the thought occurs that inasmuch as we have identified the ideal of democracy with that of the spiritual brotherhood of humanity, these questions are already answered in the moral precepts of Christianity. What are these but statements of what a man

must do to "enter the Kingdom," to be admitted to the divinely established community of free spirits? We are very familiar with their general tenor; they are injunctions to brotherly love, forgiveness and helpfulness, to service of fellow men and sacrifice of self. They insist upon the complete surrender of what is narrowly and exclusively individual, as the primary condition of entrance into the larger social relationship. Individual desires and ambitions, individual tastes and preferences, even individual existence itself, must be sacrificed upon the altar of social service. We must come as little children, we must take up our crosses, we must bear one another's burdens, we must lay down our lives.

Christian teaching thus gave prominence to the negative side of social morality; it stressed what the individual must forego and surrender in order to participate in the larger social good. There was a sound and sufficient reason for this: the willingness to give up private pleasure and to look beyond the narrow limits of individual interest is the indispensible preliminary to social self-realization. The man of normal intelligence who is fairly well circumstanced soon learns what are the requirements in the way of property, reputation, family ties, etc., of a secure and comfortable life. His will tends to become completely absorbed in the pursuit of these, the conditions of comfortable existence and instinctive satisfaction for him as an individual. A painful effort often involving hard struggle and sometimes protracted suffering is demanded in order to tear his will loose from these objects of natural desire and attach it to the wider concerns of social thought and endeavor. The effort called for is made more severe by the fact that self-interest,

centering upon the means of safe and pleasant living along with the conditions under which individual aptitude can be exercised and preferences fulfilled, offers an end which past experience has found satisfactory. Attention to its demands has consequently become habitual: it has become one with the will itself. The claims of others, for all their rational justification, have not so convincingly demonstrated their value to the will of the agent. And it is an undeniable fact based upon the conditions of physical existence that the individual must acquire habits of action which assure fulfillment of his natural needs before he can establish any wide or inclusive social relationships. But in advance of actual realization, social relationships must remain somewhat uncertain and experimental; to seek them will be in a sense to venture. When, moreover, as frequently happens, merely to engage in a coöperative undertaking involves the abandonment of individual interests that have proved themselves to be sources of satisfaction, an effort of will, an exercise of courage distinctly moral is required. Ample justification there was, consequently, for the stress laid by Christian teaching upon the duty of self-sacrifice. It was necessary, furthermore, in the earlier centuries of the Christian era, when the outlines of the social good were but dimly discerned, to crown self-sacrifice with a halo of heavenly light, in order to inspire men to deeds of social service.

But the negative is after all but one side of social morality; it has a positive side as well. The associated life does not merely require its participants to renounce private ambition and selfish pleasure; it also offers a rich and varied content of interesting activities and fruitful

satisfactions. And it is this positive side that needs emphasis to-day. The positive social teachings of Christianity are definite and pointed, but they confine themselves to injunctions which govern our direct personal contacts with our fellow men. We are to be charitable and generous, forgiving and helpful, in dealing with all the human beings we meet and come into personal contact with. These precepts are fundamental: possibly the command, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," includes all the rest. But the outstanding fact about modern civilized social life is, as our survey has shown us, that modern means of communication and transportation, industrial production and commercial exchange, have made possible the effective association of men on a scale undreamt of two thousand years ago and this upon the basis of indirect contact and influence. Through the ballots we cast, through our industrial labor, through our business enterprise and connections, through the books we read, the pleasures we take, and the entertainments we patronize, we influence the welfare of thousands and millions of human beings whom we shall never see or meet nor talk with, of whose personal characters we have not the slightest knowledge. Hence moral precepts which enjoin us to be just and kind and loving to all individuals who cross our path and stand in need of our assistance need to be reinterpreted in the light of the modern social situation in order to express the positive requirements of social morality to-day. We of modern civilization have come to understand that the associated life of humanity is a great joint enterprise calling for organized thinking and systematic investigation, concerted and productive endeavor, sympathetic insight and intelligent appreciation. He who

would serve society and participate in the common good must expect to engage actively and effectively in one of these departments of social enterprise. The qualities, that is to say, which democracy, taken as the type of perfect human association, requires its members to possess, are such as find expression in the three departments of personal intercommunication, the fields of thought and action and feeling. They are the dispositions and habits which individuals must develop if they are to share in the three comprehensive social satisfactions of mutual understanding, working fellowship and imaginative sympathy. In the present chapter only a brief enumeration of these qualities can be made; in later chapters we shall discuss the problems that come up in connection with their exercise in the particular relations of social life.

Democracy must, in the first place, depend for the realization of its ideals upon the cultivation of certain qualities of *mind* in its members. No longer can we regard ignorance, even though it be the ignorance of innocence and childhood, as anything but a disastrous and threatening drawback to the individual and a threat to the safety of society. In this day we know too well that the sole hope for a continued advancement of human civilization lies in the steady increase and rapid dissemination of knowledge among men. Only through such increased knowledge of the natural world and of his own human nature can man hope to secure such control of the conditions of his natural existence as will make possible for the race a widespread personal culture. Therefore democracy must make the discovery of new truth and the effective communication of facts already known a primary public concern. And the individual citizen must be eager to

participate in this fund of common knowledge, curious to learn of new facts and ready to impart them to others. He must possess what is called the "scientific spirit"—a reverence for truth and a mind that is always open to receive it. But the new truth that is thus sought and welcomed will not merely be such as can be discovered by the experimental methods of the physical sciences; it will include the facts of man's history and development, his institutions and achievements, his ideals and valuations. All this is not to say, to be sure, that the free and fruitful interchange of ideas among fellow citizens which is involved in the ideal of democratic association, requires that each one possess an encyclopedic knowledge. What is required of the individual is principally an attitude and habit of mind. He must be free from the blinding and stupefying effects of prejudice and partisanship, tolerant of other men's ideas, and open to the light of new truth. His thinking must be free from the bias and contamination of self-interest; he must be intellectually honest, impartial in his judgments and candid in their expression. His mind must be clear, alert, and responsive.

In the *practical* sphere, the democratic ideal of a working comradeship of humanity can be realized only if every individual exercises the capacity for productive labor. Human society must avail itself of all the inventive faculty, all the contriving skill, all the organizing ability, of its members, if it is to carry through successfully its now gigantic but still constantly growing tasks of productive industry, political administration and social regulation. Mere zeal for social service and human betterment will not count for much in the individual unless it is accompanied by the ability to do something socially

useful. What is here demanded is practical capacity, the initiative to cope with the external conditions of social life, be they mechanical, agricultural, commercial, vital, or what not, and the ability to adapt existing forces and materials to rational human uses. Influenced by the tradition of Christian ethics we have tended in our glorification of the spirit of altruistic devotion and sacrificial service to forget that the first and fundamental service which the individual can render society is that of productive labor. The individual should first learn to pull his own weight in the boat—to use Roosevelt's familiar figure —continuously and completely, before he attempts to improve its working arrangements or essays to give advice as to altering its course. And not merely is practical competence required by the democratic ideal, but loyalty as well. The latter, indeed, is implied in the former. Genuinely productive labor is objective in its interest, its concern is rather with the efficient performance of the task itself than ulterior considerations of private gain; it presupposes devotion to an end which has rational utility and social value. Loyal devotion to the great ends of social endeavor, those of economic production and distribution, of public order and health and education, of social intercourse and recreation, is the duty and privilege of every individual who renders efficient service in any of these lines. When such loyalty is not merely tacitly implied but consciously felt and affirmed, it is a source of heightened power and increased effectiveness to the individual worker; he is uplifted and inspired by a sense of his working partnership with his fellows in the great social undertaking.

Thirdly, we have to consider the quality of *feeling*,

the emotional disposition, required by the ideal of democratic association. Universal love is doubtless what perfect social union demands; but human individuals cannot love one another by mere act of will and, if we could, individual liking would go but a little way since modern social organization brings us into operative connection with great numbers of human beings beyond the range of direct individual contact. Emotional concord can be induced only if men become responsive to, that is to say, appreciative of, the meaning and value of personal life in whatever way or form it is symbolized or expressed. Responsiveness of this sort depends upon an enlivened and cultivated imagination, and no form of training is so influential, as we have seen, in awakening and developing the imaginative faculty in man as the appreciative enjoyment of beauty in nature and in art. Hence democracy's interest in art: the capacity for æsthetic appreciation is itself a bond which unites the individual with his fellows; he learns to respond sympathetically and intelligently to what is universally human. The quality of sympathetic imagination thus developed has a determining effect upon social relations; indeed, it is necessary to harmonious personal association. It alone gives the individual ability to understand and appreciate the personal meaning expressed in the countenance, the manner, the tone of voice, of another. His feelings are attuned to whatever is significant in human nature, and his imagination engages sympathetically in interpreting others' purposes and aspirations, in understanding their points of view. No quality is more urgently needed to-day as a primary condition of social harmony than this of sympathetic imagination.

The ideal of democratic association thus calls for the development of three personal qualities in the citizen body: *intellectual alertness and honesty, practical competence and loyalty, and imaginative sympathy.* Do these conclusions represent more than theoretical deductions, logical inferences, drawn from a general principle? And these personal qualities specified—are they not the mere "counsels of perfection" which we should expect to derive from such a theoretical deduction? Is there anything in present social and political and economic fact to bear out or to justify the importance attributed to them? Suppose that these three qualities were generally developed by our citizens, would all the practical difficulties that embroil and harass our social life immediately disappear, and its many problems, economic, racial, domestic, religious, at once be solved? We shall not dispel such doubts as to the practical import of the conclusions just reached by denying or disavowing their theoretical basis.

The personal qualities in question have emerged as the result of an analysis of social relations which brought to light the three fundamental forms of intercommunication among men. But, unless indeed we are prepared to distrust intelligence in general, and thus surrender our surest ground for hope of continued human progress, we must regard the fact that conclusions are well founded theoretically as the best antecedent guarantee of their practical import and value. That our conclusions in the present case do have a direct bearing upon the existing state of society is quite apparent if we try to imagine what a transformation would be wrought in civilized societies if their members really acquired as

traits of personal character the three qualities just enumerated.

Consider, first, alertness and honesty of mind. Suppose that all citizens in matters of thought and reflection desired simply to learn the truth, to act upon it, and to communicate it to others. Not merely would they be incapable of lying and misrepresentation; this is merely the beginning and of itself does not go very far. They would be possessed of an eager desire for knowledge in every field. They would be incapable of the subtler forms of intrigue and evasion, deceit and pretense, to which men now resort in pursuit of what they call their interest. Tyranny and oppression have buttressed themselves, always, upon deception and fraud. Authority, political and religious, has maintained itself by fostering in the popular mind beliefs that would not stand the light of honest investigation and scientific scrutiny. Democracies have sought to protect their citizens from the demoralizing influence of ideas unscrupulously disseminated by designing persons and factions for selfish purposes, by securing for them freedom of speech, freedom of religious profession, and freedom of the press. In this way considerable progress has been made in defending the individual citizen's right to free thought so far as this has been denied or impugned by social influences working upon his mind from without. But his intellectual integrity is still impaired, if not destroyed, by influences working from within—by his own unlimited capacity for self-deception in the direction of his own apparent interest. Popular government has made it much harder for ambitious men or designing groups to fool the people but it has not in the least checked the

tendency of the people to fool themselves. It is this, the more dangerous because the subtler and more insinuating form of intellectual insincerity, that would be eliminated if the quality of open-mindedness and intellectual honesty were generally developed. The growth of this quality in the citizen mind would do much to cure our gravest political ills, since they spring in a large measure from the widespread persistent inability of human beings to look at any question *squarely*, that is to say, from any other standpoint than the one which their own interest and ambition dictate. This influence of self-interest upon men's judgment is hard to combat because it is unconscious: the individual is himself unaware of its influence: he believes that he is judging fairly and honestly, while his whole outlook is colored by the prepossessions which his own plans and projects have created, and his judgment warped by the hopes of profit and success which he entertains in connection with them. He resents any imputation of insincerity, for he knows that his conclusions are upheld by his own reason. What he is not aware of, however, is that his reason has not been applied directly and impartially to the question in hand but has been used to discover plausible grounds for believing what he wanted to believe. What chance is there to secure from citizens an illuminating and practically helpful expression of opinion under these conditions? On every side we see the views of men upon the gravest political and social issues of the day determined by private ambition and group or sectional interest rather than by honest thought. On the one hand, we hear men defending the rights of property and the sanctity of the established order with all the earnestness and unction of patriots

and prophets, never recognizing that the motive which underlies the righteous zeal which possesses them is the desire to preserve intact their own bank accounts. On the other hand, we hear impassioned pleas for revolutionary reconstruction of our economic and political system made by professed champions of the poor and the oppressed whose ardor is fired, unknown to themselves, by the hopes of personal power and exalted position to accrue to themselves as a result of the change.

Suppose, secondly, that the personal qualities of practical competence and loyalty were developed as they should be in civilized society. This would mean that men looked upon their daily work as an opportunity for expressing themselves in constructive service. From it they would derive the satisfaction of sharing in the productive labor of the world. The elevating and stabilizing effect of this experience upon human character could scarcely be overestimated. The individual comes to respect himself, he acquires a new personal dignity in his own eyes in proportion as he is conscious of contributing to the social organism a service of positive value, which no one else could render. Enlightened prison administrators have discovered that for many convicted criminals the first step on the road to honest citizenship is to learn a useful trade. And the decline in the pride of workmanship and workmanly devotion to a worthy job which has followed upon the rise of the modern industrial system is one of the disquieting features of the times. Without doubt it is the cause of much of the restlessness and dissatisfaction that pervade modern society to-day. Equally certain is it that the present condition must be remedied and workmanly competence and loyalty raised to its rightful

position of prominence in social life before a permanent betterment can be wrought in the tone and temper of modern society. It is the height of futility, however, to bewail the lack of loyalty on the part of employees to the corporations they serve, the decline of pride in good workmanship among workmen, and the lowering of professional ideals and business standards of community service, if we do nothing to change the conditions which have checked the development of these qualities or have even worked to suppress them. The mass of the workers, having no voice in the management of the industries they serve, no direct share in the profits which accrue from their labor, have lost interest in the social purpose of their work and, failing to appreciate its social function and value, they fail to take any personal pride in their own contribution to it or to feel any loyalty to the end which it serves. At only one point do they feel a personal concern in the industry that employs their labor, and this is the amount of wages which it pays them. In this alone do they feel interest, and such loyalty and competence as they develop are called forth by this interest which unites them in a common cause with their fellow workers. And owners, who as small share holders have no part in directing or controlling the policy of management of an industrial concern, look upon their connection with it simply as a source of dividends, which they in common with other investors are justified in protecting against attack or diminution.

The machinery of business and finance has been elaborated to an incredible degree by the invention of special instruments and procedures for expediting every step in the activities of buying and selling, borrowing and lend-

ing, saving and investing. No doubt these artificial instrumentalities do facilitate the movement of business as a whole, but their use makes necessary and renders profitable many activities whose productive value is not apparent. A business transaction which in previous times could have been carried through by the two persons primarily concerned now calls for the intervention of scores of intermediaries, agents and recorders, bankers and brokers, each of whom is prepared with special knowledge and equipment to perform one act in the chain which the transaction involves. Many young men of good ability and intention are engaging in these highly specialized employments of modern business. Since the productive or creative value of their work does not appear, on the surface at least, they are likely to estimate success in terms of pecuniary profit. Thus it has transpired that business, which attracts the energies of the majority of our well educated and ambitious young men appeals to them not as a socially useful calling but as a great game in which they can match their wits against others in playing for the stakes of wealth and power. Reform is urgently called for in two directions, both of which are dictated by democracy's demand for productive service from its members. The first is that such activities and employments in the sphere of modern business as contribute nothing of positive value to the community should be rendered unprofitable and thus eventually eliminated. The second and not less important is that such lines of business as possess real social value which on account of the complicated organization of modern business passes unnoticed should be exhibited in their true nature and function to the general public and to the business com-

munity itself. Such information, were it widely disseminated, would influence the attitude of individuals embarking on such pursuits; understanding their work as a contribution to the general good, they would be encouraged to take it up and carry it on in the spirit of service.

Finally, let us think for a moment of the effect which the development of the third-named quality of imaginative sympathy would have upon modern social life. The importance of sympathy as a motive to social helpfulness and a bond of social union has been long recognized. But it is sympathy in the sense of compassion, of fellow feeling with the suffering and the distressed that has usually been meant, the sympathy that prompts men to kindly deeds and to compassionate ministrations and renders them responsive to appeal on behalf of the sick, the starving and the defective. The worth and the beauty of this human trait could scarcely be overestimated; it will exert in the future as it has done in the past a beneficient influence over the social relations of men. But the sympathy which has been called *imaginative* is different from this, although it is also in its way productive of altruistic action. By it is meant the fellow feeling which depends upon and springs out of an understanding of another's personal outlook and point of view, due to an exercise of an imagination trained to surmount barriers of birth and up-bringing, of education and occupation, of race and religion. Of the development of this type of sympathy the world has perhaps more present need than for a further growth of simple compassion. It is at least true that imaginative sympathy has been given far less expression in human society thus far than have pity and compassion. A good deal has already been accomplished

by society in providing for the continuous and intelligent care of all classes of defectives and for the relief of the victims of misfortune and calamity. But almost nothing has been accomplished toward overcoming those antagonisms of race and nationality, of social caste and ancestral religion, which threaten to disrupt human society, to set groups at one another's throats, and to turn the world into a battleground and a shambles. Now it is just these antagonisms and hatreds created by the radically different outlooks and ideals of different races and cultural groups which imaginative sympathy and imaginative sympathy alone can allay and overcome. Only when men's powers of imaginative insight are sufficiently quickened and developed can they detect beneath impressive differences in color and features, dress and speech, customs and manners, the essential traits of a common humanity. And having learned that differences are not absolute between the mind of the Occident and that of the Orient, the ideals of the White and the aspirations of the Black, the possibility will be created of seeing a subject with a "foreigner's" eyes, of viewing a matter from the standpoint of an "alien" race, of looking at a question as it appears to a "heathen" religion. Then, and not till then, will the way be prepared for the growth of a wise tolerance and fellow feeling for all humanity in the spirit of which the many difficulties which arise out of racial, cultural and sectarian differences can be taken up and peaceably adjudicated.

CHAPTER X

DEMOCRACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Thus far in our survey of the mental factors in human association we may seem to have paid little attention to the different instincts which psychologists to-day recognize as the original determinants of human behavior. True the relation of instinct to intelligence was considered in the second chapter. But the upshot of that discussion was to deny to instinct the sovereign role frequently assigned to it in human conduct. Have we then drawn an idealized portrait of human society exclusively in terms of the higher intellectual faculties and sentiments to the neglect of the physical factors in human life? Such accounts of human life and social relations, more "edifying" than true, have not been infrequent in the past. But thus to attempt edification at the expense of fact, we now know to be futile, and injurious to the very interests it seeks to forward. Hence while impartial analysis proves conclusively that we cannot explain social relations in their distinctively human aspect except as based on reason and will, still it must be acknowledged that a social intercourse limited to the exchange of ideas and the rational adjustment of purposes would be lacking in the warmth and color and zest of human life as we experience and relish it. Such a rarified relationship would be indeed a

"platonic" affair, and altogether different from the human association we know and value. More than this, even if we cherish the moralist's interest in man's personal expansion and self-realization, nothing is gained by neglecting the material conditions of human existence; our moral task as well as our social opportunity is to transform these agencies and processes of existing nature into means of personal expression and fulfillment. Instinct it is which first assembles human beings in groups, determines their reciprocal interactions, and gives rise to their conscious desires. In connection with the instinctive interests, activities and satisfactions of living individuals the social values of human personality must be realized if they are to be realized at all.

Understanding then, that the basis of human association is found in the community of purposes which governs the conduct of human individuals so far as they live up to their rational nature, we have now to see how the various instincts natural to man can afford the occasion and incentive for interesting and profitable discussion, productive labor, inspiring comradeship, quickened imagination, and enlarged sympathy. The personal qualities just described can display themselves only upon the stage set by the enforced routine of daily existence. The social meal is an excellent illustration of the way in which the satisfactions of instinctive desire may be made instrumental to personal intercommunication. The cause and occasion for this social observance is of course the appeasing of hunger. But its social significance and value lie in the encouragement which it gives to continuous conversation and the lively interchange of ideas. The heightened vital tone due to the reception of food and

drink quickens the mind and facilitates the expression of thought, while the interest in the ideas exchanged and the wit and good feeling manifested add zest to appetite and furnish tonic to digestion. When, as was generally the case in primitive society, and frequently happens in civilized social life, the meal is the outcome and climax of successful coöperative industry, these features may be even more strikingly exemplified.

Human association of the highest type—which realizes the ideal of democracy as we have agreed to understand it—does not require the elimination of instinct; it does not necessarily demand its suppression. It does require that instinct be "sublimated," expressed on such occasions and in such way that its expression shall be contributory to those personal satisfactions in which men participate together, rather than to those enjoyments which depend upon exclusive possession. If this is possible, the way is open for instinct to play an important part in the realization of the rational ends of social life, an indispensable part as far as we can now see. For these personal ideals, because of their universality, do not possess for the individual the imperative actuality and vital interest which attach to the objects of instinctive desire and aversion. Hence arises instinct's opportunity to contribute to the fulfillment of social values: through association with instinctive activities, the values of personal intercommunication acquire a warmth and color, a vital appeal and urgency, that they would not otherwise possess.

The reason for this is quite clear when we remember the contrasting functions of instinct and thought. All human action is originally of the instinctive type, and

such instinctive reactions are normally pleasant in process and result. The consequence is that the perception of the object which stimulates instinct is accompanied by lively interest. This interest, developing in time into desire, initiates the bodily responses which lead to the appropriation and enjoyment of the object. The relation thus established of the object of instinctive interest and desire to the motor impulses of the individual gives it present and urgent actuality. Now the world of common perception is primarily a world of objects like this: objects that play upon our instinctive tendencies and invoke motor responses, thus compelling us to recognize their objective interest and vital import. Thought, on the contrary, reveals the essential connections and wider relationships of things as they exist for all thinking individuals. Inasmuch as it does not relate them as directly to the individual's powers of overt action, however, it does not give them the vivid and compelling actuality possessed by objects of instinctive interest and desire. But when instinctive activities are made the occasion and incentive for personal intercommunication, the objects, endeavors, and appreciations, of social intelligence are given the lively interest and urgent actuality possessed by the sources of instinctive satisfaction.

This relation between natural instinct and rational will in man throws light upon the purpose of that system of customs and institutions which has developed in the course of social evolution and which, in their systematic totality, we identify with civilization. They make the instinctive activities of men subservient to social order and social culture. Thus the institution of marriage and the family provides for such expression of the instincts of

sex love and parental tenderness as is consistent with the rearing and training of the younger social generation, and the personal association of men and women. The institutions of justice impose such regulation upon the instincts of anger, jealousy and acquisition, as is consistent with social order and community life. The system of industrial methods and mechanisms has been gradually worked out to make the instinctive desires for food and shelter, and the instinctive tendencies of workmanship and acquisition, operative in producing the material necessities and mechanical equipment of social life. The institution of private property makes the acquisitive instinct subservient to personal self-expression and social security. The various methods and institutions of government avail themselves of the force of the gregarious instinct, and the instincts of leadership and subjection, in maintaining public order and safety, and in bringing about extensive coöperation between citizens individually and in groups.

No doubt the primary function of these institutions, social, political, and economic, is to preserve social order and thus make social existence possible. Without their restraining influence, human societies would have been shattered by the violence of natural instincts impelling individuals to behavior that in result was anti-social and thus embroiling them in constant strife. So impressed have many students of human conduct been with this fact that they have seen the sole moral, as well as social, value of these institutions in the reinforcement they give to man's social and sympathetic instincts in maintaining the conditions of group life. Thus Darwin explained morality as a development of the social instinct under

the illumination and direction of intelligence,[1] and Leslie Stephen held that morality has developed as a condition of group survival.[2] But these institutions, as has been shown in previous chapters, may, and to a certain extent do, subserve a higher purpose. They facilitate personal communication and promote social culture; and in this opportunity which they give to individuals for personal development through participation in universal human experience lies their highest social, and their genuinely moral, significance. For not through their words only but also, as we have seen, through their daily work and their civic duties, their bearing, their manners and their æsthetic preferences, men may communicate what is intelligible in their experience, and thus enrich the content of their associated lives. Enforcing as they do, upon individuals of succeeding generations, that uniformity and coadaptation of behavior required for the realization of unitary social purpose, these institutions are media for the transmission of significant experiences from one generation to the next, and their accumulation in an ever-growing sum of human culture. Science and art—what do they represent but the subjection of individual thought and feelings to the conditions of human intelligibility, and their expression in a common objective medium? And the words, spoken and written, the painted canvas, the chiselled marble, or the musical score, these become like the institutions we have been discussing, the means of linking successive generations in a unity of progressive achievement. This social heritage which we call civilization consists in the intellectual field of in-

[1] Darwin, *Descent of Man,* chap. v.
[2] *Cf.* Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics.*

scriptions and records and books, in the industrial and economic sphere of tools and machines and technical processes, in the æsthetic field of the products of fine art in its different branches. So impressive in its sum total, it gives rational meaning to our lives, for it places us in communication with countless numbers and generations of our fellows who have in their time worked and played, rejoiced and suffered, even as we. With them direct communication is denied us; we may not catch the flash of understanding in their eyes, or answer to their voices, or respond to the vigor and direction of their movements. But we may communicate with them indirectly through the enduring memorials they have left: through their writings we may see the world with their eyes, learn of their ideas, and gain understanding of their points of view; through intelligent and public-spirited participation in the organized industrial system and the institutions of family, church, and state, we enter into a working partnership with the inventors, law-givers, reformers and statesmen, who in former times have striven and suffered in hope of an elevated humanity and a bettered world; when we appreciate the works of art which are priceless products of the past, we feel that sense of the deeper significance of things which inspired their creation.

But many of these institutions and observances which turn the force of instinctive desire to social uses, while successful in preserving social existence and maintaining social order, fail to facilitate or foster that personal intercommunication which is the basis of all true social culture. We are just awakening to the seriousness of this problem; one of the gravest, it appears, that confront

modern civilization. Admittedly, the first essential is that the existence and safety of the social order be secured, and society is justified in encouraging all instinctive impulses that are favorable to this end, and in restraining all that threaten it. But the resulting adjustment and regulation of instinctive tendencies in members of society do not, in the case of many social observances and institutions, promote their free association and personal development—indeed when considered in contrast with the demands of the social ideal they seem to have done just the reverse. The present competitive and capitalistic system of industry, for example, has been very successful in enlisting the combined activities of men in the production and distribution of the material commodities of life: as we know, comforts and even luxuries, which a century ago were accessible to only a fortunate few, have been brought within the reach of all. But it does this by appealing to instincts of self-preservation and acquisition which prompt individuals to be jealously self-regarding and ruthlessly self-assertive, while affording little or no scope to the instincts of workmanship and construction which favor intelligent self-expression and free coöperation. The monogamous family under masculine headship has proved a most effective agency for the rearing of children and the training of them for social life, yet it has owed its unity, compactness, and permanence partly to the appeal it has made to instinctive jealousy and sense of proprietorship on the part of the husband and father which have prevented and, in many cases still prevent, the wife and growing children from enjoying that self-expression and free association which is their personal right. The forms of punitive justice which have

proved efficacious owe their force and influence largely to the appeal they make to instinctive anger and fear. But the methods which are most successful as deterrents to crime and hence in the preservation of public order and safety (such as capital punishment and long-term confinement) are difficult to reconcile with any claim which the offender may make, when awakened to a sense of his personal initiative and social responsibility, to an opportunity for further participation in the social order.

Hence we must reject as false the view that the human individual who, after his period of preliminary social training, has come to think for himself and to form rational ideals of what is best in life, can find in the organized institutional activities of civilized society a means of complete self-expression and personal development. We cannot admit that the existing system of social institutions, domestic, industrial, and political, in any modern nation, represents the "real will" or "larger self" of the human individual. These institutions, it is true, do offer to those who loyally engage in the activities they prescribe, an opportunity for personal intercommunication far-reaching and real. But because of defects due to the hard physical conditions under which social evolution has proceeded and the limitations of human nature itself, they do not offer to human beings a way to that mutual understanding, coöperative endeavor and intelligent sympathy that their own rational nature demands for complete self-expression.

Civilized society must strive earnestly and unremittingly to modify the institutions and observances that control the instinctive activities of its members so that these latter shall work not merely to maintain social order

and security but also to enliven and enrich personal association. Indeed, civilized society has little choice in this matter, for it is at present confronted with a peculiar danger. The progress of social intelligence, culminating in modern science and invention, modern industry and technology, has placed in the hands of men, or rather of individual members of society, a power that is quite unprecedented in human history. We are all familiar with the astonishing growth of natural science and the marvellous progress of mechanical invention; we are less likely to think, perhaps, of recent developments in other lines of thought such as pure mathematics and psychology and economics, and such practical fields as those of social organization and political administration. But, as remarkable as such achievements have been in enlarging the content of social culture, even more notable are recent improvements in social transmission. Through the circulation of books, periodicals, and newspapers, through popular education and the increasing popularity of higher education, through the educational processes of democratic government and the systematic publicity which has come to accompany business and industry, the discoveries and inventions of human intelligence in all departments are made immediately available for effective use on a scale which our ancestors in previous ages would have deemed quite impossible. The result has been an increase in the power of man over his surroundings which, in its unlimited possibilities for good and evil, marks our time as perhaps the critical period of human history.

The war brought home to us with startling emphasis the tremendous possibilities of this power when used by a modern nation made for the time truly one by a single

purpose, concentrating all its thought upon devising means of warfare and applying its coördinated energies in the production and employment of the weapons thus invented. Indeed some have seen in this proof of the power which modern science and technical invention have placed in the hands of organized humanity, the most impressive fact of the war. To a lesser degree, of course, but with vast potencies for good or evil, this same power is bestowed by social intelligence upon the individual of to-day who is capable of understanding and employing the instrumentalities it has created. To whatever field he turns, he finds knowledge organized and classified for his use, accessible to his investigation and ready for employment as a tool. In the world of business and industry he finds a great operative system whose methods and processes, based upon numberless inventions and adjustments, offer to men capable of mastering its intricate interplay the opportunity for amassing wealth in amounts undreamed of by the avarice of previous times. The civilized state of to-day frequently seems, by virtue of its size and complexity, to have become "estranged from itself," to have lost its soul, in fact; but, depending as it does upon modern methods of communication and publicity, and intimately connected with a highly organized and inter-locking industrial system, it opens to individuals capable of commanding its various forces, economic, psychological, and ethical, a way to fame and influence unprecedented in human history.

And this danger is increased by the fact that the organization of present society, the institutions and observances upon which it relies to maintain orderly life and secure coöperative action are such as appeal to, and

strengthen by continuous exercise, the impulses of self-preservation, acquisition and competition, rather than those of construction and companionship and sympathy. What is more natural than that the man who in the field of business or politics finds himself possessed of apparently unlimited power to accumulate and "profitably" to employ wealth or to control the activities of his fellows, should feel justified in using this power to increase his own private enjoyments, provided that he fulfills those elementary requirements which are conditions of public safety and orderly social relations, and, in the form of legal enactments, constitute the rules of the game? Or that the group which has discovered the political and economic potencies of combination under present industrial and social conditions should believe that it is free to exploit the same without regard or reservation in competition with other groups? Yet if this tendency prevails it will mean that human civilization has failed, after having come within sight of the goal. For the power which mankind has gained, through science and invention and technical art, over the physical conditions of life on this planet, power over the means and methods of production, of transportation and communication, brings for the first time within the range of practicability the beginnings of that world-fellowship of men and nations which is the social ideal. Physical barriers have been overcome, world-wide intercommunication among men through language and literature, art and industry can now be established. The result should be a progressive and cumulative enrichment of human life and experience through participation in a good which cannot be exclusively possessed but must be shared in order to be enjoyed: the satisfactions

of gaining and giving knowledge, of comradeship in creative work, of intelligent appreciation and imaginative sympathy.

But if the present opportunity which modern science and invention have created of advancing toward the social goal is not to be thrown away, the institutions of civilized society must be so modified as to afford free expression to those instincts which impart vital warmth and color to human intercourse and fellowship. It is not sufficient to urge individuals to engage whole-heartedly in the institutional life of civilized society, to gain the most they can through education and technical training, to fulfill civic requirements, to found homes and families, to play the game in business and in politics. These activities enlarge the mental horizons of the individual and bring him into personal relation with his fellows of his own and previous generations; but, as we have seen, the power and influence which they can give to the individual under present social conditions may be turned to narrow and selfish uses. A man may choose to use the power which social progress has placed in his hands to insure himself of those instinctive satisfactions which go to make up an enjoyable existence. To do this he need not be a monster of selfishness, or a sensualist, or a criminal. Any person of intelligent outlook on life quickly learns what are the conditions of comfortable and pleasant living in the way of material possessions, family connection, and community standing. He may deliberately decide to use that extension of his own powers which civilized economic, social and political institutions furnish to him, for the purpose of creating and maintaining these conditions in his own case. If he so decides

and there are many who do, he will acquire knowledge to be used as a tool in advancing his own schemes for private enrichment. He will engage in political activity and assume civic responsibility solely with a view to creating out of the influence and prestige he may gain, an asset upon which he and those few whose interests he identifies with his own, may realize in terms of enhanced enjoyment.

Nor will it answer merely to remind men of their social duty and to exhort them to social service and self-sacrifice. What is most needed to-day is that men be aroused to an appreciative understanding of the larger and richer content of the truly social life. They must be brought to realize how much more durable and fertile are the satisfactions which spring from increased understanding and fellowship and sympathy, than are the enjoyments which private wealth and favored position can provide. But how can they be expected to engage whole-heartedly in those activities of thought and imagination, of invention and appreciation, through which alone these social values can be realized, unless the system of customs and arrangements that governs their social interactions gives full scope to such of their instincts as tend to impart interest and attraction, zest and enlivenment, to companionship and coöperation, constructive effort and sympathetic appreciation? It is evident, therefore, that a general participation by individuals in the institutional life of society will not be sufficient to insure progress in realizing the ideal of democracy. Social institutions and instrumentalities must themselves be modified and developed so as to yield their fullest values of personal association. And these values they can yield only if they avail them-

selves to the utmost extent of all the instinctive incentives that give impulsion and interest to personal communication among men.

The full scope and import of the principles under discussion in this and the foregoing chapters become apparent only when they are brought to bear upon the actual problems in the different fields of human association. Only when thus applied to existing social problems do they cease to seem mere easy generalizations and stand out in their true character as formative influences in conduct generated by the social ideal, the ideal of democracy, as we have defined it. For purposes of illustration and explanation, we shall now consider some of the present problems of political, industrial and family life in the light of these principles which embody the demands of the social ideal. Each of these organized forms of social life, the state, industry, and the family, is a subject by itself requiring many chapters, or rather volumes, for its treatment. Our discussion must of necessity be brief and cursory, limited in fact by the scope of the question which the present chapter leaves uppermost in our minds: How far and in what way can these institutions be modified so as to realize, or to promote the realization of, the values of personal intercommunication?

CHAPTER XI

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC OPINION

The state, as we all know, differs in important respects from all other types of social organization. It is not a voluntary organization like the social club or the church or the labor union. Every human individual is born a member of some nation or political group which claims and exercises authority over him. Thus the state is more comprehensive than the family or the economic group; since for fundamental practical purposes of life it includes all the individuals resident in a certain area. And this area has expanded in the case of leading modern nations to cover hundreds of thousands and even millions of square miles. The present generation, which has seen the growth of international world-wide association in the defense of economic interest and for the promotion of trade and commerce, has also had a new and striking proof of the greater strength and cohesiveness of the political tie. In the late World War, workers who had hailed as comrades all men of like occupation and had proclaimed identity of economic position and interest to be a bond stronger than any obligation of citizenship, nevertheless threw their lot with fellow citizens of every different grade of economic and social position and faced their former comrades in industry as enemies on the field of battle. And the scholars and scientists who before the international

crisis would have maintained that the devotion to truth and human welfare which they shared with investigators and social workers of other nations constituted a tie deeper than any national allegiance also found themselves fighting shoulder to shoulder with their fellow citizens of every variety and description against their former colleagues and fellow students. Hence there is no reason to suppose that the tie of citizenship has lost its strength and its power, as the cement capable of binding into effective unity the most diverse human elements. Capital and labor drawn off into hostile camps may admit no community of interest, inherited wealth and differences in education may create social bars that seem insurmountable, but the political bond remains, bridging all gaps and surmounting all antagonisms.

While all must admit that the state is thus distinguished by a certain over-arching inclusiveness, room is left for radical difference of opinion as to its precise function and its relation to other types of human association. Indeed, two opposing tendencies assert themselves in all thought and discussion of political problems: the one to restrict and circumscribe the purpose and powers of the state, and the other to enlarge and strengthen them. These two tendencies have their roots in two contrasting conceptions of the function of the state, a narrower and a wider. The inclusiveness of the political relationship in the sense just explained may be fully recognized and the state believed to be but one agency or institution among many, having a circumscribed sphere and a limited importance. Its proper function, so say those who hold this view, is the exercise of police power. Some agency must be empowered to enforce the indispensable condi-

tions of social order and public safety. This agency is the state, and it is inclusive as religious and industrial and cultural organizations are not, because its function is to maintain those fundamental rights to security of person and property, and to freedom of action, with which all individuals are equally concerned. But this, after all, is but one interest among many in human life; the church, the family, the trade-union, represent other interests just as strong among those who feel them, even if less general; hence the state must be prepared to coördinate its activities with those of other types of association.

There is, however, another view of the state which assigns to it a much larger function and a more commanding position. We step naturally onward to this view when we consider that in the case of conflict between other organizations having more limited purposes, the state in the exercise of its police power is compelled to intervene and to adjust their conflicting claims. So the force of the law may be called into play to protect a man in working to support his family when his trade-union forbids, or to uphold the validity of a marriage which the church declares to be null and void because it contravenes its regulations. Hence we are led by the logic of social relations to regard the state as the authority empowered to limit the scope and to adjust the claims of all other organizations and institutions. But such supremacy as this can be justified only on the assumption that the state subserves an end more comprehensive than that of any other organization—comprehensive enough, in fact, to include the special purposes realized by all other forms of association, respectively. Such an end or

purpose must cover all of human life, the whole range of man's associated activities. Thus we come to think of the state as *the organization of the whole population of a territory to promote a certain type of associated human life.*

If we stop to consider what such a type of associated life involves in actual practice, it will be apparent that its maintenance and promotion is commonly regarded, among civilized peoples at least, as the proper business of the state and the true purpose of political organization. Of course it presupposes, first of all, the preservation of public order and the security of person and property. But it embraces much more. It involves, for instance, a definite "standard of living" with all that this entails. Witness the laws that have been passed in the United States and Canada and Australia to prohibit or restrict immigration that would tend to lower standards of living. We see that if the housing and dress, the facilities for amusement and recreation, of a people do not meet "civilized" requirements, their associated or community life must fall short of its full possibilities of satisfaction and achievement. It involves also certain forms of social intercourse, of marital relation and family organization. Witness the jealous solicitude of states for the superiorities which they find in their own social systems—occidental nations would go to any length to protect their own types of social and family organization admitting the equality of women and permitting the free association of the sexes, from oriental influences which would, it is thought, degrade women to a position of servitude, and erect barriers of sex and of caste to prevent social intercourse. It involves or may involve a degree

and kind of educational opportunity, of religious freedom, of æsthetic cultivation.

If, in this way, we consider what a civilized state of to-day is interested in or concerned with, we see that it is nothing less general or comprehensive than a form or type of associated human life. This is in part actual, being embodied in the national system of laws, customs and institutions by which the life of the whole people is organized or directed. As such it is rooted in the national history, is sanctioned by historic tradition and supported by the authority of the founders and statesmen of the nation whose conspicuous public services and far-seeing political wisdom have caused their names to be venerated and their policies followed throughout the centuries. It is in part ideal, focussing and rendering articulate the hopes and aspirations of a people for a fuller life and a more satisfying collective achievement. The national ideal has also its roots in the national history, being prefigured in the visions of teachers and reformers, and consecrated by the deeds of heroes who have spent their energy and sacrificed their lives in patriotic devotion to their country's larger good. But this ideal whose realization is the supreme concern of the state is the product as well of the rational criticism of existing social arrangements in the light of growing present knowledge and the more adequate understanding to which it has led, of human needs and capacities and the conditions of their realization.

Largely as the result of such rational criticism which is bringing to light the actual conditions requisite to the realization of those humanitarian ideals which religion has implanted in the mind and conscience of occidental

civilization, nations are assuming a more and more complete responsibility for the whole mental and moral life of their citizens. Hence it seems not too much to say that the wider conception of the function of the state is the one which is in line with the direction of social progress. It is doubtful, to be sure, how far the state is justified in the use of force, said to be its distinctive instrumentality, in the promotion of a humanly desirable social life. Certain it is that such direct use of physical constraint as is necessary for the defense of fundamental human rights and the preservation of public order and safety is of limited efficacy when employed in promoting the educational and ethical interests of a people. In this higher field, governments must depend mainly upon indirect influence and action: limiting themselves to intelligent, consistent and determined efforts to provide the economic conditions and social atmosphere most favorable to the exercise of the higher human faculties in the associated life. But, while accepting this limitation, it is hard to see how states can avoid direct action and forcible restraint when the larger social interest seems to demand it.

Very noteworthy indeed has been the increasing tendency on the part of governments during the last quarter-century to invade the sphere, previously held inviolate, of individual liberty and private possession, when the public interest seemed to demand it. This "socialistic" tendency has aroused strong and bitter opposition which can be depended upon to produce periodic, partial, reactions. But one can scarcely doubt that it is destined increasingly to prevail, because it springs from that enlarged sense of social responsibility called forth by

the moral ideal and required to usher in the era of human brotherhood.

In the case of democracy which, as we have found, is the formulation in political terms of the ideal of human brotherhood, that social good which it is the avowed purpose of the state to promote must be a good in which all citizens may personally participate. Now the essential condition of the realization of the political ideal conceived in this comprehensive way is personal intercommunication, complete and thorough-going, and the establishment of such intercommunication throughout its citizen body is the most urgent present duty of every state which assumes its full social responsibility. Personal intercommunication, as we are now aware, consists in the exchange of intelligible experiences on the widest possible scale, so that the consciousness of the individual is expanded and enriched through the incorporation of the personal points of view of his fellow citizens, including their illuminating ideas, their practical inventions, and their significant emotions. The first, preliminary work of political organization, the establishment of peace and good order, has merely the effect of removing the hindrances which unregulated human impulses oppose to such personal association, while its higher activities in the promotion of education, public health and recreation, economic efficiency and conservation, contribute directly to the realization of this end. Of the three forms of personal association which we have differentiated and described, that upon which the state chiefly relies and which it must encourage if it is to fulfill its purposes, is the exchange of ideas through the medium of language. In earliest times, political affairs, that is to say matters

of group concern and tribal action, were subjects for counsel, for solemn deliberation on the part of the oldest and wisest heads, whose conclusions were communicated to others and duly discussed by them. With the rise of authority this factor became less prominent in political administration although the sovereign himself, no matter how despotic, usually took counsel with his head men and favorites. But with the advent of constitutional monarchy and, finally, of representative democracy, discussion has again come to the forefront as the acknowledged basis of popular government. It is, to be sure, far from true, that the other forms of personal communication have no place in the activities of the state. Coöperation is in the highest degree necessary between those directly engaged in the work of government in the narrow sense, between elected representatives, administrative officials, and the like. We all know, furthermore, how profoundly feeling influences the course of political affairs, how indispensable emotional accord in the form of a favorable public sentiment is to a wise and effective political administration. Without a positive feeling on the part of the citizens for the common good and the state that exists to promote it, such a feeling as the one we call love of country or patriotism, it would be impossible in the clash of contending interests to secure time and opportunity for the processes of national deliberation to go on. Certain instinctive tendencies, as well, are constantly and powerfully operative in the life of the state, notably the gregarious and pugnacious instincts, and the instincts of self-assertion and submission, respectively. But in spite of the importance of all these diverse influences, discussion or collective deliberation remains the distinc-

tive and characteristic political activity: the state is preëminently the sphere in which men exchange ideas and experiences through speech and by writing and thus formulate an ideal of a common life that seems both comprehensive and satisfying.

We have grown used to thinking of discussion as the means or method upon which democracies must rely for arriving at decisions and directing the conduct of affairs. We believe that it is on the whole safer and better to be guided by the consensus of popular opinion than to entrust the direction of public policy to certain families or classes of supposedly (or actually) superior ability and training. This, or course, is to give weight to the judgment of the average man, of the prejudiced and ill-informed as well as the educated and fair-minded. But it does not necessarily follow that the conclusions which result from a general discussion of questions of national policy and general welfare reflect the opinion of the ignorant voter in his ignorance, or even of the average citizen in his mediocrity. There is reason to hope—and this hope is increasingly confirmed by experience—that the views of the most enlightened will in the end prevail through the ability of those of superior intelligence and wider information to convince their fellow-citizens and persuade them to accept wiser views. The public discussion that goes on in an intensified form during a political campaign has just this object and this value. And, therefore, understanding its value, we recognize public discussion as needful and salutary. But we are prone to think of it as a tiresome necessity at best, so tiresome that we often wonder if the game is worth the candle and welcome doubts as to the efficacy of the

method in the hope of escaping its exactions. Now there is little reason indeed to question seriously the efficacy of discussion in shaping the policies of democratic government. Citizen bodies grow constantly less willing to support governments in the use of force unless the policies that call for its application have been generally discussed and have produced a preponderance of affirmative conviction. But we do not grasp the full significance of the democratic ideal until we understand that the popular discussion in question is not merely an instrument of democratic government but the end, or one aspect of the end, of democracy itself. In other words, for democracy the exchange of ideas and experiences among fellow citizens is not merely a means or device for the carrying on of government, but an end, good in itself, for whose realization government in the narrow sense exists. For why should order be preserved, economic production encouraged, traffic regulated, and recreation provided, except that men may be enabled to associate on the widest possible scale?

The result of the interchange of ideas and opinions, the recounting of personal experiences and the expression of personal preferences, is, we have seen, an incalculable enrichment of the individual consciousness. To such opportunity democracy, through its regular processes, invites the loyal citizen. It is very easy for such a citizen —as the experience of democracies is demonstrating afresh with every passing year—to fail at once in the use of the means and in the realization of the end of democratic government. There is a certain inertia and exclusiveness about the individual consciousness which causes it to resist the entrance of others' experience and view-

points. As individuals we are at home with our own opinions and standards and so also with those of our immediate circle of friends and congenial acquaintances: our minds move freely among them and (partly for this reason) we find them agreeable. The ideas of others, particularly those of different occupation and upbringing and social traditions, we assume will be for us uninteresting and valueless if not distasteful and antagonistic. Hence we avoid personal contact with them. We do not care to know what people very different from ourselves think, for we are sure beforehand that we shall not like their ideas any better than we like them. But the experience of all who, from force of circumstances or a sense of duty, if not from human interest and sympathy, surmount the barriers of individual exclusiveness and self-sufficiency, goes to show that the wider and more varied personal contacts are infinitely interesting and fructifying: they add to the zest and relish of life as well as to its deeper meaning. Miss Jane Addams, one of the modern prophets of democracy, gives impressive testimony to this effect in her *Democracy and Social Ethics*, there showing that democracy means the opening of communication with thousands of our fellow citizens whom we have hitherto regarded only externally, and thus the discovery of infinite resources of interest and inspiration and the exposure of our natures to the beneficent influences of sympathy, tolerance and pity.

The cry of "Back to the people" is always heard at the same time when we have the prophet's demand for repentance or the religious cry of "Back to Christ," as though we could seek refuge with our fellows and believe in our common experiences as preparation for a new moral struggle. As the

acceptance of democracy brings a certain life-giving power, so it has its own sanctions and comforts. Perhaps the most obvious one is the curious sense that comes to us from time to time, that we belong to the whole, that a certain basic well-being can never be taken away from us whatever the turn of fortune.[1]

Nor need we be confused to find discussion playing a double role of means and end in national democracy. For we have found this to be true of the social and moral values generally: they are not divorced from the natural routine of life, but first emerge as incidental to it; men talk together, help one another and share their joys and sorrows as they work and fight and eat and rest. But gradually the conviction dawns that these by-products, these three forms of personal intercommunication, are the ends to which the whole natural process is but a means, that they are the values whose realization gives import and meaning to human existence.

A clearer understanding of the problems of political association is promised by the fact that these are now being studied from the standpoint of psychology rather than that of physics or biology. For certain purposes it is doubtless legitimate to look at the political group from the outside, considering it as a collection of living individuals maintaining corporate existence through its power of adjustment to other groups and to the forces of the natural environment. But this is, and must remain, a relatively superficial view. The deeper, the adequate insight can be gained only from within, from the standpoint of conscious personality which views the group as an association of selves, each with an outlook that is

[1] Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, pp. 275, 276.

individual but which includes with more or less fullness the aims and purposes of others. The state or nation then appears as essentially an organization of minds, a correlation of wills. Whether we describe the personal relation in question in terms of intellect or will does not matter as long as we understand that thought is directed by purpose and purpose illuminated by reason. It does, however, hold true that political organization in a civilized democracy depends primarily upon the intercommunication of ideas rather than the coördination of actions among fellow citizens. The act of voting is a simple matter, no fine degree of motor coördination is called for; it is the thought behind the ballot that counts, the community of ideas and reciprocity of intellectual insight among the voters. This process of intellectual interchange through the medium of language has two principal functions which are deserving of specific mention: the first is to produce in the minds of the individual citizens a realizing idea of the group as a whole; the second is to bring to the intelligent notice and discriminating judgment of the group the constructive ideas, suggestions, and original discoveries of its members.

Professor McDougall has recently emphasized the first-named function of intercommunication on the formal side. In his *Group Mind*, he comes to the conclusion that nationhood is essentially a psychological conception and signifies an organized system of mental or psychical forces. Such mental organization and it alone, he holds, renders a group capable of that collective deliberation and volition which constitutes it a nation.[2] But national deliberation and volition, along with the mental organiza-

[2] McDougall, *The Group Mind*, 1921, pp. 100, 191.

tion which they presuppose, are altogether dependent for their existence and operation upon the formation in the minds of the mass of the members of the group of some adequate idea of the group as a whole, its nature, composition, functions and capacities, and of the relations of the individuals to the group.[3] Hence in Professor McDougall's view, to which reference has already been made in an earlier chapter, the members of the group might be united by a common purpose but the group would lack highly organized mentality if an adequate idea of it as a whole was not present in the minds of its members, accompanied by such feeling of personal interest and attachment as would make it an effective motive to action. Applying these conclusions to the state, he maintains that only so far as the idea of a people or nation as a whole is present to the consciousness of individuals and determines their actions can a nation in the proper sense of the word be said to exist.

> Any nation exists only in virtue of the existence of the idea of the nation in the minds of the individuals of whom it is composed. . . . In fact, national progress and power and success depend in chief part upon the fullness and extension, the depth and width of this self-consciousness—the accuracy and fullness with which each individual mind reflects the whole; and upon the strength of the sentiments which are centered upon it and which lead men to act for the good of the whole, to postpone private to public ends.[4]

These considerations lead Professor McDougall to attribute great importance to freedom of communication as a condition necessary to the formation of national

[3] *Op. Cit.*, pp. 49, 50.
[4] *Op. Cit.*, p. 161.

mind and character. It is, he points out, the immense development of the modern means of communication, especially the printing press, the railway, and the telegraph, that has made the national state of to-day a possibility.

> Although, then, the platform and the orator and the assembly remain important influences in modern times, it is mainly the telegraph, wireless telegraphy, the printing press and the steam engine that have rendered possible the large modern nations; for these have facilitated the dissemination of news and the expression of feeling and opinion on a large scale, and the free circulation of persons.[5]

Professor Graham Wallas in *Our Social Heritage* treats of the same subject on the side of content, asking what kind of an idea a modern civilized man can be expected to possess of the nation of which he is a member, considering the hopeless inadequacy of his perceptions to the range and complexity of his social environment, the limitations of his intelligence, and the defects of his imagination.[6] The difficulties of the problem are increased, Professor Wallas reminds us, by the sinister influence of some modern purveyors of news and entertainment who use their practiced skill to create just those impressions on the popular mind that it suits their own interest or avarice to produce.[7] The author is led on by these considerations to raise the momentous question of what changes must be made in the economic system, social organization, and educational methods, of the modern nation, in order that the idea of it may induce a larger

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[5] *Op. Cit.*, p. 132.
[6] Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, 1920, chap. iv.
[7] *Op. Cit.*, p. 81.

degree of voluntary coöperation than at present exists. His first answer is that we must secure a much nearer approximation to economic and social equality than now exists in any industrial nation.[8] But this, he holds, will not produce the desired result, "Unless it is accompanied by two other conditions: firstly, a better understanding of the nature of the social coöperation created by 'money economy'; and, secondly, a greater positive liking by men and women for the work they do." [9]

In his very interesting and illuminating study, *Public Opinion*, Mr. Walter Lippman confesses to an even greater scepticism as to the ability of the average citizen of a modern democracy to form an idea of his nation sufficiently accurate and adequate to enable him to judge rightly upon questions of national policy. Representative democracy, he reminds us, was forced to fall back upon the wisdom and experience of the ordinary voter.[10] Such ordinary citizens have consequently to deal with what is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. They are of course dependent upon those artificial means for extending the range of individual perception which modern invention has devised and modern enterprise has put in operation. Hence the individual citizen has a picture made inside his head, of himself and of others, their needs and purposes and relationship, and these pictures inside the heads of individuals are their public opinions.[11] But these pictures set up in individual heads by modern means of information and publicity such as, principally, the public press are, Mr. Lippman believes, hopelessly stereo-

[8] *Op. Cit.*, p. 88.
[9] *Op. Cit.*, p. 90.
[10] Lippman, *Public Opinion*, p. 275.
[11] *Op. Cit.*, p. 29.

typed by tradition and convention.[12] Hence the number of public opinions based upon any objective report has been very small in proportion to those based on casual fancy.[13] He reaches the conclusion that the troubles of representative government as well as the troubles of industry are due to "the failure of self-governing people to transcend their casual experience and prejudice by inventing, creating and organizing a machinery of knowledge." [14] Representative government, he is convinced, cannot be worked successfully, "unless there is an independent, expert, organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions." [15]

President Lowell has more confidence in agencies which now exist in modern democracies to mold public opinion and to obtain an expression of the popular will. He and Professor McDougall agree that representative government under the party system, with freedom of the press and wise leadership constitutes the only effective means that has ever been devised for collective deliberation. In a body of men too large to form a collective opinion by general discussion and mutual concession, there are, he states, just three possible conditions of government: autocracy, anarchy (which is the negation of all government), or the formulation by concerted action of alternatives between which the body can choose.[16] The true function of political parties, he holds, is this necessary one of formulating the alternative policies and candidates

12 *Op. Cit.*, p. 273.
13 *Op. Cit.*, p. 274.
14 *Op. Cit.*, p. 365.
15 *Op. Cit.*, p. 31.
16 Lowell, *Public Opinion in War and Peace*, p. 183.

between which the people can choose.[17] On many public questions, the formulation of alternatives antecedent to full discussion in legislative assembly is admittedly impossible and upon such matters a rather vague indication of policy is all that is possible or desirable.[18] Moreover, in popular government the tendency is to have the alternatives different enough to make an issue but not so far apart that men who do not go to extremes will be alienated by either.[19] Dr. Lowell assents to what Mr. Lippman says of the prevailing influence of "stereotypes," that is, traditional beliefs and conventional prejudices, in the formation of individual and collective opinion.[20] He admits their dangers: at best they are merely approximations not safely applicable beyond the limits within which they are fairly accurate.[21] But nevertheless he seems to regard them as a convenience which we could not well do without, labor-saving devices which all thought, individual and social, must utilize it if it is to make progress. It is the task of intellectual leadership, he asserts, to criticize such inaccurate general assumptions, and it is through such constructive criticism rather than through any revolutionary innovation, one gathers, that he expects public opinion will gradually become more enlightened and competent for its political task.

These current discussions bring forcibly to our notice two facts which bear directly upon the problems of personal association which have interested us. The first is that the free interchange of ideas among fellow citizens

[17] *Op. Cit.*, p. 187.
[18] *Op. Cit.*, p. 189.
[19] *Op. Cit.*, p. 163.
[20] *Op. Cit.*, p. 90.
[21] *Op. Cit.*, p. 91.

must be facilitated through the fullest possible use of every modern mechanical means and instrumentality if the organization of civilized nations is to be preserved intact and rendered effective in promoting the good of its members. The second is that citizens will not be moved to loyal devotion and patriotic service by their ideas of the nation to which they belong if they have reason to believe that its organization is dictated by the interests of a few in positions of power, and its policies calculated to insure their further enrichment and advantage. In this case, the more truthful and adequate the idea of the nation disseminated by agencies of public education and information, the stronger the impulse toward disorganization and dissolution. Unfortunately, this appears to be just the situation in more than one modern nation.

The second-mentioned function of intercommunication within the group was made much of by genetic psychologists like Professor Baldwin whose researches a generation ago established the importance of social heredity and intelligent selection as factors in social evolution.[22] At this time, natural selection had come to be regarded as the principal cause of evolution in the human as well as the animal field. For biologists had reached the conclusion that none of the results of individual experience and effort are physically inherited. To what then can the evolution of animal species and human societies be due, asked the Neo-Darwinians, except the process of natural selection, working upon variations produced in the germ plasm? But further study made it evident, not merely that natural selection is rendered

22 Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*, chap. x. Also, *Mental Development: Social and Ethical Interpretations.*

largely ineffective within the group by altruistic feeling and action, but also that social evolution depends primarily upon the inventions and achievements of individuals. The problem then was to account for the appropriation by society of the products of individual effort and invention, and their transmission to subsequent generations. This was seen by Baldwin and fellow-investigators to be due to a process of social heredity and selection in which the individuals, after receiving through example and instruction the social tradition, exercised their own inventive intelligence in improving upon and adding to this. These results of his own invention the individual communicated to his fellows; they were subjected to social judgment and criticism; such as won social approval were incorporated in the social tradition to be handed down to following generations. It will be seen that this process through which the social culture advances is altogether dependent upon the ease and facility of intercommunication within the group. Ways must be open for the exchange of ideas and experiences and achievements with sufficient ease and adequacy and freedom to encourage gifted individuals to bring their inventions to the notice of society and to enable society to estimate them fairly and to avail itself of every element of value in them. If the prejudice of class, the inertia of conservatism, the interests of established authority, check or thwart such intercommunication, society suffers, its progress ceases, and it falls victim to injurious influences engendered from within.

The importance of intelligent intercommunication in this respect has impressed the mind of a recent writer, Mr. Trotter, who approaches social problems from the

biological standpoint and undertakes to explain "social habit" in terms of the gregarious or "herd" instinct. The following passage is worth quoting in its entirety as a singularly interesting instance of the way in which a writer who professes to accept only an objective, "scientific" psychology is led on by his investigation of the facts to acknowledge the importance of the "subjective" factors of self-consciousness and personal intelligence.

The gregarious mind shows certain characteristics which throw some light on this phenomenon of the progressively enlarging unity. The gregarious animal differs from the solitary in the capacity to become conscious in a special way of the existence of other creatures. The specific consciousness of his fellows carries with it a characteristic element of communion with them. The individual knows another individual of the same herd as partaker in an entity of which he himself is a part; so that the second individual is in some way and to a certain extent identified with himself and part of his personality. He is able to feel with the other and share his pleasure and sufferings as if they were an attenuated form of his own personal experiences. The degree to which this assimilation of the interests of another person is carried depends in a general way upon the extent of the intercommunication between the two. In human society a man's interest in his fellows is distributed about him concentrically according to a compound of the various relations they bear to him, which we may call in a broad way their nearness. The centrifugal fading of interest is seen when we compare the man's feeling toward one near him with his feeling toward one farther off. He will be disposed, other things being equal, to sympathize with a relation as against a fellow townsman, with a fellow townsman as against a mere inhabitant of the same county, with the latter as against the rest of the country, with an Englishman as against a European, with a European as against an Asiatic, and so on until the limit is reached beyond which all human interest is lost. The distribution

of interest is of course never purely geographical but is modified by, for example, trade and professional sympathy, and by especial cases of intercommunication which bring geographically distant individuals into a closer grade of feeling than their mere situation would demand. The essential principle, however, is that the degree of sympathy with a given individual varies directly with the amount of intercommunication with him. The capacity to assimilate the interests of another individual with one's own, to allow him, as it were, to partake in one's own personality, is what is called altruism, and might equally well perhaps be called expansive egoism. It is a characteristic of the gregarious animal and is a perfectly normal and necessary development in him of his instinctive inheritance.[23]

Mr. Trotter believes that if man is to gain the full advantage of the gregarious habit he must develop a power of intercommunication of unprecedented fineness.[24] For man differs from the other highly successful gregarious species such as bees and ants in the enormous capacity for varied reaction possessed by individuals. Now unless man acquires a capacity for intercommunication equally great, human society will not, Mr. Trotter thinks, derive the advantages it might from the possession of gregarious habits. It will drive gifted and original minds into "resistiveness" on the one hand, or "mental instability" on the other, thus weakening its own structure besides losing the benefit of the contributions they might make to social life and progress.[24]

There is only one agency through which the citizens of a nation can be brought into personal intercommunication so close and thoroughgoing that the character

[23] Trotter, *The Herd Instinct and War*, p. 120.
[24] *Op. Cit.*, pp. 61, 62.

and interests of the group are reflected in the consciousness of individual members, and the fruitful ideas and inventions of individuals are freely transmitted to the group. That agency is *education.* Hence the crucial importance of education to the democratic state. Hence its advance in the modern world from the position of a luxury, the privilege of the leisured class or a benefaction of the church, to that of an imperative public concern whose adequate support and successful administration is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

CHAPTER XII

DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

If education is to render the essential public service which we expect from it, a clearer understanding must prevail as to its true purpose and scope. Such an understanding has been hindered up to the present by the tendency of thought upon the subject to go to either of two extremes, the intellectualistic or the utilitarian, in conceiving of education. These different and opposing conceptions of the aim of education have led to different and opposing views as its subject matter. According to the one, the true aim of education is the training and cultivation of man's intellectual and æsthetic faculties; its content is determined by scholastic tradition which prescribes the subjects that have been found best suited to this purpose. In the main, classical literature and pure mathematics have been thus favored as studies affording the most thorough mental discipline. A mastery of these subjects does, without doubt, afford valuable intellectual training and contribute as well to the formation of sound standards of judgment and the cultivation of taste; but such training, because of its limited range and the remoteness of its subject matter from the natural and social environment of the modern individual, tends to became a purely conventional mark of learning, the socially recognized badge of culture. The second theory

holds that the purpose of education should be to prepare the individual for life in the situation in which he finds himself; it will concern itself primarily with imparting such knowledge of his material and social surroundings as promises to be useful to the modern man. But such education, by aiming too directly at individual interest and social utility, defeats its own aim, for, as has been amply shown, civilized society with whose welfare the interests of the individual are indissolubly bound up, depends for its orderly activities and continued progress upon the ability of members to participate in the collective mental life, and this they will not be able to do unless through education they have been taught to look beyond the limits of convenience and utility and pass judgment in terms of a social good to be coöperatively realized in the course of centuries.

Avoiding then the errors of these two extremes, we shall find in the social relation itself, understood as the intercommunication of persons, the true purpose of education written plain. It is no less than the reproduction and reorganization within the developing consciousness of the individual of what is universally significant in the experience of humanity. Looked at from the standpoint of the state and the public interest which must justify its heavy financial cost, we say that the purpose of education is to prepare for citizenship. What does this mean, however, but preparing the individual for participating in the national mind and will? It means that he shall learn to identify the national achievements, the national problems, the national ideals, with himself, his own interests, perplexities and purposes. Now he can do this only if he knows the history of his country, the

character of its population, the conditions under which it has developed, and the national ideal which these influences have conspired to produce. He can do this only if his mental horizons have been sufficiently enlarged to admit of a sympathetic understanding of the viewpoints of fellow citizens whose situation and outlook in life is very different from his own, and an intelligent appreciation of the racial, economic, and religious influences that have caused these differences. It is of course obvious that any education that was narrowly national in its interest and scope would miss its aim of training for citizenship. Prerequisite to all such instruction as we have been considering is the fundamental knowledge of language, of mathematics, of natural science, which will enable the individual to classify and enumerate the objects of his environment, to anticipate the action of natural forces and of physiological processes, and to communicate freely with his fellows. And inasmuch as a civilized nation can have no past history or present prosperity except in constant interaction with other nations, no citizen has acquired a truly national mind who has not learned to think internationally, who does not see his own country against a background of world history and international relationships.

We need to understand knowledge in terms of our unfolding human experience. Despite the growth of the scientific spirit—one of the fine and heartening things of our time—a taint of professionalism attaches to knowledge as the average person views it. Knowledge is commonly supposed to be the special interest of a peculiar type of mind, that of the investigator or researcher, who explores all sorts of difficult and recondite subjects.

The results of such research are recorded in treatises and encyclopedias where they are available for our use when we have practical need of them. The application of knowledge to the practical arts of life is primarily the task of the inventor or technician; secondarily, and in a lesser way, it is the special privilege of the "educated." For the principle purpose of education, we are told, is to teach us where to find the knowledge we need for the discharge of professional duty and the prosecution of business enterprise. What a pitiful conception of knowledge! Books are not collections of facts in cold storage. They are (when they contain real knowledge) living voices capable of communicating to us what has permanent value in the experience of mankind. Knowledge initiates us into the corporate life of humanity. It frees us from the limitations of time and space and the narrowness of our own sense world by introducing into our conscious lives the experiences of our fellows from the remote past to the very present, experiences of natural fact in their order of objective sequence, experiences of personal meaning with their varied possibilities of interest and satisfaction. Knowledge makes its possessor a citizen not of his local neighborhood merely but of the world; not of his own age simply, but of all time; it enlarges his consciousness to include the universe. When we come to understand knowledge thus in terms of living human experience, the full value of our present machinery for the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge comes home to us in full force. What boundless possibilities for social culture lie in the modern facilities for the publication of books and periodicals, in our newspapers with their world-encircling telegraph service, in our

schools and universities, in our free libraries and extension services!

These glowing possibilities of an intellectual culture humanized and socialized are confirmed if we glance momentarily, for the sake of illustration, at the great departments of knowledge. The content of history—what is it? Dry facts exhumed from their burial places in the dusty past, to be sorted out, arranged in order and memorized? No, the acts and experiences of our fellows which have shaped our lives by making our social world what it is. These acts and experiences of our forerunners in the great human drama, we understand in the light of our own experiences: their motives we interpret by the impulses which rise in our own breasts; their world by the natural environment with which we have to contend. And the story of the human past with the deeds and sufferings it relates gives new meaning to our present experience; we see it in an altered and enlarged perspective as a step in the unfolding life of humanity. We are reminded that we live not unto ourselves but by virtue of a social heritage that has been bought with a price, and lays us under a debt which can be discharged only if we do our duty to the unborn generations of the future. It is no accident that the increased sense of social responsibility that has accompanied the dawning of the humanitarian ideal has convinced men of the importance of studying universal human history. Nor is such study to be regarded as an ornament, an eminently desirable embellishment of human life, limited by necessity to the educated few. It is a general necessity, a pressing necessity, if democracy is to survive and to fulfil its mission. We profess our faith in representative democracy, resting

upon the clarifying effect of free discussion and intelligent public opinion. But we are indeed blind if we expect popular government to succeed when the vision of the great majority of citizens is limited to their own private interests and the events of their local neighborhood, who know no history but that of their own country and very little of that. And we now fondly hope that the influence of democracy will avail to end wars and to establish international relations upon the basis of goodwill and common devotion to human well-being. But how absurd to expect from the people wise judgment on matters of foreign policy when their mental outlook has not been expanded to embrace the viewpoints of other peoples different from themselves, and to comprehend the inter-play of forces that has produced the present world situation.

When natural science is mentioned, we think of a body of facts which exists in independence of human hopes and aspirations: the vast impersonal forces of the physical universe. "Zeus is dethroned and Vortex rules in his place." Yet this physical world is our world; the "laws of nature" are formulations of human intelligence which indicate the conditions under which physical events are universally experienced. The whole fabric of science rests upon the universal validity which we assume for our logical and mathematical procedures. And the crowning achievement of modern natural science has been to close the gap between man and nature, to establish, in fact, the essential kinship between man and the physical universe which now presents to us an aspect so strange and forbidding. In the movements of stellar masses, in the latent energies of the atom, life and reason were slumbering. From the molecule to man;

yes, from the revolving fire-mist or spiral nebula to man! When the wonder of it sweeps over us, what an utter travesty it seems to conceive of natural science as a collection of facts formulated for the benefit of those who have practical use for them.

Language and literature perhaps illustrate better than any other subjects of study the truth we are contending for, that the function of knowledge is to broaden the outlook of the individual so as to include what is significant in the experience of humanity. Language is the instrument of communication; through it the personal experiences of successive generations of men gain objective embodiment and expression, thus becoming the permanent possession of humanity. Great writers are men peculiarly sensitive to what has enduring significance in the life of man; to their discerning vision, certain facts, events and situations, disclose a deeper meaning which excites their imagination and arouses their emotion. This meaning they are able to embody in words which are adequate and thus capable of communicating it to us: we are thus permitted to share their insights, we are given moments of vision from the mountain peak whence the facts of common life appear transfigured in the light of eternal meaning. In the eloquent words of the report of the British Commission on the study of English:

> We must treat literature not as language merely, not as an ingenious set of symbols, a superficial and superfluous kind of decoration, or graceful set of traditional gestures, but as the self-expression of great natures, the record and rekindling of spiritual experiences and, in daily life for each one of us, the means by which we may, if we will, realize our own impressions and communicate them to our fellows.

Closely related to the schools of every grade which are maintained to transmit to rising generations the results of social experiences are the agencies of public information and enlightenment, such as newspapers, books, and magazines, which bring to the knowledge of all people events of general interest and importance occurring within the nation and throughout the world, and give wide currency to beliefs and ideas which, at least in the opinion of their authors, have a similar public interest and importance. Favored by an astonishing progression of marvellous inventions from the printing press and telegraph to the wireless telegraph and telephone and aërial transportation, these instrumentalities of communication have revolutionized the social life of modern states. They have, it is unnecessary to repeat, made the modern civilized nations possible. Not that the influence of present-day agencies of publicity is altogether for social good, however; they contain potentialities of evil which to-day threaten the integrity and even the existence of democratic institutions. Every year adds to the evidence already overwhelming, of the control exercised by the newspaper press over the political affairs of democracies. Great newspapers dictate party platforms and direct administrative policies; they elect presidents and unseat premiers. This power they of course possess only through the public opinion and national sentiment to which they appeal. But the proprietor of a successful metropolitan newspaper or string of newspapers is in a position to mold the public opinion to which he professes to appeal and defer, to create the national sentiment on which he pretends to rely. This he may do by bringing to light facts of public importance not generally known, or by

force and cogency of reasoned argument. But equally well he may do it by coloring the news, by one-sided and partisan treatment of public questions, by deliberate and well-calculated appeals to the prejudices of ignorance and the antagonisms of race and ancestral creed. The exercise of such power unaccompanied by a keen sense of social responsibility and a sincere devotion to the public good is acutely dangerous to any nation. It is indeed not without its perils when inspired by disinterested devotion to public good; for even though the individual who exercises it be transparently honest and unquestionably patriotic, he may be mistaken in the convictions that give aim and direction to his thought. It is a principle fundamental to democratic government that all who possess political power shall be directly accountable to the people. And the radical evil of such journalistic enterprise as we have been considering is that it gives to newspaper proprietors a power greater than that possessed by the regularly elected representatives of the people, for the use of which they cannot be called to direct account. Since it is primarily a commercial enterprise, the only way to curb a newspaper which is misleading public opinion or creating prejudice or fostering ill will is through its business office; yet this offers a very indirect and correspondingly ineffective means of control, since the revenues of the journal are derived principally from advertising, and this again is distributed on a strictly business basis.

But civilized intelligence is being aroused to the importance of keeping wide open and clear the channels of public information and enlightenment. The experience of the war furnished evidence, too striking to be easily

forgotten, of the pervasive and powerful effect upon the social mind of well organized and skillfully directed campaigns of publicity, utilizing not merely the newspaper and periodical press and the lecture platform, but the advertising column, billboard, and motion picture as well. In the early stages of the war we congratulated ourselves and modern civilization upon the efforts which all the belligerent nations were making to convince their own citizens of the moral justice of their causes, acclaiming this as signal proof that no civilized government would dare to adopt a policy disapproved by the moral sense and right reason of its people. But the new methods of influencing the popular mind proved so astonishingly effective that, as the difficulties and dangers of the war increased, and military necessity became more compelling, they were used with less and less scruple for truth and justice in order to keep the popular passions aroused to that fever heat of fear and anger which the authorities believed to be necessary for the continued relentless prosecution of a war that was exacting such calamitous destruction and unspeakable suffering. The word *propaganda*, with all its sinister associations, came into common use. To be sure, partisan appeal with misrepresentation as well as denunciation of opponents, with scandalous abuse as well as unfair innuendo, was no new thing: it had become a familiar accompaniment of partisan politics in all countries with parliamentary government. But this was coarse and clumsy work in contrast with propaganda. In the first place, propaganda made full use of the new methods for disseminating ideas and creating opinion devised by recent invention. While partisan appeal had found expression in the newspaper and

through the lecture platform, propaganda made use of the advertising column, the billboard, the motion picture, the airplane. But, secondly and more important, propaganda did not confine itself to denouncing and misrepresenting opponents; this was after all comparatively crude and inefficacious, easily countered and frequently defeating its own ends. The secret of its power, that which made it such a potent instrument, lay in the fact that it was guided by a scientific knowledge of the underlying motives that move men to action, of the fundamental human instincts and impulses.[1] It consisted essentially in the selection for dissemination and publicity of just those facts that would touch certain springs of action and thus move men to act as the agents and directors of propaganda desired them to act—the selection of just those facts and the suppression of all others.

As thus employed by governments, propaganda proved to be an instrument of such sweeping and terrible efficacy that it was adopted and utilized with equal success by other agencies engaged in the work of relief and restoration made necessary by the ravages of war. Since the war, its methods have come into general use by welfare organizations, charitable agencies, and educational institutions, in their money-raising campaigns, as well as by political parties and government bureaus. It has profoundly influenced modes and methods of advertising, one of the most important forms of present-day publicity. It is now an accepted principle fundamental to all intelli-

[1] An interesting and authoritative account of the psychological factors in propaganda is given in an article by Strong: "The Control of Propaganda as a Problem in Psychology," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. XIV, p. 234.

gent advertising that misrepresentation in praise of the article advertised or to the detriment of a competing article, does not pay. But propaganda in the form of carefully planned campaigns of publicity presenting a series of facts skilfully chosen with a view to touching impulses of whose existence and character the readers themselves are unaware but which when aroused impel them to buy and make use of the article whose merits are described, now pervades all advertising and must be taken into account as a powerful economic force governing the demand for certain classes of goods and consequently influencing their production and price.

Is it conceivable that civilized nations should continue to maintain school systems for the purpose of preparing youthful minds to participate in the responsibilities of citizenship and still leave these agencies through which information is disseminated and public opinion formed, quite uncontrolled? Since freedom of expression and communication is the very foundation of democratic government, any direct regulation of the public press (other than that provided by just laws against libel, etc.) would be undesirable as well as impracticable. But society, acting through its authorized agencies must undertake a larger part of the work of public information and enlightenment. One cannot doubt that the future will see printed and circulated an increasing number of news sheets and bulletins paid for by private endowment or out of the public funds, which contain authentic information of general interest and import, presented in a clear and impartial manner. For surely it is inconsistent for nations and private benefactors to spend millions to support schools and universities for the promotion and spread of

knowledge and then hesitate before the cost of supplying the general public with accurate information upon all subjects and happenings that directly and vitally concern it in its corporate capacity! Here again the war has opened our eyes to a political problem of utmost gravity: we all know how difficult, even impossible, it has been during and since the war to secure accurate and helpful information regarding important political and economic movements in other countries, how easy it has been for interested agencies to give a certain color and tenor to all the news obtainable, and how completely public opinion has been at the mercy of the established sources of news supply.

If the problem of circulating the news were entirely a question of spreading accurate information concerning important events, it would be much simpler than it is. Unfortunately, it is very much more complex than this. If a publicly supported or privately endowed journal were published in every center of population, presenting the news clearly, accurately, succinctly, and with a sense of proportion, it would have comparatively few readers. For what the readers want is not information exclusively or, one is tempted to say, primarily, but interest, entertainment, excitement. Putting the most favorable interpretation upon the popular taste, what it craves is "human interest." People wish the news to be so told that they can *realize* the events they read about, can visualize and feel the day's happenings in terms of their own experience. And because of untrained imagination and imperfect mental grasp, they are unable to do this unless the news is, by the help of the reporter's imagination, put in the form of a "real life" story with catchy headlines and

allusions made familiar by the talk of the day. This popular demand for a bright, gossipy, newspaper, alive with human interest, is also due in considerable part to the unsatisfied social impulses of our large city inhabitants who come into full personal contact with a very limited circle, yet crave some of that wider neighborly familiarity characteristic of village life. Hence the eagerness with which details of weddings and balls and scandals in high society, and of the private lives of prominent statesmen, screen stars, etc., are read and discussed. But these factors have all conspired to encourage the sensationalism, the scandalmongering, the vulgarity and intrusiveness which we so greatly deplore in a section of the metropolitan press. The cure for these evils is not easy to find, since they have their source in the untrained impulses and undeveloped intelligence of the great mass of newspaper readers. Laws protecting individuals from slander and malicious innuendo go but a little way. Probably the only real remedy lies in an improved general education which will create truer standards and a wider, saner, interest in fellow men and human happenings.

But the evils of sensationalism and vulgarity in the newspaper press are as nothing when compared with the danger of propaganda insidiously carried on by political and commercial interests in news columns and advertising pages. The former expends itself chiefly upon local happenings and the deeds and misdeeds of individuals, while propaganda poisons the sources of public opinion upon political and economic issues and thus threatens the existence of democracy itself. And as the cure for the ills of democracy is said to be more democracy so, it would seem, the remedy for the evils of publicity is more pub-

licity. Here, of course, is a compelling reason for leaving the public press unfettered. For no matter how far the net of propaganda may be thrown or how fine its meshes, some organ of publicity will remain unentangled whose interests will lie in exposure and attack. Newspapers should be compelled to make public the names of their owners, managers and writers of leading editorials, and also make obvious the distinction between matter secured to publish as news, and matter which is furnished as advertising. Political parties and candidates should be required to make public the sources of their campaign funds and great corporations to include and publish in their annual reports all expenditures for publicity and promotion. The political and commercial relations of the great news-gathering agencies, as well as the facts of ownership and management, should be subject to constant and critical scrutiny on the part of the public and its authorized representatives. Many of these requisites for an effective control of publicity in the interests of national and international well-being, have already been enacted into law and the remainder are doubtless destined to be in the not far distant future. Such measures as these promise well; indeed, so far as they have been seriously tried, they seem to have produced good effects. Yet they will certainly prove inadequate unless accompanied by an awakened understanding on the part of the general public as to the gravity of the problem that called them forth, and a popular determination to resort to more positive measures if necessary to secure accurate information on all matters of national and international import.

The general public must be aroused to a realization of the fact that the success of democratic government,

yes, the very existence of democracy itself, is involved in this problem of the use and control of modern agencies of publicity. Whether the average citizen is competent to form an intelligent opinion on grave issues of public concern when he is in possession of the essential facts on which to base such judgment may perhaps be questioned. But there is not the slightest question of his inability to form such a judgment when he is ignorant of the facts or is misled by false or distorted information. In the degree to which the efficacy of democratic government is dependent upon the growth and influence of an intelligent public opinion, so is it also dependent upon the existing sources of news supply which furnish the facts upon which such opinion rests. Mr. Lippman believes that the necessary limitations of the press are such that it must be supplemented by impartial agencies for the gathering and spread of important news. Democracy must organize some agency or institution, he thinks, for furnishing its citizens with the information they must have in order to form a reliable picture of the world.

The press is no substitute for institutions. It is like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of darkness into vision. Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes, incidents and eruptions. It is only when they work by a steady light of their own, that the press when it is turned upon them reveals a situation intelligible enough for a popular decision.

The trouble lies deeper than the press and so does the remedy. It lies in social organization based on a system of analysis and record, and in all the corollaries of that principle; in the abandonment of the theory of the omni-competent citizen, in the decentralization of decision, in the coördination

of decision by comparable record and analysis. If at the centers of management there is a running audit, which makes work intelligible to those who do it, and those who superintend it, issues when they arise are not the mere collisions of the blind. Then too the news is uncovered for the press by a system of intelligence that is alone a check upon the press.[2]

[2] Lippman, *Public Opinion*, p. 364.

CHAPTER XIII

DEMOCRACY AND INDUSTRY

In the number and variety of human individuals which it brings into personal contact, industry stands next to the state. Indeed, as readers of the *Republic* well know, Plato regarded division of labor with the economic interdependence to which it gave rise as the original cause of political union. In these days of far-reaching industrial and commercial organization, made possible by machine industry and the establishment of world-wide systems of communication and transportation, it is frequently remarked that while the political bond remains narrowly nationalistic, commerce and industry have become international and promise eventually to unite humanity by ties of common economic interest. But it must not be forgotten that while the trend of business and industry may be toward an international organization, it is not whole populations which are thus being associated. Rather is it limited groups which by virtue of their special interests are being drawn together and impelled to make common cause. Thus we have international banking and finance, international shipping trusts and manufacturing combines, international labor unions and workers' syndicates. No doubt this growing tendency on the part of special groups to seek friendly counsel and assistance from those of like occupation and interests in other countries signifies

a growing sense of brotherhood among men, but it is not in itself to be mistaken for the true internationalism to which we aspire.

As politics is the peculiar sphere of discussion, so industry is the sphere of action. It is the sphere of action understood as effortful performance, or work. Common speech identifies the two, industry and action. This is not to say, of course, that reason and imagination play no part in work: the outstanding feature of modern industry is its control by analytic intelligence and inventive imagination. But the activity involved is all focussed upon an external task, that of controlling the forces of the natural world and utilizing its materials in meeting the needs of mankind. Those whose intelligence directs the processes of industry, we speak of as "brain-workers"; but directly or indirectly, their thinking and planning bears upon the subjugation of physical and vital forces, and the transformation of the natural and social environment to suit the purposes of conscious human life. And if writers, students, and artists protest, and rightfully, against the popular tendency to treat their activity as a more or less serious and sustained form of play, it is because they know from bitter experience that the medium in which their abilities are exercised, and the bodily instrumentalities which they are forced to employ, are both external and intractable. Hence their activity is robbed of that spontaneity to which it may impatiently aspire, and is converted into effortful industry, hard work.

For many centuries social tradition tended to confirm in mature human thought the childish dislike of work as one of the menial and degrading things of life. It has been regarded merely as a means to an end, the only means

whereby man could procure the food, clothing and shelter required for continued existence, or accumulate the wealth requisite for an enjoyable life. Associated with the labor of slaves and "inferiors," all work, and particularly manual labor, was stigmatized with servility. To be sure, in every age, those trained to proficiency in special crafts have taken pleasure in the exercise of their skill, and men have found enjoyment in subduing the refractory forces of nature through the ruder exercise of muscular strength. But this did little to offset the general tendency to treat work as a hard necessity, to be valued, or rather tolerated, for the sake of the results it produced. Such hardship was to be cheerfully accepted by the mass of mankind—this was the teaching of moral and religious tradition. But superior natures might rightfully claim exemption from its exactions and its exhaustion. So in an aristocratic society exemption from the necessity of "work" has always been a privilege of noble birth; the ruling classes have been the leisure classes supported directly or indirectly by the labor of the rest.

The advance of democracy has worked a two-fold change in the popular attitude toward work, at least in occidental societies. Democracy, all now agree, admits of no leisured class: the burden of the work necessary for the support and continued progress of human society should fall upon all equally. The change in common opinion on this subject is reflected in the popular witticism current some years ago, that a "gentleman" is a man "without visible means of support." The idea, of course, is that any one who on account of accident of birth or in order to maintain social pretensions, claimed exemption from useful work assimilated himself to the

class of vagabonds and ne'er-do-wells who are objects of police surveillance.

The second change wrought by democracy in the social standing of work is positive and consists in a recognition of the social and moral value attaching to the process or activity of work itself apart from the results it produces. This insight came later than the first and is in fact just now dawning upon the intelligence of civilized society. It is due in main part to the better understanding of human nature which we have gained through recent researches in the fields of biology and psychology. The scientific facts thus brought to light have shown that the economic and ethical theories of a century ago were based upon false psychological assumptions. Man has not been impelled to work simply because his desire for happiness was strong enough to prevail over his natural indolence when his intelligence once perceived that thus only could he procure the material means of an enjoyable existence. On the contrary, human industry has, from its very first beginnings, afforded expression to a variety of instincts whose satisfaction has given interest and value to the activity itself, which the weight of an unfortunate social tradition has availed to conceal but not to destroy. Thus, for instance, Mr. Tead, who in his *Instincts in Industry* endeavors to bring the conclusions of recent psychology to bear upon the processes of industry, holds that not less than ten instincts function in human behavior as it is revealed in industry: (1) the parental instinct, (2) the sex instinct, (3) the instinct of workmanship, (4) the instinct of acquisitiveness, (5) the instinct of self-assertion, (6) the instinct of self-abasement, (7) the herd instinct, (8) the instinct of

pugnacity, (9) the play impulse, and (10) the instinct of curiosity.[1]

The fact that so many different instincts are called into play by the processes of industry greatly complicates the moral and social problems to which it gives rise. Work is not simply to be looked upon as a task which we must be urged to perform with fidelity and cheerfulness for the sake of an ulterior reward, but as an activity through which a number of human capacities gain expression and which may consequently be itself a source of satisfaction. Whether it is thus a source of satisfaction depends upon whether the conditions of its exercise provide for the full and natural expression of these capacities or leave them thwarted, frustrated, unfulfilled. And a principal cause of our present industrial trouble is, as we have been reminded by recent writers, that the conditions under which work is performed under the modern factory system are such as to leave fundamental instinctive dispositions thwarted, or "baulked";[2] with the result that the workers find in their tasks not a hard and joyless routine merely, but a source of positive irritation and increasing nerve strain. It is a mistake to think, however, as many present-day students of the psychology of industry seem to do, that the sole source of personal and social value in the processes of industry is in the satisfaction of instinct. It is true that human beings were first impelled to exert themselves in foraging and hunting, in making clothes and building shelters, by the self-preservative and hoarding instincts.

[1] Tead, *Instincts in Industry,* p. 11.

[2] This phrase has been given currency by the writings of Professor Graham Wallas. Certainly a more impressive statement of the facts of the case than he gives in chapter iv of the *Great Society* could not well be imagined.

The gregarious instinct prompted the men to hunt and fight in bands and the women to dress and sew the skins, to prepare and cook the food, in company. The sex and parental instincts were powerful motives impelling men and women to arduous exertions in the discharge of their respective functions in the family group. When we go on to consider the first steps in industrial progress (which came surprisingly soon, as the tools, weapons, and utensils of some primitive peoples show), we find that other and higher instincts were influential in prompting men to those activities and adjustments involved in the acquisition of skill in particular occupations. Thus instinctive curiosity gave man an interest in the materials provided by his environment and their suitability to his purposes, the instinct of trial and error[3] prompted him to experiment with various materials and forms, and, most important of all, the instinct of workmanship and construction made skilful and effective activity a source of satisfaction in itself and impelled him to improve his methods and perfect his processes. The development of skill, the specialization of industry, and the division of labor, were accompanied by a more intimate type of association, that of master and apprentice, or of fellow workmen in the same trade or occupation, and this brought other instincts into operation, such as those of leadership and subjection, and of emulation.

Entirely consistent with the important part played by instinct in the industry of the past and present, is the control exercised by intelligence over this department

[3] Assuming, of course, that there is such an instinct. Perhaps it is better understood as a particular manifestation of the instinct of construction.

of human conduct. The view that intelligence functions merely as an instrument to increase or enlarge instinctive satisfactions, we have rejected as unfounded and misleading. We have found the exercise of intelligence, or rational will, to be an end in itself and the source of the most comprehensive personal satisfactions. Now industry is intelligently directed action, and such action has been shown in a previous chapter to be a possible form of intercommunication among men. In principle it is, as we have seen, both creative and coöperative. It is capable, therefore, of yielding the value of personal fellowship in productive labor. This is the satisfaction which men have a right to expect from their participation in the work of the world. And it is upon the possibility of so organizing and directing industry that all men may share in this satisfaction that the program and the hopes of democracy chiefly rest.

We can easily see how the work of the skilled craftsman gives opportunity for the exercise of creative intelligence. By the help of his tools of which he has gained a thorough mastery, he shapes his materials and combines them in such a way as to realize the preconceived idea which has guided his activity. The finished product is thus an embodiment of his purpose, an expression of himself. The source of the satisfaction thus afforded lies not in the possession of the article constructed; this is designed for others' use. It lies rather in the adaptation of processes and materials available for general human use to the fulfillment of an end which can be understood and appreciated by all. Because the activity in question is the expression of intelligence, it is universal in its scope and significance; because the value realized is rational, it is

in the truest sense social. The social or coöperative feature of skilled handicraft stands out most clearly when it is done under conditions of the workshop. Here we see industry realizing its full possibilities as a means of personal intercommunication and working comradeship among men. Each worker exercises his own creative intelligence and manual dexterity within the limits of a technical procedure that gives unity and efficiency to the efforts of all. And each one is impelled to perfect and improve upon the accepted procedure in his own department by what he observes of the inventions and accomplishments of the rest. All participate in the consciousness of a common creative achievement, all share in the joy of fellowship in productive labor, one of the highest and finest satisfactions experienced by man.

But how, it may be asked, can industry furnish this satisfaction of coöperative achievement under the conditions of our day when the factory has in most cases supplanted the workshop and the automatic machine has deprived the worker of all chance for the exercise of his own individual skill or inventive intelligence? It is needless to recount here all the changes in the method and organization of industry which have resulted from the introduction of machinery and the use of mechanical power. In its wake have come the factory system, the massing of population in industrial centres, the concentrating of initiative and control in the hands of the few, and the mechanizing of the labor of the many.[4] The factory

[4] The general reader who is interested in the rise of modern industrialism will find these changes described and interpreted, briefly and clearly by Professor Tufts in his *The Real Business of Living*, chap. xi.

hand no longer owns his own tools which he has been trained to use with skill and a sense of mastery. He tends a machine and, as machines are further perfected, they become more and more automatic. Hence the duties of those who tend them become simpler, less interesting, more tedious—the monotonous repetition of a few prescribed movements. Operations of manufacture are so minutely subdivided that the part with which the single worker is concerned loses its apparent connection with the whole. He never comes into contact with the finished product (except as he among others may purchase it in open market); the performance of his part in its production requires of him no knowledge of its nature or appreciation of its value. And if the individual can find no opportunity for the exercise of his own constructive intelligence in his work, is there any reason to expect that his activity will identify him in a unity of coöperative endeavor with others employed in the same industry? Dynamic interdependence seems in this case to have been transferred from the workers to the machines whose servants the men have become. This result threatens to be accentuated to the extreme limit by scientific management; even under the factory system as it has previously been operated, the possibility remained for workers to show individual skill in the management of the machines, but now their movements are to be standardized and prescribed. Mechanical efficiency seems to demand that the work be completely depersonalized. But how then can we expect personal and social values to be realized through the processes of industry?

The fact remains that industry exists to meet human needs and not men to fulfil the demands of industry. If

at times the reverse seems to be true and the best brain power is expended and the bodily strength of the mass of men exhausted merely to keep the machinery going and to accelerate its momentum, we may be sure that the situation is temporary and the condition will be paid for by a destructive reaction. For human personality will assert itself: the neglect of the personal factor in the machine industry of the present has produced a social tension which must soon be relieved to avert a devastating explosion. The problem of the present in connection with industry may therefore be stated: *How can modern industry be organized (or reorganized) so as to realize the personal value of coöperative human achievement with the accompanying satisfactions of fellowship in performing the necessary work of the world? More briefly: What are the conditions of coöperation in modern industry?*

This question haunts the thought of our time. If interest in it seems to flag through sheer discouragement over its difficulty and the apparent hopelessness of finding a solution, it is provoked anew by the increasing bitterness that accompanies industrial strife, the implacable determination of contending parties to maintain their respective positions, the appalling wastefulness and increasing violence of industrial warfare. With ominous steadiness events are marching on toward a final crisis: strikes assume the proportions of civil wars and the propaganda of social revolution is received with increasing favor by the mass of the workers who are becoming convinced that the present order leaves them little or nothing to lose. On the other hand, the word "coöperation" is on every one's tongue. It has become, in fact, the slogan and shibboleth of our day. On every side we hear the need of

coöperation preached, the lack of it lamented, its advantages extolled. No doubt it is a catchword in the mouths of many, one of those words which the current fashion of talk encourages men to use as a substitute for any clear or sustained thinking. They pronounce its syllables and the very sound of the word seems to bring understanding and point toward solution. Yet this vogue of the mere word, insignificant verbal symbol that it is, may indicate a vague intuitive perception on the part of the popular mind that the root of our social troubles does lie in the fact that our present forms of social organization do not call forth any real harmony of mind and will among the human individuals concerned. And to find a basis for such coöperation, political as well as industrial, looms up as the overshadowing social problem of the present and immediate future whose solution must be forthcoming if civilization is to advance.

What are the conditions of coöperation in modern industry? The first is undoubtedly *community of purpose*, which means the willing, as we say, the whole-hearted, devotion of all who are engaged in any industry to the end or purpose which the industry exists to subserve. This requirement, so simple in statement, involves us at once in perplexities and difficulties that seem insuperable; in fact, it brings us face to face with the crux of the whole industrial problem. Thus to say, without further ado, that community of purpose between all concerned, owner-directors and wage workers, is the first condition of coöperation in industry, will seem to many a most irritating way of begging the whole question—little better, indeed, than a very poor joke. For, they will protest, the crux of the industrial problem is to be found in the fact

that there can be no community of purpose between those who own and control and those who serve with their labor, and to say that there ought to be, and must be, is merely to gloss over, and not even to get a fair sight of, the fundamental problem. It must be admitted that there is an exasperating futility about preaching community of purpose and coöperative alliance to persons or parties who feel that their interests are and must remain, in the nature of the case incompatible and antagonistic. But this futility is due, at least in part, to the superficial notion of what community of purpose means, to a failure to probe thoroughly its meaning when applied to the industrial field. For the question is of course whether, when the true purpose of human industry is affirmed, it will not be found sufficiently comprehensive to include the interests of contending parties.

We shall advance more speedily towards an understanding of what community of purpose as the basis of industrial coöperation really means if we consider in passing two mistaken conceptions of it that are fairly common. Coöperation is frequently identified in the first place with emotional accord, that harmony of feeling which results when persons or factions that have been at odds, meet and air their grievances, remove misunderstandings, smooth away points of variance, and resolve to work together in the future. In the glow of friendly feeling that follows, both sides are filled with enthusiasm over the prospects of coöperation. And the public which has perhaps suffered in consequence of the long-standing quarrel, industrial or political, hails with eloquent delight the advent of coöperation. But the promised coöperation fails to stand the strain of actual daily practice, and

the old strife breaks out anew. The trouble is that it was based on feeling and feelings are temporary; they continue only a short time from their own momentum. And since the underlying causes of discord were not removed, their continuing influence must inevitably dissipate the new spirit of friendly accord and revive the old animosities. The experience of Carleton H. Parker whose brilliant success in settling industrial disputes in the Pacific northwest during the war is a notable instance of the public service which the trained economist and sympathetic student of social problems may render, is particularly illuminating in this connection. His first step was to bring representatives of the contending factions, labor unions and associated employers, together, under conditions favorable to prolonged discussion. When the group was assembled, usually in the early evening around a long table, he invited and encouraged the two parties which faced each other with unconcealed hostility, to present their cases freely and fully, thus unburdening their minds of the grievances long stored up and rankling. As the discussion proceeded, with the expected charge and counter charge, assertion, denial, and disavowal, the air began to clear and an atmosphere to be created favorable to constructive deliberation. Usually three or four hours were consumed in this preliminary work which was often little more than a recital of old wrongs, a rehash of stale, and frequently irrelevant, issues. But Parker never allowed his impatience to hurry this stage of the proceedings, for he saw that a degree of personal confidence and friendly recognition was thereby brought about that was absolutely essential to a profitable discussion of the fundamental points in dispute. But he never con-

fused this preliminary stage which frequently lasted until midnight with the real work of the conference which only began when it was over. It did create a feeling of friendly accord, an attitude of mental receptivity, which was necessary if the two parties were to join in an earnest, intelligent search for a basis of agreement.

A second error of more serious importance because less obvious and consequently less open to detection is to mistake coincidence of interest for the community of purpose which is the foundation of all true coöperation. Professor McDougall has thoroughly exposed this error in his *Group Mind*. He shows that the different members or parties in a group may be entirely agreed upon a certain purpose or policy without there being any real unity of mind and will in the group.[5] For each of the participants may favor the special policy for reasons of his own interest, and the several interests may happen to agree. To be a genuine expression of the group mind or will, and thus an instance of true coöperation, this writer points out, a purpose must be adopted by the members of the group for the sake of the good of the group as a whole, with which they as individuals identify their several interests. This distinction between coincidence of interest and community of purpose is one of great practical importance for modern industry where real coöperation seems at once an urgent necessity and an actual impossibility. "For mutual profit" is often proposed as a basis of coöperation between capital and labor. What is meant by this is that if the management and the labor force will just pull together, combining wise, considerate direction on the one hand, with faithful, energetic

[5] McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 169*ff*.

work on the other, the interests of both will be advanced: owners will reap greater profits and workers draw higher wages. While capital and labor are drawn off in separate camps and maintain an attitude of unqualified hostility, perhaps no better basis of adjustment can be found. But it is not true coöperation—for no unity of purpose has been established. The pecuniary interest which both sides are urged to consult is really the desire for private profit on the part of the individuals or factions concerned which does not necessarily imply the slightest regard for the good of the industry as a whole or the welfare of all who are engaged in it. The desire of each for his own pecuniary profit may at times prompt all to pull together in a common undertaking when they understand the situation. Conditions may arise in any industry due to its favorable competitive position or the unlimited demand for its product, such that the payment of higher wages to secure faithful and efficient service results in an increased annual dividend. But this is not the case in every industry, nor is it always true of any industry under present conditions. The discrepant interests have occasionally happened to coincide, but the coincidence is necessarily temporary because the interests are really different and not identical. No permanent structure of coöperation can be built upon such foundations.

This question of a purpose in industry sufficiently comprehensive to include and reconcile the disparate interests of all concerned and sufficiently appealing to move men to concerted action, is the very heart of our problem. Does not the answer lie on the very surface, so obvious indeed, that its simplicity is a bar to its general acceptance? For what should the controlling purpose of organ-

ized human industry be but to provide the material commodities and physical equipment necessary for secure, comfortable, civilized, human living. But this, some one will say, is to make the material interest supreme in industry and to admit its essentially utilitarian character, after insisting that the coöperation which we seek is a personal relation which involves the realization and accentuation of social values. There is no real contradiction here, however. For while the purpose of industry as just stated, is confessedly utilitarian, it is at the same time socially comprehensive. It is to provide human society, the group, the nation, and ultimately mankind, with the physical necessities, the material comforts and conveniences, the mechanical appliances and equipment, which are needed if they are to have opportunity for exercising their distinctively human capacities and living satisfying human lives. By virtue of its comprehensiveness, this purpose is lifted above the plane of the utilitarian in the narrow and invidious sense of that term, and made part of the personal-social good. For the economic production which it contemplates increases the opportunity for general human participation in the life of intelligent community, instead of contributing to the wealth and enjoyment of a few. As controlling purpose, it is thus sufficiently comprehensive to correlate the interests of all engaged in industry upon a personal basis, the basis, that is, of an objective which possesses the implicit universality of reason and rational will.

But does this purpose appeal strongly enough to the dominant motives of human action to call forth the collective effort necessary for the successful prosecution of industry? Is it not visionary and utopian to expect

that men in the large will be impelled to hard and constant toil by any other motive than the desire for private gain in the form of wages or profit, and the hope of future enjoyment that this holds forth? This is a more serious objection than the first and the difficulty which it raises is indeed grave. Certainly, something that appears like sacrifice, at least from our present point of view, would be required from both parties to the present organization of industry. Labor's share in the profits accruing from productive industry would scarcely be less than it is now. In fact it is hard to see how with the adoption of production to meet social need as the governing purpose in industry, the economic position of labor can fail to be improved. Directly or indirectly, in the form of higher wages, lower cost of living, or better protection against unemployment, incapacity and old age, the workers would receive a larger and more equitable share of the wealth produced. To be sure, labor would share more fully than now in the unavoidable risks and uncertainties of industry, but the inconvenience or even suffering involved would not be greater than at present consequent upon seasons and periods of unemployment. The reorganization of industry upon this new basis would involve other consequences, however, less acceptable to labor and not fully recognized by many who condemn the present system and look forward to some method of social control. If production to meet the needs of our great and congested populations with their varied and increasing wants is adopted in sober earnest as the controlling purpose of organized industry then it must be pursued consistently, no matter where the shoe pinches. Made absolutely supreme, it must become the touchstone and criterion by

which all methods of management and all working arrangements are judged and determined. Schemes for the "nationalizing of industry," for "democratic control" etc., that work inefficiently, increase the cost of production, and thus render the product less generally available to meet the needs of men, must be rejected. If a modified form of the present competitive and capitalistic system proves on experiment to be the most efficient method of producing and distributing the material commodities required to meet the needs of society as a whole, it would have to be adopted. But if the present system were thus to survive in a modified form, it would be because it approved itself upon this new basis.

The profits of capitalist investors and business promoters would almost certainly be smaller, if they continued to have a function in industry reorganized under the purpose in question. The opportunities to gain great wealth through fortunate investment would be greatly diminished and the cumulative advantage accruing to indivduals from the amassing of wealth and the concentrating of capital would be decidedly lessened. These effects would be wholly good in their tendency to remove that economic inequality which is the root of many social evils at the present time. If, moreover, the aim of industry were to provide the material conditions of social welfare, the effect of any method of operation upon the physical vitality and mental resources of the workers would have to be taken into account. Suppose that in a certain great industry employing one-tenth of the total working population, the adoption of certain methods and arrangements of work recommended by technical experts on grounds of mechanical efficiency would greatly increase

production and thus diminish the cost of that article to the public at large. So far this would be a gain and the methods would be justified. But if these same methods resulted in impaired health and strength, in diminished vigor of body and mind, for ten per cent of the working population, this would be a heavy count against them. And this count in the opposite column unfavorable to many a method itself mechanically efficient, must be taken into consideration in the case of every industry where it exists, if social welfare is to be consistently adhered to as the basis of industrial coöperation. There is irony in the complaints of captains of industry that the welfare work which they have instituted for the benefit of their employees has made them less tractable and contented than they were, for, as Mr. Tead says,[6] in not a few cases this is due to the fact that the improved conditions have so far relieved the workers from the deadening effects of physical and mental exhaustion that their normal instincts are for the first time permitted to assert themselves and, naturally, their first impulse is one of rebellion against the system which has for so long repressed them.

As the upshot of our discussion of the first condition of industrial coöperation, we conclude that only one purpose is sufficiently comprehensive to command the interest and enlist the activities of all concerned, and that is production to meet social need. And the undeniably grave question that arises concerning this purpose is whether it constitutes a motive sufficiently strong and compelling to call forth from men at large the efforts that organized industry demands. Or, to put the same question in other words, is there any hope that the majority

[6] Tead, *Op. Cit.*, p. 102.

of men will ever be impelled to exertions of hard, continuous toil by any other motive than the desire for private gain and enjoyment? It must be admitted, I think, that there is very little hope, apart from the possibility of developing a stronger and better-informed public spirit among our citizens at large. They must identify the social good with themselves; they must respond to the thought of the social good with the same or greater feelings of enthusiasm and devotion than they do to that of their own interests and ambitions. The problem of industrial coöperation turns out to be identical, at bottom, with that of political coöperation. Now as compared with self-interest in the narrow sense, devotion to the social good is largely an acquired interest. Although supported by social instincts of undoubted strength and impelling power, the growth of public spirit is dependent upon the experience of the individual. It is primarily a matter of education. Thus we see that the possibility of finding a basis in human nature for industrial coöperation depends, in a great measure, upon the efficacy of our systems of general education. It does not meet the needs of the present social situation to give the individual worker a rudimentary knowledge of the "three R's" and some elementary training in a special department of industry. If he is to see his work in its true social importance, if he is to approach his daily task with a feeling of social responsibility and derive from its faithful execution the satisfaction of public service efficiently rendered, he must possess some organized understanding of the socio-economic system in which he participates. He must possess some organized knowledge along lines of economic and social and political science—a knowledge that will

make clear to him the function of the industry he serves in the great system of industries that supports civilized social life; that will give him an intelligent comprehension of its essential processes so that he will be able to relate his (perhaps) simple task to the working of the whole and, understanding its necessity and importance, receive from his labor the satisfaction of serving in a competent fashion the essential interests of his community. This education, in its general aspect and fundamental part, should be given in the public schools: all citizens-to-be in a democracy should be made to understand the industrial organization of modern society and the economic interdependence of its members. In addition, all organized industries should conduct schools for the instruction of their workers not in what pertains immediately to their own special tasks merely, but in regard to the conduct of the industry as a whole, its organization and methods, the raw materials it uses, the processes of manufacture, the nature and value of the finished product, the methods of distribution and marketing. This may seem to "practical" men an extravagant proposal. Yet these same men complain of lack of interest and loyalty on the part of their employees and—most remarkable—of their unwillingness to coöperate.

This much is certain: we shall never get widespread coöperation in the spirit of public service among workers who are ignorant of the social value and economic interrelations of the industry that employs them. But granted that the participants in any industry cannot be actuated by true public spirit unless they are informed as to the part played by their industry in the social economy, will such intellectual enlightenment make them truly public-

spirited. Will it make them desirous of serving the public good and ready to subordinate their own interest thereto? There is slight cause for believing or hoping that it will, at least in a sufficient dègree, apart from the assumption, or, as I believe, the fact, that the rational will of man, when it wakes to the issues and opportunities of human existence, seeks after a universal good.[7] In consequence of this, the demand of his own rational nature, let man's intelligence once become convinced that the industry which employs him is organized and administered to meet the public need and promote the social good, and his will is bound to respond with the beginnings of loyal devotion.

The second condition of coöperation in industry is what we may, for the lack of a better term, call *team-play* in action. By team-play we mean such complete correlation of the activities of all the participants in a game or exercise that the action of each is altogether governed by the purpose of the whole. Such correlation is brought about through the mastery of a technique which causes the group to function as a dynamic unity. But the effect of such technical proficiency is by no means to reduce the individuals engaged to mere automata who perform their prescribed tasks with no sense of voluntary initiative or intelligent realization of the importance of the successful

[7] This much truth may be contained in the statement often made that the only cure for present industrial troubles is a widespread revival of true religion. Not that men are to be made more contented and tractable by revived faith in a supernatural after-world in which they receive compensation for hardships and injustices suffered here. But that they must be aroused to a realizing sense of the personal tie that unites them with their fellows, of the spiritual solidarity of humanity. Is any other agency besides religion capable of thus redirecting the energies of men?

working of the whole. Rather is it just the opposite: each participant derives from the technical routine he has mastered just that degree of direction and amount of incentive required to call forth his own powers of initiative and invention and cause them to function with fullest spontaneity and freedom. Because they all of them identify their own wills with the operative organization, they derive from their own efforts the satisfaction of personal fellowship in a worthy enterprise and from its successful achievement a joyful sense of enlarged power and mastery. Thus the arduous and exacting exertions of athletic sports seem to those who are engaged in making them to be play rather than work. And it is some of this very team-play which must be introduced into the processes of modern industry if they are to be genuinely coöperative.

To make any such requirement of the processes of modern industry will seem to be more than a counsel of perfection; it will appear as confession of failure because tantamount to an admission that the problem is intrinsically insoluble. For an outstanding feature of the present situation is that considerations of mechanical and productive efficiency make any such team-play in the operation of organized industry altogether impossible and quite out of the question. We are sufficiently familiar with the effect of the introduction of machinery and the factory method of production upon the place and function of the individual worker: this has been emphasized in its different phases by a number of present-day writers. As machinery has been perfected, it has left less and less scope for the exercise of constructive intelligence on the part of the worker, until in this day of nearly automatic

machines the function of the operative is limited to the precise performance of a predetermined round of comparatively simple movements required to supplement the execution of the machines.[8] To operations thus simplified and standardized to meet the requirements of machine execution, it is impossible for individuals to contribute through the exercise of individual skill and initiative. Factory specialization has resulted in such a minute subdivision of operations that the bearing of a particular one upon the working of the industry as a whole and its intended product is no longer apparent; individual workers need no longer be aware of the relation of their task to the work of others and the conduct of the whole; their work loses interest and value in their own eyes and ceases to make any appeal to their constructive instinct of workmanly pride. The management of industry, including of course the arrangement of the plant and the order of operations as well as the distribution of tasks, is determined to the last detail by expert technicians; with these matters the rank and file of the workers have nothing to do. Under these conditions, the development of

[8] But may this not be said in its favor that such work is very easy, involving little strain or fatigue because it makes such slight demands upon the operative in the way of intelligence or severe muscular exertion. Sometimes it is easy—and therefore uninteresting, because it fails to enlist the intelligent initiative of the workers. Sometimes, however, while it remains uninteresting it is far from easy because of the strain involved in timing motor responses with utmost precision to the rhythm of the machinery or to the movements of others as when every member of a crew must perform his part at the appointed time or else interrupt the work of all the rest and dislocate the routine. Mr. Pound has made interesting observations upon this matter in the automobile industry. *Cf.* Articles by Pound, "The Iron Man in Industry," in the *Atlantic Monthly,* Vol. CXXIX, "The Iron Man and Mind," p. 179, and "The Iron Man and the Job," p. 345.

friendly and helpful relations among relatively permanent groups of workers who are thrown into constant association by their tasks is no longer possible: in many cases "system" has seemed to require the constant and rapid shifting of men from job to job. The inspection of work, it is charged, takes little account of the personality of operatives; they are so many "hands," of interest to those who supervise only so far as they add the necessary movements required to keep the machinery going and its output at maximum. Indeed, measured by standards of modern mechanical industry, the ideal operative is one who puts in his time regularly, discharging his appointed task faithfully and without the interest that would cause him to ask questions about, or the intelligence that would enable him to suggest improvements in, the conduct of the industry as a whole, and who leaves his week's toil with a sense of relief and contentment, fully compensated by the cheque in his pay-envelop.

No one with any perception of the difficulties which complicate the subject, with any feeling for the realities of the situation, could at present suppose that he had any solution ready at hand for this phase of the modern industrial problem. Perhaps we are here confronted with an essential antagonism, a not wholly removable conflict in the underlying conditions of human existence, as between society's need for a maximum production of the material commodities necessary to human existence on the one hand, and man's craving for intelligent self-expression on the other. But easy acquiescence would be a fatal blunder; human society must accept the challenge and not confess itself defeated until it has exhausted every resource. In the meantime, suggestions are being

made which encourage us to think that modern industry can in certain respects be so reorganized that its processes will afford to the rank and file of the workers that opportunity for personal coöperation and constructive accomplishment now denied to them. Underlying all these suggestions is the fact or principle which has been fully established and must be accepted as fundamental to the whole matter. This is that in operations where human beings are actively engaged, a regard for mechanical efficiency alone, to the exclusion of the personal factor, is in the end self-defeating. Thus, while a certain method of operation may seem to be most efficient, judged by the output produced in relation to the materials used and the power expended, it may be most wasteful and extravagant because of the strain which it places upon the persons concerned. Time may be required to show this and machine industry is yet young, but signs multiply that the time of revelation is not far off. When powers of initiative and invention are suppressed, when the instinct of workmanship is denied expression, the personal frustration that results is socially wasteful and certain to prove socially disruptive. It is an open question now, whether what is gained from the standpoint of productive efficiency by methods of "scientific management" is not lost through the suspicions and antagonisms which these methods have engendered in the minds of the workers, with their inevitable accompaniments of strikes, sabotage, and violence. Accepting this principle, then, it is not hard to believe that methods of industrial operation may be modified and altered so as to permit a larger coöperation on the part of workers, in the spirit of teamplay lately described. So far as the social relations of

the workers are concerned, for instance, there is surely no good reason why work should not be so arranged and workers so placed as to encourage personal acquaintance and helpfulness and the permanent association of congenial groups. And more intelligent and humane methods of supervision and inspection might be devised which would estimate workers as men and women rather than as "hands."

But the deeper difficulty lies in the necessary effect of machinery and mechanical processes upon the character of the work itself. The machine worker is denied the opportunity enjoyed by the craftsman of exercising his own powers of construction and invention in the manufacture of an article which becomes an expression of himself. And it is idle to talk of returning to craftsmanship: machinery must be fully utilized and improved to its highest possible efficiency, if an adequate economic support is to be provided for the civilized social order. Unquestionably, the future is destined to see the use of machinery extended to industries as yet untouched by it —the increasing supply of generally available and comparatively low-priced electrical power is sufficient guarantee of that. Hence the task of the present is to provide individual workers with the opportunity for self-expression in their toil while retaining for industry as a whole all the advantages of machinery and large-scale mechanical production, rather than to waste effort in belated and futile efforts to limit the use of machinery or to revive handicraft. Many interesting possibilities are being suggested in this connection; some of them are being tried in a tentative way by enlightened industrial managements. Mr. Tead mentions two of these possibilities.

The first is that of giving the workers full information in regard to the aims and methods of their industry and also as to the place which it and its product occupy in the scheme of things economic and social.[9] This possibility we have already discussed and this much seems obvious: unless the workers are given such an understanding of the industry that employs their services, and of its methods of operation, with particular reference to the function of their own task therein, they can never gain from their labor any sense of personal participation in coöperative human achievement. Mr. Tead's second suggestion is that of the assumption by the workers of a greater control over the conduct of the industry. This possibility has been much talked of in recent years: the phrase "a share in the management" has been much bandied about. It has been used by labor agitators (often without any clear notion of its practical application or limitations) as a rallying cry for arousing radical sentiment among the workers; it has also served, through the immediate antagonism which it excites to stiffen conservative employers (who have little patience to investigate its real meaning or the conditions of its application) in their unalterable opposition to all "revolutionary" schemes for altering industrial methods. It is this idea which Miss Marot presents in an interesting and convincing way in her *Creative Impulse in Industry*. As she states it, while machine industry can never give the workers a chance for creative work on the mechanical side, it can, if rightly administered, afford just this opportunity on the social side. The men can be given control over the conditions under which they work and,

[9] Tead, *Instincts in Industry*, p. 56.

further than this, over methods of operation and the working procedure generally, so far as the working force is concerned, and their mutual relations are involved. Of course the education of industrial operatives would be necessary, such education as we have been considering, which would enlighten the workers in regard to the purpose of the industry in relation to other industries, its method of operation, the distribution and social uses of its product, etc. With such information to guide their thoughts, employees would be stimulated to make suggestions for the improvement of working-methods and to discuss such ideas in periodical conferences. Miss Marot finds encouragement in the fact that modern industry has become, in *form*, at least, thoroughly coöperative. Through the use of machinery and mechanical power the activities of men have been associated, physically speaking, and brought to bear upon the production of a single result. "Formerly men worked as individuals to feed and clothe their families, now they work together to provision the world." The skeleton of a truly coöperative organization has thus been provided, but the spirit, the will to coöperate, is lacking. It remains, then, for modern social invention to devise ways of introducing the soul and spirit of coöperation into the industrial machinery.[10]

One further suggestion may perhaps be drawn from the arguments of those who would dismiss as fictitious and unreal this whole question of how to find expression for the creative impulse and the sense of workmanship in machine industry. Fictitious and unreal, they would call the problem, because in their view the majority of

[10] Helen Marot, *The Creative Impulse in Industry*, pp. 135*ff*.

men are born with no such creative impulse nor have they any cravings for personal participation in creative achievement. Rather are they, who make up the great majority, born to work with their hands under the direction of the few whose superior mental endowment gives them the right to control. Favorable conditions of work, fair treatment and generous wages are therefore what the great mass of the workers really want and what would satisfy them if they were not misled as to their own desires by agitators and malcontents. Now all this, which is in the main false, contains this grain of truth: all men possess both an instinctive tendency to lead, and an instinctive tendency to follow a lead, and the comparative strength of these two instincts varies with individuals. It may be true that with a great many, perhaps the majority, the instinct of subjection is the stronger. They do not therefore require for the satisfaction of their natures positions of leadership; they work most happily and effectively as members of a controlling organization which takes them in, directs their activities, and determines their methods. With this organization they can identify themselves: in its achievements they can take pride. So it may be with a considerable fraction of those engaged in industry as now organized. But the loyalty of even these more passive natures which is readily roused and generously given cannot be retained by an organization which grants them no personal recognition, nor the slightest opportunity for exercising the slender initiative they possess.

A third condition of coöperation in industry is such honorable recognition of faithful intelligent service as will foster the spirit of loyalty among all engaged in an

industry, and unite them in bonds of fraternal feeling. Just what means are taken to signalize in a suitably impressive fashion the public appreciation of meritorious service is perhaps immaterial, but the expression itself is by no means unimportant. The choice should be made in accordance with our best knowledge of human nature and social psychology. The significance and value of what is awarded or conferred will of course be primarily symbolic or emblematic, but symbols or emblems, whether they take the form of badges, medals, titles, or what not, have a decisive influence upon human conduct. They have this influence because they are external signs or tokens, open to the perception of every one, of feelings and sentiments in which all or many can share. Instances have been recently reported of the exultation, enthusiasm, and loyalty, aroused among operatives of certain industrial plants by the practice of awarding a cup or a banner to the group making the best monthly or annual record in production, freedom from accident, or some other respect.

If industry is to be made coöperative, full advantage must be taken of this susceptibility of human nature to the visible tokens of social appreciation, and an effort made to find some symbol appropriate for the recognition of efficiency and worth wherever they are displayed by individuals or groups. This third suggestion looking toward coöperation in industry may seem of trivial import in comparison with the two that have preceded it. Possibly it is not equally fundamental with community of purpose and team-play in operation, but it brings to our attention certain psychological factors in the industrial situation whose influence we cannot afford to overlook. We propose to replace the desire for

private gain by the wish to render public service, as the dominating motive in industry, yet we must acknowledge that the latter motive is much less firmly rooted in instinctive impulse than the former. We can scarcely hope to succeed unless we avail ourselves of every effective means of strengthening the social motive, every psychological accessory that can be summoned to add to its practical potency. The susceptibility of human feeling to social recognition and to the external symbols which are its understood expression, is just such an accessory of which we must avail ourselves to the full scope of its influence. Nor is its efficacy limited to the rank and file of the workers whose efforts have gone, up to the present, almost unnoticed. It extends to the leaders also, whose signal service can be rewarded by suitable tokens of recognition. That such honors will be an incentive to utmost exertion on the part of the ablest individuals cannot be doubted. Indeed it can be said with truth that the only motive which in the past has shown itself comparable with the desire for private gain in respect both to strength and persistence is that of devotion to the "honor of the service." After a large financial remuneration had failed to secure from the engineering profession the distinguished ability and protracted effort required to overcome difficulties and push the Panama Canal to completion, an army engineer, assisted by his colleagues, working for the honor of his service and to uphold its traditions, carried the work through to a successful conclusion. In India the spirit and traditions of the British Civil Service have elicited an unwavering, heroic, devotion to duty which has been the wonder of men and which merely commercial interests could never

command. The record of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in frontier days is a world-famous illustration of what splendid efficiency and unflinching heroism can be called forth in a body of men inspired by the spirit and ideals of an organization devoted to public service. Can the spirit of loyalty and devotion, of service to "king and country" which has inspired army and navy and certain branches of civil service at its best, not be developed by the right measures in industry as well, when generally understood to be what it really is, the most important branch of public service?

As we pass in review the conditions which must be fulfilled before modern organized industry can be made coöperative and thus productive of the values of personal fellowship in creative effort, we may feel discouraged at the thought of the enormous changes which must be wrought both in the spirit and the methods by which the necessary work of civilized society is done. The first essential, *community of purpose*, can be realized only if all the participants agree in making production to meet social need the controlling aim of all industrial enterprise and activity. The second, *team-play in method of operation*, requires that the rank and file of the workers be given an intelligent comprehension of the purpose, organization and methods, of the industry that employs them, and some opportunity to participate constructively in its direction and management. The third essential, *esprit de corps*, the feeling of loyal devotion to the organization to which they belong, can be developed only if loyal and efficient service in every rank and position receives appropriate recognition. But in stating these requirements, we have merely analyzed our problem and

not solved it; the real difficulty lies in discovering practical ways and means whereby these requirements can be met. And these ways and means cannot be discovered by any process of rational analysis and deduction, no matter how rigorous and thorough; they can be ascertained only by years of practical experimentation, courageously undertaken, wisely directed, and patiently pursued. There can be no more urgent social need at the present time than for greater willingness on the part of those in charge of industrial and political administration to embark upon such experiments and, if need be, to take the risk of discomfort, temporary loss, and real hardship, in order that a fair trial may be given to new methods and arrangements which in the opinion of those competent to judge, hold forth reasonable promise of relieving the tension and remedying the injustices of the present industrial situation.

The obstacle to such courageous experimentation is principally, of course, the conservatism of those who find themselves well enough off under the existing system, and view with alarm and dread the possibility of personal loss and privation that might ensue upon the change. But it should have a salutary effect even on those whose conservatism takes fright at the thought of any "meddling," even by way of most cautious experiment, with well-established and time-honored arrangements, to reflect upon the menace of the present industrial situation and the growing number of their fellow citizens who are ready to welcome any change whatsoever on the ground that the present system could not be worse and leaves them nothing to lose. We may not agree with Mr. Cole that: "Any one with the smallest degree of social vision can

see that the existing structure of society is doomed either to ignominious collapse or to radical transformation."[11] But we can agree that the existing system works so unsatisfactorily that a prepossession is created in favor of proposals looking toward fundamental and far-reaching reform. In the meantime, we should view with interest and favor, policies and schemes now being tried which make, even in a halting and tentative way, toward fuller industrial coöperation. Such, for instance, are profit sharing plans and devices. These suffer, in the opinion of labor-representatives, from not being what they profess to be, plans for dividing profits, but rather plans for maintaining or increasing the profits of owners by the greater efficiency of labor when it is given a larger amount out of the total receipts of an industry. Such are plans for giving the working force a voice in determining wages, hours and conditions of work. The proposal to make labor part-owner and director through the provision for the purchase of large blocks of stock on the part of the workers' organization has promising possibilities because it touches, although in an indirect and somewhat fumbling way, the heart of the difficulty, that is, the desire of the workers to participate in some effective, personal way in the conduct of the industry, instead of serving it merely as wage earners. These plans and proposals do but point the way; undaunted by existing forces of disorder and the threats of revolutionary propaganda, civilized society must seek by sane and courageous experiment to find the path to that industrial coöperation through which alone the personal and social value of work can be realized.

[11] Cole, *Social Theory*, p. 207.

CHAPTER XIV

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL LIFE

People sometimes come together to exchange information, compare opinions, and agree upon conclusions; for such purpose a political conference is held. People sometimes assemble to take a hand in a common task; such is the association of employees in an industry. People at other times associate merely for the pleasure it gives them. This last-named type of association is what is generally meant by "social" life and diversion. When, for instance, we speak of "social" training or experience we do not usually mean training for citizenship or community life, but experience and facility in the conventional forms of social diversion and entertainment. Even the word society is itself popularly given the narrower meaning of "polite" society, the organization of men and women in clubs and coteries, or the assembling of groups on special occasions at dinners and teas and dances for the purpose of mutual enjoyment. Not that pleasure is entirely absent from association of a predominantly intellectual or practical character. Indeed just the opposite is often true, even in comparison with social intercourse of the lighter sort. The members of a legislative assembly may derive far more enjoyment from the routine discussion of matters of public concern than from a banquet or reception given to promote sociability among

them; the employees of an industrial concern may derive far more enjoyment from the fellowship incidental to an average day's work than from the annual outing arranged by their recreation association. But the purpose for which the latter exists is to give pleasure to those concerned while that of the former is not.

What is the source of the pleasure which men obtain from the games, diversions, and conventional occasions which bring them together to enjoy one another's company? Modern psychology would refer it primarily to the instincts which are under these conditions called into play and given their natural satisfaction—and doubtless instinct is the original source of the pleasure felt. Chief among these is the gregarious instinct which makes individuals of the human and other animal species restless and miserable in solitude, creates a longing for the presence and proximity of members of the same species, and causes companionship with them to be keenly enjoyed. The gregarious instinct is not to be confused with the instinctive love of, or pity for, fellow men; particularly in their practical expression are they different. The altruistic instinct, as we have already noted, responds to instances of human need and suffering with helpful deeds and kindly ministrations. The gregarious instinct causes men to avoid solitude and seek the company of their fellows. Indeed the two instincts do not necessarily support one another. A man may be highly gregarious, seeking the society of his fellows, enjoying the sense of their presence in considerable numbers, with the opportunities for constant and easy intercourse thus opened, without being naturally sympathetic or possessed of a strong instinctive disposition to help those in need of assistance. And,

conversely, many individuals in whom instinctive altruism is a constant compelling force, are, in habit of mind, solitary and unresponsive to the pleasures of human companionship and the lighter forms of social intercourse. Next to the gregarious instinct in contributing through its activity to the pleasure of social intercourse is the sex instinct. While the range of its influence is less and it is not, like the gregarious instinct, called into play by all forms of social diversion, its greater strength and intensity make it a more important factor where conditions are such as to call it forth. The instinct of rivalry which may be, as Professor McDougall suggests, a modification of the instinct of combat, finds expression in games and sports and is the primary source of the pleasure which they give to those engaged. Other instincts, such as those of construction and of leadership, of curiosity and of acquisitiveness, although of lesser importance, make their respective contributions to the pleasures of human companionship and intercourse.

How can the social pleasures of men be made means of personal association and thus given a moral and truly social value? This question forces itself upon the mind of one who is interested in the realization of democracy's ideal. For no present social fact seems to demonstrate in so signal a fashion the defects and drawbacks of democracy as the banality and vulgarity of popular amusements when uncontrolled by any authoritative social and moral tradition. The artificial and senseless excitements of the amusement park, the degradation of the theater, the sensationalism of the "movie," the demoralizing accompaniments of professional baseball, boxing, and wrestling, stand out in contemporary civilization

as convincing evidence that the advance of democratic ideas has meant no improvement or elevation of the popular taste in the matter of amusements. In societies of the older type, conventional sports and amusements, and social diversions as well, are subject to the controlling influence of a social tradition shaped and supported by the ruling class. In this class superior educational advantages resulted in a refinement of taste which exacted both form and beauty of conventional modes of social intercourse. And the conventions and standards governing the social pleasures of the upper classes, while not applying directly to the amusements of the mass of the people, nevertheless did, through the influence of long-continued example and undisputed prestige, mold their social conventions and imbue the popular mind with respect for certain standards of refinement and decorum. Lacking a favored class to act as arbiters of social decorum, is democracy condemned to go without such standards of refinement and dignity as will make social enjoyment a means of personal development and culture? The question of how social pleasures may be made a means of personal association merits consideration, therefore, as a fundamental problem of social life. The answer which previous analysis of personal relationships has prepared us to give is that when the surroundings and occasions which arouse the social instincts to pleasurable activity are such as to awaken also the sense of beauty, then not merely is the mutual enjoyment heightened, but it is given a rational import and significance in which all individuals may share, and by which they are associated as persons. In Chapter V the attempt was made to explain in some detail how æsthetic enjoyment, although a feeling, was

different from the other feelings in being disinterested, and possessed of a rational significance which makes it a means of personal communication among men. When we enjoy a beautiful object in nature or in art, a sunset or a picture, or a musical composition, that object by virtue of its sensible form so stimulates the fancy and liberates the higher powers of intelligence that it conveys a meaning which, while defying articulate expression, has nevertheless a universal human significance which we long to share with others. When together with them we enjoy the beauties of a landscape or of one of the fine arts we share in an appreciation of the deeper meaning of human life which we could never express in words but which when we do share it creates a new bond of intelligent sympathy between us.

The development of æsthetic sensibility in a people increases their capacity for intelligent sympathy with one another by kindling imaginative faculties which respond to the features of rational interest and import in universal human experience. The enjoyment which it brings should be deliberately fostered by democracies because conducive to that spirit of human fraternity implied in the democratic ideal. Such effort on the part of the democratic state should be thoroughly practicable, moreover, because the enjoyment of beauty in natural objects and art products does not depend upon their exclusive possession, but rather upon their perception and contemplation, which is open on equal terms to all. In the public interest, effective measures should be taken to protect and preserve spots of great natural beauty and to make them generally accessible, to employ architecture and landscape art in the adornment of city streets, parks,

and playgrounds, to open to public view, in galleries and museums, really beautiful pictures and statuary, and to have the best music played at popular assemblies. No more effective way than this of developing the very spirit of democracy can be imagined: that people should come to take pleasure not in what they possess as individuals to the exclusion of others but in what they possess in common with their fellow citizens, and to receive from this pleasure an increased sense of the solidarity of mankind. But we are in the present chapter, concerned with the effects of æsthetic enjoyment when it enters as an element into the *social pleasures* of men. As has been pointed out, it endows these popular amusements and pastimes with the values of personal association. And this added element of rational significance and personal value is not purchased at the expense of making the natural pleasure, the instinctive thrill of combat, or congenial fellowship, or sex attraction, any less keen. Rather just the opposite—indeed, the central psychological fact with reference to which social intercourse and popular amusements should be organized and carried out is just this: that under proper conditions the two supplement one another: awakened instinct gives vigor and actuality to the creations of artistic fancy while the trained and liberated imagination gives scope and significance to instinctive enjoyments.

Thus to substitute for the original stimulus of an instinct, a modification of this stimulus dictated by social intelligence, so that the energies of the instinct shall expend themselves not solely upon the preservation of individual and race existence, but also upon the promotion of personal and social culture, is, in the current termi-

nology, to sublimate the instinct. The capital instance of the possibilities of such sublimation is afforded by the sex instinct. Of all natural instincts it is, during the period of its activity, the most powerful. Even the imperious demands of instinctive self-preservation yield to its ruthless exactions according as in the scale of biological utility, race survival is more important than individual existence. But, as we know, the conditions of civilized social life require that this instinct be denied its normal expression during the comparatively many years which intervene before the sexually mature individual is economically and personally prepared to assume the responsibilities of marriage and parenthood. The difficulties of such suppression with its heavy demands upon the self-control of the individual, and the forms of vice to which it leads when self-control is lacking, have long been apparent to every observer. Recent studies of human physiology and psychology have brought to light, however, evils still more radical which follow upon the suppression of any principal instinct and, particularly, the long-continued suppression of the sex instinct. We have learned that the forcible suppression of a primary instinct like that of sex or of fear, produces a condition of nervous strain which undermines the foundations of character. Suppressed instincts while consciously inhibited remain active and effective below the level of intelligent consciousness and reveal their existence in aberrations of conduct and disturbances of mind which have no apparent connection with their real cause but are personally devastating and socially injurious. In the case of the sex instinct the only feasible remedy seems to lie in the sublimation of the instinct during the period when it is denied normal

expression. For the original impulse, substitutes must be found closely enough associated with this to afford a degree of satisfactory expression to the instinct and of such character as to make the response subservient to the purposes of social intelligence. The sexual response has intimate association with æsthetic as well as physical characteristics; it is attuned to beauty of face and form, the personal charm and the social graces, as well as to the primary sex structures of its object. Advantage can be taken of this fact: by easy steps, as Plato has suggested, the transition is made from the beauty of this or that particular human individual to beauty of human feature, form and carriage, in general, and finally to beauty of form and color and sound wherever it is revealed; from the pursuit, the coquetry, the courtship, to which the sexual impulse impels, to the enjoyment of social intercourse and the cultivation of personal relations in general. Thus the possibility is opened of sublimating the sex instinct through its æsthetic associations and social expression and hence of converting it, during the period of its physical suppression, from a social danger into a social asset. It can be given expression in the lighter forms of social intercourse, made beautiful by music, by graceful carriage and rhythmic movement, by color, costume and harmonious background, by the sparkle of wit and ready repartee: to these refinements of social pleasure it gives the zest and thrill of vital interest. It may find expression in art, transforming the appeal of beauty from an intellectual aspiration into a vivid, personal desire: it may find expression in social service, giving other human individuals an interest and appeal that they would not otherwise

possess and contributing its powerful dynamic to altruistic endeavor.

Some such sublimation of the social instincts through æsthetic appreciation must be brought about if social amusements and recreations are to be made means of personal intercommunication. Unconscious recognition of this fact is betrayed in the disposition which men and women have always shown to seek for their social pleasure a setting sufficiently beautiful to hide for the time being the ugly and sordid aspect of their lives. Summer sees countless families and prearranged groups leaving city blocks and village streets to picnic for the day in some place of conspicuous natural beauty—park, seashore or country-side. When in the winter an invited company gathers indoors for dinner or an evening's amusement, all are dressed in the manner which they think befits the occasion, the house is put in its best order, the table adorned with flowers—every care taken, in short, to make the external setting and accompaniments of the meeting just as attractive as possible. All this trouble is taken because of an intuitive understanding that the beauty and order of the surroundings will be reflected in the spirit of the assembled company, that they will be freed from the dispiriting effects of the daily routine, stimulated in mind, and elevated to a higher plane of social rapport. This tendency should be definitely encouraged and extended, under the guidance of intelligence, to all social enjoyments. Indeed, æsthetic refinement with the feeling of fitness and order which it produces, constitutes the most effective defense against vulgarity, excess, and animalism, which manifest themselves when social pleasures are left to the domination of

instinct. In social intercourse, particularly that of young people, the sex impulse is bound to play a large part; it is this which makes the attraction of the dance, the holiday excursion, the moonlight ride, irresistible. And we all know to what demoralizing excess it may lead in, say, the unsupervised public dance. The best safeguard lies doubtless in the power of good music, graceful and orderly movement, and beautiful surroundings, to produce a sense of personal dignity and restraint that will elevate the character without diminishing the pleasure of the association.

Much the same may be said of the theater, the motion picture, the cheap magazine, the ephemeral novel, which depend for their popularity largely upon their appeal to the sex impulse, to prurient curiosity, to an instinctive liking for the sensational and exciting. In these matters preaching and denunciation accomplish little; human beings, civilized as well as savage, are bound to enjoy themselves as they can, and their pleasures are certain to center in the social situation. The effect of censorship and regulation is merely negative; they do not reach the root of the matter.[1] Yet if these modern sources of public entertainment and social amusement are left to commercial exploitation, their effect will be to stimulate appetites and unleash passions which, uncurbed, will ravage the social order. Under intelligent and socially responsible control, on the other hand, they may prove to be one of the most powerful agencies ever at human disposal for the socializing of mankind. What society should aim

[1] This is not to belittle the importance or to deny the value of judicious censorship. In some cases, such as motion picture display, it is doubtless justified as a measure of public safety if not a means of social benefit. But its effect, we must admit, is merely negative.

to do, however, is not to determine what plays people shall see, what music they shall hear, what books they shall read, but to develop in them an appreciation for good art in all its forms so that, finding it really more enjoyable than its demoralizing counterfeits, they will demand and obtain it. This elevation and refinement of popular taste can be accomplished only through education, and it should be made a primary concern of the public educational system. This improvement in æsthetic standards, once it has been secured, may be depended upon to work its own beneficent social effects in a wider sympathy, a deeper social insight, and a gentler, more humane spirit.

The same possibilities of sublimation and socialization can be demonstrated in the case of the other social pleasures which have their primary source in the stimulation of instinct. The pleasures of hunting and shooting arise originally from the satisfaction of some primeval instinct or instincts in the nature of man—some psychologists, indeed, speak of a hunting instinct. But the beauties of nature and the fascinations of wild life are also a source of pleasure to the hunter; he comes to anticipate more and more the relief and refreshment which they bring to his mind and spirit. Gradually, at least in many cases, communion with nature and enjoyment of her beauties becomes the chief end and interest of the excursion, for which the rifle and its prospective quarry furnish only the pretext and occasion. In a like manner, men are prompted to engage in athletic sports and social games by the instinct of combat and rivalry: it is the desire to win which prompts them to play and which gives zest to the combat. But in the course of time, this instinctive

interest is overshadowed by other sources of enjoyment and the game itself becomes but an excuse for a half-holiday spent in the open air amid beautiful surroundings, enlivened by the banter and jollity of familiar associates, or an evening of companionship with congenial spirits who welcome an occasion for meeting together and enjoying the easy flow of casual conversation and ready wit.

The institution of monogamous marriage furnishes the most important and instructive instance of the sublimation of instinct, not through the substitution of a new stimulus for that ordained by nature but through a reconstruction and revaluation of the natural stimulus in the light of personal experience. In ethical monogamy, the instincts of sex love and sex jealousy respond not merely to the bodily features of the exciting individual as perceived or reproduced by imagination, but also to the conception of his or her distinctive mental characteristics as revealed through personal association. And these instincts find expression not merely in exclusive possession and sexual gratification but also, and principally, in protecting solicitude, constant devotion, and intimate association. Love is the pleasure taken in such intimate personal association with another, in the appearance and conversation, temperament and behavior, purposes and preferences, of the beloved individual. But it is more than pleasure, as this is generally understood; it is an exulting appreciation of the value of another personality as an end to be cultivated and cherished for its own sake. It involves exchange of ideas, mutual helpfulness, and harmony of taste and sentiment.[2] Yet it is more than intel-

[2] If there are differences of taste as well as opinion, they must fall within and enrich some wider harmony.

lectual, æsthetic, or practical communication as these have been described, more than any one taken separately, or the sum of them all put together. In fact, it introduces us to another form of personal association. The association of individuals who are in love is not referable directly to that community of intelligence which induces men to exchange ideas with their fellows, or to that identity of practical interest which leads them to coöperate in industry, or to that harmony of taste which causes them to enjoy in unison the same natural or created beauties. Rather does each find the others' ideas endlessly interesting, and opportunities for working with him and rendering him assistance and service infinitely satisfying—because his friend or beloved is the person that he is. Of course the love may have its beginnings in, and continue to involve, intellectual congeniality, practical comradeship, or harmony of æsthetic taste. But it is primarily an association of individualities in the totality or unity of their respective natures rather than a personal contact due to any one of the fundamental interests, intellectual, practical, æsthetic, which all men as rational beings have in common.

In such personal love of men and women as the forms of monogamous marriage imply, the family has its source. Including, as it does, the children which issue from such a union, the family may be looked upon as the practical realization and social outcome of marital love. But the social purpose of the family is not limited to the fostering and fulfilling of such love. It realizes other values, notably that of coöperation, and serves further ends, economic, educational, and (in the conventional sense) social. The wider social purpose of the family

is indicated by the fact that its natural roots include, in addition to the instincts of sex love and sex jealousy, the primary instinct of parental devotion. And while the first-named instincts may impel the individual to seek only his own pleasure, exhausting themselves in forcible appropriation and selfish gratification, the parental instinct is essentially altruistic. Indeed, as Professor McDougall has pointed out, no human disposition or propensity approaches the parental instinct in its power to call forth unstinted devotion, arduous and unremitting toil, complete and reckless self-sacrifice. This instinct unites husband and wife by giving them a common object of devotion; it impels the parents to work together for the support and upbringing of their children. As the children grow up and develop individual character, their personalities are added to the family group, and the scope of its associative life is increased and diversified. Each of the children, himself a personality with distinctive traits and capacities, becomes an end of highest value; instinctive parental affection is transformed into personal love which seeks, through the requisite nurture and training to secure the maximum development and future happiness of its object. Thus the family circle is the theater of coöperation in the highest type of productive labor; in the production, that is, of new personalities for the social order. As a social and moral institution, its purpose is revealed in the fact that through its organization men and women realize the personal value of fellowship in the worthiest coöperative achievement.

Since children must be fed and clothed and provided with the material necessities of human existence if they are to grow to maturity, family coöperation begins in

the industrial and ecomomic sphere. In the earliest stages of social evolution it goes little beyond providing for the physical sustenance and early upbringing of the children. Among savages, the industrial coöperation of husband and wife is based upon fundamental sex differences. The husband and father secures the food and other requisite raw materials through hunting and fishing, and helps defend his clan against wild beasts and human marauders. The wife and mother cooks and prepares food, makes clothing and tent covering from the skins of the animals killed, and performs, in fact, all the drudgery of the lodge or encampment. Boys are instructed by their fathers in the arts of hunting, woodcraft, and warfare; girls are trained by their mothers in the industries which fall to the lot of women. When agriculture begins, the family possessions of lands, buildings, and domestic animals, become the basis of more systematic industrial coöperation. As is well known, such agricultural proprietorship has constituted one of the most enduring and effective bases of human coöperation that human society has yet seen; it has influenced the course of social evolution by demonstrating the efficacy of property as a basis of social coöperation and enlisting family sentiment in support of the rights of landed property. All the members of the family joined in working the land and utilizing its products, all shared in the wealth it produced in consequence of the combined effort. To all it stood as the tangible basis of family unity and continuity, the ground of present security and the provision for future need, linking successive generations which it fed, clothed, and assured of a comfortable existence. The family estate furnished the scene for the education

of each rising generation: the joint activities of field and stable and house were means of schooling boys and girls, who acquired skill in these branches of industry by actual participation in them from earliest years. The divison of labor, with the development of skilled handicraft and highly specialized industrial arts, produced a new type of industrial coöperation in the family. The workshop at first was located within or nearby the house and the efforts of all members of the family were concentrated, under direction of the head, upon the family trade or operations subsidiary to it. Sons were trained in their fathers' occupations; if assistants were employed from the outside, they were as apprentices temporarily adopted into the family.

When, in the course of industrial development, a divorce was effected between the workshop and the home, industry ceased to be the basis of family coöperation. Mothers and daughters no longer took direct part in the industry which supplied the family income; only such sons as showed a taste and aptitude for their father's trade would assist him in his labors. But another type of family coöperation continued, economic if not industrial, with which we are still familiar in present-day society. It was based upon a sharper differentiation of economic function between husband and wife which resulted in more thorough-going interdependence and coöperative efficiency. The husband and father pursued his occupation in the outside world and thus provided the income for family support; each of the sons took up at adolescence his own trade and, as long as he remained at home, contributed his earnings to the family income. The wife and mother found her field of activity entirely within

the home, devoting herself to the care and management of the household with all the exacting duties of the domestic routine, the cleaning and tidying of the house, the cooking of food and the serving of meals, the making and washing of clothes, the care and training of young children; and in this work her daughters were expected to take a hand as soon as they were old enough to assist. At this period of social development the parents were relieved of full responsibility for the education of their children by the common schools established under state or church support.

But now, as we are reminded by all students of present-day family life, the effect of modern industrial development and particularly the factory method of production has been to lessen the scope and value of such economic coöperation within the family. Much of the work connected with food and clothing supply can be accomplished so much more efficiently in the factory that the finished article can be purchased for little more than the cost of the raw materials to which the housewife must contribute her own labor. The use of mechanical power makes it advantageous to have much of the work of cleaning and renovating done outside the house, and electrical appliances are lightening the burden of domestic operations necessarily done at home. The result is that women no longer find in the duties and cares of the household a field in which they can profitably employ all their time and energy to the family interest and prosperity. Indeed, as has been frequently remarked, they can better serve the family interest by wise and judicious buying than by labors of production. It is suggested that the economic function of the wife is in the future to be the control of

the family expenditure: she will see that the income earned by her husband is so expended as to contribute its maximum to the family well-being. But this is a responsibility in which the husband must share; its discharge even in major part by the wife would hardly exhaust all her capacities for family service. The alternative for women in the family organization seems, therefore, to lie between finding profitable outside employment and adding her earnings to the family income, on the one hand, and serving more directly and intelligently its fundamental social purpose of personal association and development, on the other. As between these two alternatives there is scarcely room for doubt—at least, as far as family life in general is concerned—there will always be special cases. Accumulating experience proves with increasing certainty that for the wife to undertake a separate career in industry, business, or profession, is to create a division of interest in the family which prevents it from fulfilling its purpose as a coöperative enterprise. On the other hand, there is good reason to think that it augurs well for social progress to have women so far relieved from economic pressure within the family that they can devote themselves wholly, or in larger part, to its moral purpose of cultivating personal relations and developing personal character. For while economic necessity has associated the activities of family members, we must not forget that the coöperation which gives value to such organized effort is one of persons, not of physical processes; it is personality which the family as an "economic unit" exists to foster and promote.

It is true, I think, that in civilized society the family is tending, so far as economic conditions permit, to assume

this higher responsibility for promoting association on a genuinely social plane among its members and in the community. This is principally due, we must further acknowledge, to the influence of women who have been so far relieved by labor-saving inventions from the fatiguing round of domestic drudgery. For women seem to possess by a fundamental sex difference, a keener sense of personal relations, also a superior delicacy and refinement of æsthetic perception which seeks satisfaction in personal adornment and the beautifying of their immediate surroundings. We have been recently reminded of the important service which beauty in all its forms may render to the social pleasures of men. Through its influence, pleasures which originate in the craving of instinct acquire an intelligent meaning and a personal relish which makes them both more luminous and more lasting. There is no reason to doubt that the higher standard of living, increased beauty of home surroundings, a more orderly and decorous home life, greater freedom of travel and opportunity for observation are having just this effect. The family home is becoming what its social purpose demands that it should be, the scene and center of continuous and fruitful personal association on the part of its inmates. In conformity to its own ideal it is also extending its influence to the community, affording through its hospitalities a place where acquaintances may assemble in surroundings that conduce to pleasant and inspiring companionship. The rapid and radical improvement in standards of domestic architecture, house furnishing, and household equipment, is one of the striking features of our time. Much the same may be said of the facilities for family recreation and social enjoyment outside the

house: the automobile is opening wider vistas of natural beauty under conditions of comfort and exhilaration; parks and country clubs in increasing numbers are providing the necessary facilities and appropriate setting for such games as tennis and golf which unite the enjoyment of nature and natural beauty with the pleasures of congenial association.

Of the socially salutary effects of these innovations, and of the refinement of popular taste of which they are at once the effect and the cause, there cannot be the slightest question. Taking the house alone, as the center of family life—what single agency can do so much for the elevation of social life and social pleasure as a home in which beauty and orderliness and decorum add the needed touch of refinement and restraint to good cheer and hearty hospitality? Could more favorable surroundings be provided, we may be emboldened further to ask, for the principal and primary task of family life, the birth and rearing of children? Such an environment seems to be precisely the one needed, not simply for the care and nurture of very young children, but for their personal development during the later years in which their characters are formed to fit the somewhat complicated requirements of modern social life. Reasonably we might expect that married persons who have been relieved from the menace of poverty and permitted to live an easier and more orderly life would be more willing to undertake this central and most important responsibility of family life. In particular, we might expect that women whose household burdens have been so greatly lightened would assume more readily and cheerfully than heretofore their chief social responsibility of motherhood. But just

the reverse is true. Indeed, it seems even to approach the certainty of a rule that as the standard of living rises and more beautiful and appropriate surroundings make family life pleasanter and more personally satisfying, the number of children diminishes. For these higher standards of house furnishing and equipment, these new methods of household management and sanitation, these new facilities for family recreation and enjoyment, have all of them increased the expense of living, and these increased expenditures have borne especially heavily upon the incomes of the middle class. Each additional child means a marked increase in the annual family expense, particularly if advantage is taken of all the methods and discoveries of modern medical, sanitary, and educational science. Hence the head of the family regards more than one child as too great a load upon the family income. And women, tasting the pleasures of freedom from an irksome domestic slavery, the comforts of well-appointed homes, the delights of attractive dress and constant social intercourse, refuse to make the sacrifices of youthful appearance and bodily ease, of time, strength and personal self-possession, which motherhood entails.

This unwillingness on the part of men and women whose homes boast of every comfort and refinement, and whose lives afford time for reading, travel and social recreation, to rear more than one, if even one, child, is our great present-day problem of family life. If it persists, the family, as a moral and social institution, must be accounted a failure. No more complete failure can well be imagined: it will have abandoned the very purpose which called it into being at the very period when, for the first time in social history, it was equipped with all the

facilities and resources required for the realization of this purpose. For, in previous ages, while parents might by severe and continuous exertion provide for the physical comfort and care of several children, only a very few were able to surround their growing children with the home influences required to insure the free development of their personal capacities. Yet it is the personal development of children that the family exists to promote; only through the quickening of intelligence, the organization of impulse, and the refinement of feeling, are members of the rising generation prepared to participate in the associated life. It is therefore nothing short of social catastrophe, if to-day, when social prosperity and progress have equipped so many with sufficient education, material means, and leisure time, to enable them to supervise effectively the personal development of children and to give them the intellectual companionship and inspiration necessary to awaken their higher faculties, these beneficiaries of modern civilization refuse to discharge their family duties. And if the family fails, as it must in these circumstances inevitably fail, it is difficult to see how democracy can succeed. For does not democracy depend for the realization of its ideal upon the preparation of each succeeding generation to enter more fully than the last into the ideals, the purposes, and the appreciations, that give meaning and value to the associated life? The public schools can do much, but they must also fail if the human material with which they work comes, in vast preponderance, from homes where ignorance and poverty stand in the way of an intelligent personal guidance of growing children and youth.

A strange reluctance still lingers to discuss freely and

publicly this question of "race suicide" as it has been called. This is presumably because the question of how many children a husband and wife shall bring into the world is felt to involve considerations of some delicacy which concern them alone; to make it a matter of public scrutiny and criticism has been thought to be an unjustifiable invasion of the privacies and sanctities of married life. But society has too much at stake in this matter to have regard for such scruples. When an institution on which it depends for its continued progress is threatened with sterility because faithless to its purpose, the emergency does not permit of a tender regard for human sensibilities. The question of the number of children in a family does involve matters of some delicacy which are the exclusive concern of the individuals whom they directly affect. But these matters do not necessarily decide the question in its public or social aspect, for the alternative of adoption is always open in special cases. In time of war, public sentiment holds families responsible for contributing to the social cause such of their sons and daughters as may be qualified by age and ability to render military service or assistance. With how much better reason is society justified in holding each family responsible for contributing to the coming generation its quota of citizens prepared by intelligent upbringing and personal nurture for capable public service! There has been of late much public discussion and agitation relative to "birth control." Surely the energy used in combating the spread of knowledge concerning means of "birth control" is largely misspent; it would be far better employed in combating the *use* of such methods by our well-to-do classes, to the detriment of the social order

to which they owe their wealth and their opportunities.

Not inappropriately, therefore, we find ourselves in conclusion looking out upon the problems of democracy from the vantage-point of the family circle and the domestic hearth. The realization of the ideal of democracy depends, we have seen, upon the establishment through modern instrumentalities, mechanical and social, of nation-wide intercommunication among fellow citizens. But the individual gains his initial outlook upon the social world and his primary experience of personal association from the family life into which he is born. And the possibilities of his entering into direct communication with his fellow citizens at large is altogether conditioned by the degree to which he has realized the values of personal association through the direct and constant contacts with family members and family acquaintances. These are the fundamental social experiences through which alone the intricate system of signs and symbols which are later to assail his senses as an adult member of society can be translated into terms of personal meaning and reality. Without this experience, the wide and varied opportunities which modern society offers of fruitful and stimulating personal contacts through literature, politics, organized industry and art, are forever lost to him. As the institution and agency through which new personalities are developed and prepared through the impact and urgency of direct social experience for comprehensive human association, the family must therefore remain the foundation of civilized society and the cornerstone of democracy.

INDEX

Action, as constructive, 124; as coöperative, 124; as means of communication, 118*f*, 136; controlled by intelligence, 49; in human association, 80; in industry, 246; meaning of, 120; moral and social value of, 113; realizing ends, 52; realizing the social ideal, 75, 76.

Addams, Jane, quoted, 215.

Aesthetic appreciation, as fostering social concord and unity 153, 154, 284; as transmission of intelligible feeling, 143; meaning of, 146*f*; relation to voluntary effort and satisfaction, 144*f*; social significance of, 148; what objects arouse it, 147*f*.

Allport, F. H., in criticism of McDougall, 140; on consciousness in psychology, 60.

Aristocracy, 1, 283.

Art, as expression of meaningful emotion, 150; as fostering social unity, 153, 154; as medium of personal intercommunication, 150; deserving encouragement by the state, 254.

Association, based on intercommunication, 82; conditions of perfect, 171; enlivened by instinct, 192; indirect, through mechanical agencies, 86.

Baldwin, on social heredity and selection, 224; views on imitation, 121.

Beauty, as end of absolute value, 168, 170; should be fostered by democracy, 284.

Behaviorism, as a tendency of present-day psychology, 27, 28; criticized, 59; social implications of, 57.

Beliefs, not subjective fancies, but socially verified interpretations, 96.

Bergson, on intelligence and practical construction, 117.

Birth control, 302.

Brock, A. Clutton-, quoted on art, 151.

Business methods, 187, 201*f*.

Capitalism, 197, 259, 262, 272, 278.

Censorship, 289.

Children, advantages of in modern family, 299; later education of, 296; primitive training of, 295.

Christianity, social ethics of, 175, 177; social ideal of, 172.

Communication. See Intercommunication.

Community, and democracy, 5; logical implications of, 56; the perfectly organized, 171.

Community of purpose, in industry, 253; mistaken conceptions of, 256*f*; to meet social needs, 260, 263.

Constructive instinct, a factor in industrial development, 250; as a human characteristic, 115;

Constructive instinct—*Cont.*
denied expression in present system, 197.
Cooley, conception of human society, 21.
Coöperation, as form of intercommunication, 81f, 126; conditions most favorable to, 124; essential to rationally directed action, 129; in family, 293*f*; in industry, 254*f*; limitations of, 128; under factory system, 273.
Crowd psychology, abandoned as a theory of human association, 20, 21; its weakness, 20.

Danger, present social, 200, 254, 270, 278, 301.
Darwin, and the new psychology, 15; on social function of morality, 194; on the human hand, 115, 117.
Democracy, and community, 6; and equality, 4; and industry, 247; definition of, 8, 10; in modern times, 156.
Dewey, criticism of, 74; criticism of social idealism, 71; function of intelligence, 43*f*; on instinct versus custom, 42; realization of ideals, 45; social unity realized through feeling, 73.
Discourse, rational, as reorganization of universal human experience, 107; values of, 109.
Discussion, a social ideal, 101; as basis of political action, 212*f*; as end in itself, 214; as form of intercommunication, 81*f*; disparagement of 88, 90; seeks to discover truth, 101, 104.

Education, classical and modern theories of, 228; importance of, 227, 229; purpose of, 229; to promote industrial coöperation, 135, 264.
Emotion, as realizing universal social community, 73; communication of, 138, 139; in aesthetic appreciation, 143; in human association, 80; sympathetic induction of, 140*f*.
Emotional expression, as human characteristic, 82; extended by mechanical agencies, 85; mode of personal communication, 83; through facial expression, 140, 150.
Ends, absolute or universal, 12; as realized in action, 50*f*; Dewey's criticism of, 45; realization of, 45, 49*f*.
Equality, and democracy, 4, 63.
Esprit de Corps, in industry, 275.

Family, as the social purpose of marriage, 292; default of duty, 300; cornerstone of democracy, 303; economic coöperation in, 295; industrial coöperation in, 294; present opportunities of social service, 298; primitive organization of, 294.
Feeling. See Emotion.

Giddings, quoted, 105.

Handicraft, cannot be revived, 271; distinctively human capacity, 82, 115; expressive of personal intelligence, 252; extended by mechanical agencies, 85; means of intercommunication, 83.
History, educational value of, 232.
Honesty of mind, 183.

Idealism, failure to direct modern democracy, 162; its practical efficacy, 74; neglect of outward action, 113, 114; not bankrupt, 172; objections to, 9, 11.
Imaginative sympathy, and instinctive pity, 188; as form of intercommunication, 80*f*; through enjoyment of beauty, 150*f*; value and importance of, 189.
Industry, normally coöperative, 132*f*; revolutionized by machinery, 252; the sphere of action, 246; traditional dislike and disparagement of, 13, 247; value of, 248.
Instinct, and intelligence, 22, 26, 193; as incentives to institutional observances, 202; as furnishing springs of human action, 34; cause of human association, 17, 19, 84; criticised by Dewey, 41; in family life, 293; in industry, 248*f*; in social enjoyment, 281*f*; in social relations, 190; nature of, 16.
Institutions, social and moral, ethical defects, 197*f*; ethical function of, 195; importance of instinctive incentives, 203; need for reform in, 292; social function of, 193.
Intelligence, and instinct, 23*f*, 32; as expressed in action, 50*f*; as manifested in perception, 30; condition of articulate speech, 100; defined, 49; essential to human association, 14; in human association, 80; its characteristic features, 25; objectivity of, 97.
Intercommunication, as condition of collective thought and action, 219*f*; as condition of political coöperation, 211; as ethical end of state, 215; based on rational will, 80; education as training for, 229; three forms of, 82, 162; through social and moral institutions, 196; through social pleasure, 283.
Internationalism versus nationalism, 68, 230.
Invention, in industrial organization, 273, 279; procedure and social value of, 131, 171.

Kantor, J. R., behavioristic conception of social psychology, 58; statement of behaviorist viewpoint, 29.
Kind, consciousness of, 105.
Knowledge, professionalism in, 220, value of, 231.

Labor, organized, 259, 261, 268, 270, 272.
Language, function in intellectual interpretation, 99, 104; influence on perception, 94, 104.
Lippman, Walter, on need for supplementing the press, 221, 243; on public opinion. 220.
Literature, educational value of, 234.
Love, marital, 291.
Lowell, A. Lawrence, on public opinion, 223.
Loyalty, 180, 185, 275.

Machinery, deprives worker of initiative and self-expression, 252, 267, 271; social value of, 135.
Maciver, conception of human society, 21.

Marot, Helen, creative impulse in machine industry, 263.
Marriage, association of individualities, 292; instance of sublimation, 291; its social purpose, 293; monogamous, 197.
Matter versus intelligence, 55, 108.
McDougall, W., as conservative, 68; criticism of, 39; on instinctive rivalry, 282; on parental instinct, 293; on political organization, 218; on sympathetic induction of emotion, 140; psychological basis of group organization, 67, 259; relation of instinct to intelligence, 33; theory of self-regarding sentiment, 37*f*.
Modern democracy, and amusements, 2, 282; and idealism, 155; and individual rights, 357; and the industrial revolution, 160, 252; limitations of, 161; rise of, 157*f*.
Moral ideal, calls for perfect society, 171; identical with aim of democracy, 10.
Murray, Gilbert, quoted, 103.

Parker, Carleton H., 257.
Parties, political, function of, 221.
Perception, and instinct, 30*f*; aesthetic, 143; but objective interpretations, 93; not subjective images, 91.
Pound, Arthur, 268.
Practical Power, as end of absolute value, 167, 170.
Press, Public, as organ of propaganda, 237; control of, 241; evils of, 236; influence of, 235; public demands upon, 240.
Productive Labor, 180, 185.
Propaganda, beginnings of, 237; control of, 241*f*; in advertising, 239; method of, 238; power of, 239.
Psychology, as applied to political organization, 216; as influenced by evolutionary biology, 16; behaviorism in, 27; crowd, 20.
Public Opinion, conditions of, 217; difficulties of, 220*f*; importance of, 219*f*.
Punitive Justice, 198.

Reason, *see* Intelligence.
Recreation, as a purpose of human association, 280; as possessing social and moral value, 282; refined and elevated through beauty, 287*f*; source of social enjoyment, 281.
Religion, as cure for industrial ills, 266.

Science, natural, 107, 233; normative, 107.
Scientific Management, 253, 270.
Scientific Spirit, 879.
Self-Regarding Sentiment, as supporting authority, 156; extended to group or nation, 66; importance of, 63; its development, 37*f*.
Self-Sacrifice, limitations of, 177; need for, 175.
Sentiment, 36.
Sex Impulse, difficulties of suppression, 286; factor in social pleasures, 282; sublimation through aesthetic delight, 287.
Social Ideal, difficulty of realizing, 65; fixed social ideals as useless and detrimental, 71;

Social ideal—*Cont.*
in action, 75; question of, 62, 64; realized through development of group sentiment, 66; realized through emotional appreciation, 73; through impulsion of instinct, 203; through intercommunication, 171.
Social Instincts, as incentives to loyalty, 276; cause of mob-mind, craze, etc., 20; cause of social interaction, 19; described, 16.
Speech, agency for personal communication, 83; distinctively human ability, 82; extended by mechanical agencies, 85; originally a biological instrument, becomes expression of social intelligence, 102.
Standard of Living, 208.
State, as a psychological organization, 216; as depending upon discussion, 211*f*; historic foundations, 209; importance of education to, 230; McDougall's theory of, 218; nature and function, 206*f*; purposes and ideals, 209.
Stephen, Leslie, on social function of morality, 195.
Stereotypes, 220, 222.
Sublimation of Instinct, 192, 285; in monogamous marriage, 291; of other instincts, 288; of sex-instinct, 287.
Submission, of workers in industry, 263, 274.
Swenson, D. F., quoted on logical implications of community, 56.
Sympathy, in behavior of mob, 139; instinctive, 138; instinctive versus imaginative, 188.
Tead, on instincts in industry, 248, 263; reorganization of industry, 272
Team play, in industry, 126, 266.
Trotter, quoted on intercommunication, 226.
Truth, as absolute value, 167, 169; as ultimate aim of discussion, 101; evolution of, 102.

Value, biological, 165; defined, 165; economic and social, 166; universal and objective, 166*f*.
Virtues, required by democracy, 174, 182.

Wallas, Graham, on "baulked" disposition, 249; on enlightened public opinion, 219; protest against anti-intellectualism, 21.
War, the Great, 200, 205.
Watson, definition of behaviorism, 27; quoted, 95.
Weiss, A. P., quoted, 60.
Will, Rational, as determining human conduct, 163; as foundation of social organization, 15; in human association, 80; seeks a universal good, 266.
Woman, failure to embrace this opportunity, 300; function in primitive family, 294; given opportunity for personal and social coöperation, 297; restricted to domestic sphere, 295.
Woodworth, as critic of extreme behaviorism, 28.
Work, *see* Industry.
Wundt, cited, 133.

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